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Abstract
Persons with multiracial identity are now the fastest growing minority group
in both the United States and Britain. As the push to acknowledge, express and
celebrate multiracial identities intensifies, the ontological status, meaning of
multiracial identities and their relationship to monoracial identities is of increasing
importance to our understanding of race relations in both countries.
The dilemma that philosophers of race are confronted with is how to identify
those persons impacted by racisms without reifying the concept of race and/or falling
foul of presenting essentialized group categories. Models that seek to grapple with
these ethical problems are typically, if not surprisingly, undergirded by an
unencumbered liberal framework that prioritises freedom and equality. The
unencumbered conception of the self is historically, socially and morally disconnected
such that one‟s identity can be separated from one‟s values.
However, I argue that there is a racial consciousness that constitutes social
reality in the United States and Britain and impacts the lived experience. This renders
unencumbered models of moral reasoning untenable. Rejecting the unencumbered
self, I consider multiracial identity from an encumbered ontological perspective,
which posits the evaluation and articulation of identity as constitutive of the self and
social reality. This model requires us to address the moral content of racial identities
imbedded in the racial consciousness and allows us to consider racial identities, not as
proxies for moral commitments but rather as part of a multi-layered process in which
a person‟s racial identity is both a reflection of and a significant factor in shaping a
person‟s moral commitments.
In light of this, I explore a selection of models of collective responsibility. I
claim that in a society with racial consciousness, collective responsibility is best
described and understood within the framework of an encumbered conception of the
self. Ultimately, I contend that if we are to tackle racial injustice, we must revisit our
understanding of moral reasoning as rational, objective and fundamentally
unencumbered.
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Introduction
In the United States and Britain persons who could be described as multiracial
are among the fastest growing racial groups. Yet, in spite of hopes that increasing
multiracial populations are a sign of decreasing racial injustice, racisms remain
structurally entrenched in every domain of society, negatively impacting the life
outcomes of all raced persons. Today‟s racisms reflect the historic legacy of
European expansion and exploitation, colonialism, and slavery, which has shaped and
indeed stratified the political, economic, social, cultural and demographic makeup of
both societies. In both the U.S. and Britain, society is stratified hierarchically
according to race, where raced people of African heritage occupy the lowest rungs in
society, non-raced people of European heritage enjoy a privileged status and all other
racial groups and mixes thereof fall somewhere in between. This work explores the
personhood of those who could be described as multiracial in an effort to understand
the moral connectivity between this group and their monoracial counterparts as
victims of racial oppression. More specifically, “multiracial” will be used to refer to
those persons who are of mixed African and European heritage as opposed to the
many other racial mixes because of the comparative elements of this work between
the U.S. and Britain. While both countries have persons of a wide variety of racial
mixtures (including those whose multiple heritages are from various raced groups),
these multiracial identities are not paralleled in the same manner in both countries.
For example, in the U.S., discussions of racial injustice tend to focus on AfricanAmericans, Latinos, Native Americans and Asians of Chinese, Korean and Japanese
descent, while in Britain, discussions of racial justice focus on persons of African and
Caribbean descent and Asians of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese descent.
Thus, a discussion of race and racisms beyond the black/white binary would not
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permit the necessary historical and cultural crossover and thus is beyond the scope of
this work. That being said, the fundamental aim of this work is to bring racial
consciousness and the lived experience of being raced to the center of our
understanding of moral reasoning, moral motivation and collective responsibility as
they apply to the question of racial injustice.
Persons who could be described as multiracial are, for myriad reasons, often
seen as pivotal in the matter of racial power relations. Again, there is a long history
that speaks to this point of entry. For some, as we mentioned above, persons who
could be described as multiracial represent a positive shift towards racial harmony,
while for others such persons represent contamination and dilution of their biological
and cultural heritage. Others still see this dilution in political terms, as a
strengthening or weakening of group power and there are those who believe a
persons‟ race is irrelevant to our understanding of politics, power, justice and
difference. In this work, however, my concern is that intuitively it does not seem
right, given the racial stratification and inequitable power relations between racial
groups in the U.S. and Britain, to consider persons with multiracial identities morally
disconnected from those persons with black identities. If we are considering
questions of racial injustice, surely there is some expectation that persons with
multiracial identities have something to contribute. As Boxill argues, it is the victims
of racial injustice who have an obligation to resist oppression, if only because it is
unrealistic to expect the perpetrators of oppression to do so.1
According to mainstream Anglo-American conceptions of collective moral
agency run counter to the individualistic understanding of intentionality and need
substantive arguments to justify why raced persons are required to fulfill such group1

Bernard Boxill, “The Responsibility of the Oppressed to Resist Their Own Oppression,”
Journal of Social Philosophy 41 no. 1 (Spring 2010): 11.
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based special obligations. Also, given the theoretical importance of voluntarism,
further explanation is required to show in what manner we can consider persons with
multiracial identities morally connected to persons with black identities. Indeed, even
those theorizing about black solidarity or collective responsibility for monoracial
persons have found it difficult to legitimize these moral claims to group membership
and values within a liberal framework. The prevailing conception of moral agency in
Anglo-American philosophy takes the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis.
Yet, this picture has been challenged throughout philosophical history. Its modern
manifestation came in the form of communitarianism, which took issue with John
Rawls, modern Anglo-American liberalism‟s most significant political and moral
philosopher. Often drawing on their more ancient and/or continental roots,
communitarians reminded us that humans are embodied social beings, whose
communities are fundamental to their personhood. Like the feminist critique of
liberalism, they questioned the default premise that ultimately moral agency begins
and ends with the individual. Humans organize themselves into groups. Sometimes
this organization is voluntary, other times it is imposed from without, and in some
cases it is a combination of the two. Sometimes we can move freely from
membership of a group to non-membership and vice versa. Sometimes such a
transition is virtually impossible. What is at stake here is not the descriptive fact that
humans are social beings but rather that our relationships are fundamental and give
meaning to our lives such that being raced into groups makes objective,
unencumbered moral reasoning an impracticable theoretical ideal.
Groups can be the source of great joy and pride and they can also be the
source of shame and pain. How we self-identify with certain groups and how others
impose group membership upon us can impact our social standing, professional
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opportunities and personal relationships. Indeed, groups and our status within them
shape our understanding of the world and our values about human worth. The reality
of race and racisms means that raced persons are viewed as having less moral worth
that non-raced persons. Additionally, raced persons have been characterized as
intellectually and morally inferior such that they are presumed to be less able to
engage in moral reasoning. This characterization and the racisms that perpetuate this
perspective mean that it is not possible to have an objective, neutral moral framework
or vantage point from which one can make rational moral judgments. Thus, taking an
individualistic unencumbered stance to moral responsibility has raised concerns from
those who strive to put an end to racial injustice. This work seeks to add to this
discussion by exploring what the challenge of theorizing multiracial identity and
collective responsibility, in societies with racial consciousness, can tell us about moral
reasoning. Specifically, this work looks at the lived experience of raced persons in
societies with racial consciousness, collective responsibility and what I take to be the
limitations of an unencumbered conception of the self. I argue that in societies like
the U.S. and Britain, racial consciousness distorts all persons‟ conception of raced
persons in a manner that compromises our perception of their moral worth. This,
coupled with the lived experience of structurally embedded racial injustice,
fundamentally impacts our moral reasoning and moral motivation with the result that
it is meaningless to speak of an objective, rational, unencumbered moral agent.
Through an analysis and critique of Tommie Shelby‟s conception of black
solidarity, chapter one sets out how I am using the notion of an unencumbered self
and what I take to be problematic with an unencumbered conception of race – namely
that it fails to sufficiently consider the moral content of racial categories and the lived
experience of raced persons. Consequently, I present Michael Banton‟s model of race
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consciousness and show how this framework can appropriately be applied to describe
social reality in the U.S. and Britain. The application of this framework also
demonstrates why and how racial consciousness is a problem for raced persons
insofar as it is the manifestation of a white superiority ideology, which negatively
impacts their life chances.
Chapter two extends this conception of racial consciousness and explores the
moral content of multiracial identity in the U.S. and Britain to demonstrate that
multiracial identity is part of the racial consciousness. Following from that, I analyze
Ronald Sundstrom‟s ontology of mixed race and highlight in what manner his
ontology, like Shelby‟s black solidarity, is unencumbered. I argue that, insofar as
multiracial identities are part of the racial consciousness they cannot be considered
unencumbered, morally neutral identities. Again, the lived experience of raced
persons in societies with racial consciousness makes this impossible. Furthermore,
the quest to articulate a multiracial ontology distracts us from the central moral
concern which is racial injustice. While it is important for our understanding of raced
persons‟ experiences to be complicated such that the diversity of these experiences is
acknowledged and reflected in the cultural narrative, the fundamental challenge is
eradicating racial injustice, for it is racisms that lead the multiracial experience to be
marginalized and considered problematic. In this regard, both persons with
multiracial and monoracial identities have a vested interest in ending racial injustice.
Given the apparent limitations of theorizing both black solidarity and
multiracial responsibility from within the liberal paradigm, chapter three outlines an
alternative, encumbered model of self. Drawing on Charles Taylor‟s dialogical
conception of the purposeful human agent and the relationship between language and
agency imbedded in this idea, I discuss the manner in which our moral reasoning is
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constitutive of the self. In this regard, I reject all essentialist approaches to race and
claim that racial identities can be identified in virtue of their impact on moral
reasoning. Thus, I argue that the encumbered conception of self enables us to more
effectively grapple with the moral demands that the immorality of racisms ultimately
gives rise to.
One of the central arguments against an unencumbered conception of self is
that it does not take seriously moral agents‟ lived experiences with respect to moral
reasoning. As such, chapter four explores the lived experience of persons who could
be described as multiracial. In doing so, I demonstrate the social connectivity
between persons who could be described as multiracial and persons who could be
described as black. I argue that given the impacts of racial consciousness and the
lived experience, the personally and socially constitutive nature of the encumbered
self enables us to better understand the significance of the moral connectivity between
raced persons. The psychological impact of racial consciousness and the lived
experience is pertinent to our understanding of both moral reasoning and collective
responsibility. In a society with racial consciousness, where white superiority is
imbedded in the moral psyche, raced persons‟ are responsible for their articulations,
actions and behavior because they will inevitably either reinforce or challenge white
supremacy at the social moral level.
This kind of responsibility seems to be consistent with our moral intuitions
about the connection between raced persons as members of an oppressed group. And
yet, theorizing collective responsibility - indeed, making a case for who should resist
oppression more generally - has proven to be a surprisingly difficult task for some
scholars. Thus, chapter five analyses a series of articles that attempt to do so. I
conclude that it is the hegemony of the unencumbered self and the authors‟ (of the
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said articles) commitments to a notion of rational moral reasoning and unencumbered
moral motivation that detracts from the power of their arguments for the collective
responsibility to resist oppression.
This is a great loss given their genuine desire to challenge racial injustice and
oppression. Therefore, this work aims to encourage those who may want to challenge
racial injustice to break the philosophical mold and step beyond the hegemony of the
unencumbered conception of the self and consider whether an encumbered conception
can lead to greener theoretical pastures. Ultimately, I contend that a conception of
moral agency undergirded by an encumbered model of self allows us to recognize
both the significance of racial consciousness as well as the lived experience on moral
reasoning and moral motivation.

7

Chapter 1: Through Thick and Thin: An Unencumbered Self in a
Racially Conscious Society

Until the philosophy which hold one race superior
And another
Inferior
Is finally
And permanently
Discredited
And abandoned Everywhere is war...
That until that day
The dream of lasting peace,
World citizenship
Rule of international morality
Will remain in but a fleeting illusion to be pursued,
But never attained Now everywhere is war - war.
Bob Marley (War)

What are we as human beings? What does the answer to this question mean
for how we live our lives? These are age old philosophical questions, the answers to
which evolve as our knowledge of ourselves as “human” grows. Indeed in the past
500 years our understanding of human nature has evolved and shifted. When Thomas
Hobbes set out to pen his political theory in the Leviathan, he rightly begins by setting
out what he understands to be principles of human nature. Centuries later, when John
Rawls' landmark book A Theory of Justice was published in 1971, central to his
notion of justice as fairness was a certain conception of human beings. Indeed, one of
the targets of the critical backlash within the Anglo-American academe that emerged
in response to Rawls was this conception of the self, which seemed to disregard the
fact that, among other things, we are beings that are shaped by our social
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environment.1 Another line of criticism leveled at Rawls‟ Theory of Justice was its
failure to speak to how we achieve justice in non-ideal circumstances, when the social
environment, for example, is the site of injustice. However, there has been an attempt
to situate the position of particular social groups and especially those groups subject
to social injustices. In doing so, some theorists have defined who is understood as the
group too rigidly and ended up advocating a form of racial essentialism.2 Such
limiting conceptions of a racial group have led members of the group to feel excluded
or misrepresented and thus in need of a framework from which they can understand
social injustice that impacts their own group, but that does not require a conception of
group members that is stereotypical or overly simplistic. For scholars seeking to
challenge racial injustice, in light of the accusations leveled at Rawls and the
commitments to moral liberalism that characterize our understanding of social justice,
a fine balancing act must be performed. On the one hand, it is important for persons
who aim to challenge racial injustice to recognize the force of racisms as group level
phenomena. On the other hand, it is equally important not to reify essentializing racial
identities as part of the strategy for combating the non-ideal reality of racisms.
One such attempt is philosopher Tommy Shelby‟s book, We Who Are Dark.
In We Who Are Dark, Shelby aims to present a case for a black solidarity that is not
dependent on an essentialist black identity. While Shelby notes that solidarity
movements and forms of collective action have typically emerged out of the socialist
and communitarian frameworks associated with identity politics, he is one of a
growing number of philosophers who are turning back to more traditional liberal

1

See Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift. Liberals and Communitarians. (Cambridge, Mass
[u.a.]: Blackwell, 2008) for a discussion of the major Communitarian critiques.
2

See for example, Lucius Outlaw, “On W. E. B. Du Bois‟s „The Conservation of Races.‟”
SAPINA Newsletter 4.1 (1992): 13-28.
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philosophical resources to ground their liberatory agendas.3 In this chapter I will
focus on Shelby‟s work to illustrate a key problem with theorizing moral motivation
for a racial group, while remaining consistent with liberal ideals, namely that, racial
consciousness4 and the lived experience have neither been sufficiently articulated nor
taken seriously enough by liberal theorists. It is my contention that a person’s
conception of his/ her self is shaped by the community in which one lives and whose
values are part of the moral consciousness. As such, this chapter aims to present what
I take to be the key features that are present in ethical strategies undergirded by liberal
ideals and to highlight the importance of the social context in which they are being
applied. To this end, I will 1) draw out a conception of an unencumbered self, using
Shelby‟s liberal model of black solidarity; 2) connect Shelby‟s work to that of John
Rawls insofar as neither takes racial consciousness or the lived experience of raced
persons seriously enough; and 3) present a conception of racial consciousness that
frames the moral landscape that is so central to discussions of race and racisms in the
United States and Britain.

Tommie Shelby’s Rawlsian Black Solidarity
Shelby‟s formulation of black identity arises out of his reliance on the
Rawlsian liberal model of an unencumbered conception of the self. The term
„unencumbered‟, popularized by Michel Sandel, refers to the idea that the self is

3

See, for example, Ronald Robles Sundstrom. The Browning of America and the Evasion of
Social Justice (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008). (Discussed in chapter two of this work); David
McClean, “Should We Conserve the Notion of Race?” in Pragmatism and the Problem of Race, ed.
Bill E. Lawson and Donald F. Koch (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); Kwame
Anthony Appiah. The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).
4

It is important to note that racial consciousness is something all persons have (in the societies
I am describing as having racial consciousness), not only those persons who are raced.
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historically and socially disconnected such that one‟s moral identity can be separated
from one‟s political values. Or, as Sandel puts it,
The unencumbered self describes first of all the way we stand toward the
things we have, or want, or seek. It means there is always a distinction
between the values I have and the person I am. To identify any characteristics
as my aims, ambitions, or desires, and so on, is always to imply some subject
'me' standing behind them, and the shape of this 'me' must be given prior to
any of the aims or attributes I bear.5
Central to this self is the capacity to reason objectively, rationally making moral
decisions unencumbered by one‟s own identities, values, and social context. In this
sense the self in not encumbered by these extra-psychological forces. This capacity
for separation is grounded in the fundamental tenets of the liberal model: the
conception of the person as a free and equal being. With respect to the former, people
are taken to be autonomous and therefore, have the right to choose their own version
of the good. In this regard, a person has the capacity to objectively adjudicate
questions of political morality such that these determinations are not unduly
influenced by the social situations in which one finds oneself, how one chooses to live
and the personal moral standards to which they aspire. With respect to the latter, all
people have the same moral worth insofar as they have the capacity to determine their
own moral standards or conception of the good. Thus such choices are understood as
politically and morally neutral insofar as they are the product of an individual‟s free
choice.6 More importantly, the human ability to establish and maintain an impartial
political framework is confirmed seemingly regardless of the social situation in which
they find themselves.

5

Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” Political Theory
12, No. 1 (February, 1984): 86.
6

See section 3.2 in Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland, “Liberalism,” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/ (accessed July 14,
2008).
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In A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls advances the idea that we can formulate
a notion of justice that can be abstracted from our own experiences, values and
identity. The primary device Rawls employs to construct this impartial, contractual
moral perspective he termed the „veil of ignorance,‟ which precludes recognition of
key sociological factors. The veil of ignorance is part of the “original position.”
Rawls‟ original position includes a hypothetical group of delegates who are bestowed
with the responsibility for making decisions about the political justice. Rawls‟ aim is
to create a situation such that when the delegates deliberate about which political
principles will be agreed, their own personal moral biases and preferences do not
inappropriately influence their judgments and decisions. Thus the veil functions as an
epistemological tool that ensures the resulting principles are fair for those who will be
subject to their implementation.7 To fulfill this condition, all delegates are stripped of
all knowledge of their personal characteristics, preferences or interests. They are also
unaware of their own or others‟ social, biological, and historical circumstances.
Hence the veil of ignorance: the delegates are ignorant of any information that could
compromise their impartiality and ultimately the justness and fairness of their
decisions. Indeed, for Rawls, the assumption is that insofar as the circumstances of
all delegates are unbiased by their personal histories, the decisions they make about
social and political justice will also be fair. He describes the original position thus,
In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state
of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position
is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as
a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical
situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among
the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the
7

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971): 11.
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good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or
the contingency of social circumstances. Since they are all similarly situated
and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular conditions, the
principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.8
Rawls is well aware that all the particularities of social status and individual
ability present a threat to his notion of fairness. So, it is necessary that this „original
position‟ is a hypothetical perspective we can adopt, from which we can adjudicate
questions of justice. Yet, Rawls does think that there is a moral point of view. He
contrasts moral theory with social theory insofar as social theory aims to develop
principles that attend to „actual tendencies‟ while moral theory is peculiar insofar as,
“the aim is to characterize this situation so that the principles that would be chosen,
whatever they turn out to be, are acceptable from a moral point of view.”9 By
imposing certain „choice constraints‟ or „assumptions,‟ namely the conditions of the
original position, Rawls believes he has created a situation where his two principles
(equal right to basic liberties and social and economic inequalities are arranged
according to the difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity principle) are
the only logical conception of justice any rational moral being could arrive at. He
claims,
The two principles of justice, however, seem to be a reasonable proposal. In
fact, I should like to show that these principles are everyone‟s best reply, so to
speak, to the corresponding demands of the others. In this sense, the choice of
this conception of justice is the unique solution to the problem set by the
original position.10
In this regard, the original position as a political vantage point is objective and the
decisions made by his delegates is impartial.
8

Ibid., 12.

9

Ibid., 120.

10

Ibid., 119.
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Crucially, as Freeman notes, “the idea of a moral point of view is that it is
designed to represent something essential to the activity of moral reasoning.”11
However, Rawls does not expect to replicate the original position in real life, but
rather he presumes that we can imagine such a state and engage in the process of
reasoning that we would adopt if placed in those circumstances. While it is clear how
such a perspective can be achieved by a group of hypothetical delegates, it is more of
a challenge to conceive of this procedural justice occurring in practice. Is it really
possible to imagine the kind of choices one would make if one was not raced, or not
gendered, or not identified by one‟s sexual orientation, religion, physical ability or
age? Don‟t these factors and how they impact a person‟s lived experience influence
the issues that might come to mind as relevant when we are „imagining‟ how to
ensure a society is just? A person who has spent a lifetime having to navigate
crooked pavements with no ramps in their wheelchair or has had to rely on relatives
for transport because public transport had no wheelchair access, is more likely to
consider the importance of disabled friendly town planning and elevators than a
person who walks without difficulty or whose primary form of transport is their own
car. Moreover, the apparent lack of awareness of the majority of the population to
such an individual‟s lived experience might further confound the wheelchair user‟s
sense of injustice even if they were trying their best to put such experiences to one
side. As Freeman further points out,
What primarily distinguishes Rawls's impartial perspective from its
antecedents (in Hume, Smith, Kant, etc.) is that, rather than representing the
judgment of one person, it is conceived socially, as a general agreement by
(representatives of all adult) members of an ongoing society. The point of
view of justice is then represented as a general social “contract” or
agreement.12
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Insofar as Rawls‟ moral point of view is understood as „everyone‟s best reply‟, we
must consider the impact the social environment has on this collective point of view.
Can we so readily accept this assumption of universal impartiality Rawls requires,
particularly given that Rawls himself concedes it is not a state of affairs that will be
achieved in real terms? Isn‟t the person imagining themselves in the original position
still an embodied, socially situated moral being?
This idea of a moral point of view that could be detached from fundamental
human interaction in the manner Rawls‟ original position seems to suggest was
widely criticized in the 1980‟s by a group of theorists who came to be known
collectively as communitarians. Led by philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre,
Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer, communitarians took issue with
the universalism and individualism at the heart of Rawls‟ political ideal and his failure
to recognize the importance of community. Among them, Michael Sandel launched
the most comprehensive attack on the Rawlsian conception of self, arguing that
Rawls‟ deontological project,
Fails to account for certain indispensable aspects of our moral experience…
[because] we cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great
cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the
particular persons we are – as members of this family or community or nation
or people, as bearers of history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as
citizens of this republic. Allegiances such as these are more than values I
happen to have or aims I „espouse at any given time‟. They go beyond the
obligations I voluntarily incur and the „natural duties‟ I owe to human beings
as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even
permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those
more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together
partly define the person I am.13
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As Sandel suggests, it is the lived experience that makes Rawlsian detachment so
difficult. Surely, those persons or groups to whom one understands oneself to „owe
more‟ and have „enduring commitments‟ such that they define who one is, evolve out
of one‟s life experiences.
The second element of Sandel‟s critique alludes to the significance of a
person‟s values. In addition to the lived experience, a moral point of view is impacted
by a persons‟ version of the good; their values (beyond natural duties) and identities.
Yet, the aim of Rawls‟ original position was devised precisely to overcome the
apparent moral concerns that arise if individual versions of the good are the basis for
political justice. Rawls, however, appreciated that the very nature of a liberal
democracy means the people will hold myriad worldviews and reflect diversity across
any number of aspects of human life. This raises questions around the legitimacy of
political power and social stability. On one hand, given that people hold different
worldviews, how can it be legitimate to impose one law over all the people? On the
other hand why would a person live according to laws based on values and beliefs that
are contrary to their own? Rawls sought to address these concerns in his follow up
work Political Liberalism. Rawls‟ vision relies on a modification of the more
traditional assumption of human „rationality‟ and his own conception of
„reasonableness‟ as presented in Political Liberalism. Rawls now presumes that a
reasonable citizen wants to live in a society in which he/ she can cooperate with
his/her fellow citizens who have differing conceptions of the good. Insofar as each
person will have their own version of the good or „comprehensive doctrine‟, none will
deem it acceptable to force their own version of the good on to someone else or
themselves be coerced into living according to laws dictated by another.14 Given the
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inevitable differences in versions of the good, according to Rawls, the only legitimate
form of governance in a democratic society is „reasonable pluralism.‟ However, for
this pluralism to be legitimate, it can only manifest in public political culture, for this
is the only arena where it is possible to separate one‟s comprehensive doctrine from
those principles designed to administer the common good. Rawls explains it thus,
Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be,
held in common; and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in
the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political
conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment.15
We can now explain more clearly how Tommie Shelby draws from Rawls
position in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The idea of an
unencumbered individual, captured in the original position underpins Shelby‟s belief
that, “We should separate the need for an emancipatory black solidarity from the
demand for a common black identity.”16 The problematic assumption is that the
autonomous individual can step outside of his/her social, historical, and cultural
context and make objective, political decisions about what is just regardless of their
worldview. Shelby advances a position based on the idea that, independently of their
social histories, persons want to end racism. Yet, Shelby, like Rawls‟ is compelled by
the communitarian critique to recognize the influence of even an autonomous
individual‟s worldview. Hence the next move Shelby makes, which is to draw on
Rawls‟ ideas about comprehensive doctrines and the reasonableness people have that
allows them to set their comprehensive doctrines aside and aspire to a common
political good. The political common good for Shelby is to defeat racism. Thus,
Shelby‟s aim in We Who Are Dark is to contribute to the wider project of finding and
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articulating „black freedom struggles for the post-civil rights era‟ by “providing a
reconstruction and defense of the underlying principles of black solidarity,” a
solidarity “that is not only, or even primarily, concerned with questions of identity,
but that urges a joint commitment to defeating racism, to eliminating unjust racial
inequalities, and to improving the material prospects of those racialized as “black,”
especially the most disadvantaged.”17 There is, however, a problem with Shelby‟s
black solidarity given its indebted to the Rawlsian model in Political Liberalism. The
idea that those raced as black in Shelby‟s thick sense, have to cultivate black identity,
is false. As I shall argue in this work, the lived experience of being raced and racial
consciousness means there is already a sense of black connectivity, the depth and
impact of which Shelby does not take seriously enough. It is not simply a
„mystifying form of social consciousness‟ but force that deeply impacts the way
people understand and are in the world.
However, Shelby is committed to an unencumbered self. It is important for
him that the principles of liberal democracy are preserved.18 As such he opts for
Rawls‟ modified version of political justice presented in Political Liberalism.
Aspiring to this Rawlsian system of cooperation as a means to garner the collective
effort required to challenge anti-black racisms, Tommie Shelby‟s We Who Are Dark
(2005) envisages a black nationalism that is akin to Rawls‟s political liberalism.19 To
achieve this Rawlsian vision, Shelby makes a distinction between two kinds of black
identity: thick and thin. In the Rawlsian sense, the identity and moral commitments
contained in any given conception of thick blackness, for Shelby, can be understood
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as a persons‟ comprehensive doctrine; those deeply held ideas about the truth that it is
improper to impose on anyone else. The challenge here for Shelby is that many
blacks think some conception of thick blackness is necessary for black liberation. He
states,
A common history of oppression and vulnerability to racism has engendered a
need for political solidarity and group self-reliance, if only as a matter of selfdefense in a non-ideal world. Among blacks, this dual foundation for black
unity – positive collective identity and shared oppression – is often taken for
granted, treated as a matter of common sense.20
Shelby‟s position, however, is consistent with Rawls. He does not believe that
a positive thick black identity is necessary for those raced as black to achieve their
common political objective; defeating racism. Rather, it is a comprehensive doctrine
that the reasonable individual can step outside of (particularly in cases where other
versions of thick black identity are incompatible with one‟s own values and beliefs) in
order to support a politically strategic black solidarity. According to Shelby,
blackness interpreted as the thin black identity is, “a vague and socially imposed
category of “racial” difference that serves to distinguish groups on the basis of their
members having certain visible, inherited physical characteristics and a particular
biological ancestry.”21 Thick black identities, on the other hand, typically include the
thin conception but require something more or other than just the phenotypical traits
and/ or biological lineage associated with thin blackness. These additional elements
are understood as constitutive of a person‟s social identity but are not permanent
components of that individual‟s moral framework.22 Moreover, they can, and perhaps
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in some cases must, be put aside to work towards the shared political goal Shelby
envisions.
To illustrate this point, Shelby explores five „modes of blackness‟ - racialist,
ethnic, as nationality, cultural, and kinship23 which are currently articulated by
collective identity theorists who share with Delany the same desire for solidarity and
an end to racial oppression. These versions of blackness, like Delany‟s „original,‟ are
categorized by Shelby as „thick‟ identities. As I noted above, for Shelby, thick black
identities include the thin conception but have „something more or something other‟ additional social and cultural elements that are fundamental to the notion of
blackness. Shelby explains it thus, “Here the social category “black” has a narrower
social meaning, with specific and sometimes quite austere criteria for who qualifies as
black. Unlike thin blackness, thick blackness can be adopted, altered, or lost through
individual action.”24
On the racialist account, certain genes, which are passed on through biological
reproduction, are responsible for the phenotypical traits associated with thin
blackness, as well as additional „socially significant‟ traits such as temperament,
aesthetic sensibility, and certain innate talents. Membership in the black race on this
version of identity is contingent upon possessing the requisite genotype. The ethnic
view, while maintaining the significance of shared ancestry, does not necessarily hold
that this common ancestry explains any particular set of psychological or behavioral
similarities. Rather the emphasis is on shared cultural heritage. Black identity is
determined by lineage and the degree to which a person embraces the cultural
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indicators. Blackness as nationality can refer to citizenship in a predominantly black
nation and/or an understanding of oneself and one‟s culture as coming from a
particular geographical location, which is seen as an ancestral „homeland.‟ On the
cultural conception of blackness, identity is derived from the adoption of a certain set
of beliefs, values, conventions, traditions and practices that are considered to be
distinctively black. According to Shelby, “Anyone could, in principle, embrace and
cultivate a black cultural identity, in much the same way that anyone could, again in
principle, become a practicing Christian.”25 The kinship model, as one might expect,
conceives of black identity on the model of the family. However, given the notion of
family is not meant literally, the connections for which the family metaphor is
deployed, such as shared ancestry, culture or convention, according to Shelby, are
sufficiently explained by one or more of the other versions of blackness.
Unlike thick black identity, the notion of thin blackness contains assumptions
about identity that any person who could be described as black in the United States
can readily agree upon. For Shelby the thin, procedural definition is the allencompassing category which is used to identify the broadest grouping of those to be
racially assigned as black. Because the thin definition is not exclusionary in its
criteria it is, therefore, the one that captures all of those raced persons to which a
discussion of blackness is pertinent. In this regard, thin blackness is a procedural
definition that is a function of the public political culture. For Shelby, the thin
conception of blackness in the United States is rooted in the “social heritage of chattel
slavery and Jim Crow domination” and designed to pick out those individuals who are
descendants of sub-Saharan Africa and who have a certain set of phenotypical
characteristics. The shared lineage and phenotypical characteristics is perhaps the
25
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most obvious indicator that an individual might share Shelby‟s proposed common
political goal of defeating racism. As Shelby rightly notes, these criteria are applied
very loosely and one need not bear all the traits to be classified as black according to
this model. Indeed, in the American context, thin blackness primarily serves as the
tool for profiling those who will be the target of anti-black racism.
Here we can see Shelby‟s direct application of Rawls‟ conception of
comprehensive doctrine, reasonableness and overlapping consensus. For Shelby, the
delegates, the set of all persons included in the thin conception of blackness are
required to make decisions about political social justice. Racial hierarchy and racisms
are acknowledged to make society unfair but this injustice is one experienced by all
those persons included in the thin conception of blackness. In this regard all delegates
are equal in that they share the same political challenge - to come up with principles
and strategies to address their shared disadvantage. Recall for Rawls that in order for
fair and just principles to be derived from this collective bargaining arrangement,
delegates must be unaware of any personal, social, historical or other factors
fundamental to the person that could affect their objective moral reasoning. But
Shelby, if he is to broach the question of racial justice that is of paramount importance
to those persons who have a thin black identity, must account for at least one of the
prime contenders for categories or characteristics that must be behind the veil. Shelby
gets around this problem by invoking Rawls‟ notion of reasonableness. The
reasonable individual can put aside their thick identities or comprehensive doctrines
in order to make decisions about what would be best for the common good politically.
The crucial distinction between thin and thick blackness; thin blackness on this
reading, is procedural, pragmatic and administrative rather than constitutive, as is the
case for thick blackness. At the heart of this notion of a procedural and pragmatic
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conception of a racial identity is the liberal idea that one can separate one‟s political
values from one‟s overarching moral values, moral identity, or as Rawls would have
it, „comprehensive doctrine.‟ For Shelby, there are social conditions that make
defeating racial justice a pragmatic and prudent choice for the person with thin black
identity. In this sense, persons with a thin black identity can arrive at an overlapping
consensus about the most beneficial political goal and strategy given their less than
ideal social circumstances. In Shelby‟s overlapping consensus, like Rawls‟, people
can support the same basic laws or principles but for very different reasons. So
persons‟ thick black identities (or having no racial identity at all), class, upbringing,
religious convictions, etc. might spawn different motives for supporting the idea of
black solidarity, but it is that shared agreement that anti-black racism needs to be
brought to an end is sufficiently stable to maintain solidarity among this diverse
group. However, engaging in black solidarity is an unencumbered choice not
grounded in the inescapable reality of the raced lived experience; as such, it is a
choice which could equally be made in the opposite direction. In this regard, there is
no recognition on Shelby‟s part, of the impact of racial consciousness and the lived
experience on raced persons‟ moral reasoning. Nevertheless, Shelby believes,
irrespective of these their thicker identities, these thinly identified people can
reasonably arrive at an overlapping consensus about their shared political aim of
eradicating racisms. Consequently, given that none of the usual criteria for blackness
articulated in the descriptions of thick black identities need apply to a person with thin
black identity, on Shelby‟s view, persons with thin black identity can measure their
commitment to black solidarity according to the extent to which they engage in
challenging anti-black racism. “Those with whom blacks should seek solidarity, then,
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are not necessarily those who most exhibit a thick black identity, but those who stand
firm in resistance to black oppression.”26
This conception of unencumbered choice arises out of the characterization of
the autonomous self.27 The autonomous self is not bound by social histories, group
affiliations, commitments to certain identities or experience of a particular culture.
Indeed, Shelby is very explicit in his aims; he seeks to develop and defend an
unashamedly liberal version of Black Nationalism that doesn‟t fall foul to the wellknown criticisms so often leveled at those engaging in identity politics. As Shelby
recognizes, it is in part the social ontology of nationalism that has led others to judge
it incompatible with liberal political philosophy. And it is precisely this position that
Shelby intends to reject. He argues,
There is a strand of black nationalism that is compatible with the core values
of liberalism – values such as equal citizenship for all persons; respect for
individual autonomy; democratic constitutional government under the rule of
law; the basic right to freedom of conscience, expression, and association;
tolerance for different conceptions of the good; equal opportunity in education
and employment; and a guaranteed minimum standard of living. This form of
black nationalism has a role to play in helping to realize these liberal ideals.28
Shelby‟s aim in exploiting this liberal framework is to avoid narrow
conceptions of group identities that require all blacks to have a „sameness‟ that is
clearly inconsistent with the multiplicity of black experiences and values present in
the African American community. He is particularly concerned with ensuring his
framework appeals to middle class African Americans, who are most likely to feel
alienated from the ghettoized, disadvantaged sameness that often represents the black
identity around which unity and solidarity must be forged.29 The economic and
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sociological manifestations of racisms that impact middle class African Americans are
clearly not the same as those experienced by working class and ghettoized portions of
the African American population. Focusing on the plight of the latter two often
means the concerns and perspectives of middle class blacks are omitted.
My objection to Shelby‟s position is not that black identities need to be
narrow, static and unresponsive to the social circumstances; indeed they are not and
must not be. Rather my concern is that Shelby has glossed over the extent to which
race is an organizing social category in the U.S. which both fundamentally impacts
our understanding of the world and the lived experience. White superiority that
manifests in racial consciousness is not simply a mutable social characteristic of U.S.
society; it deeply impacts our understanding of connectivity among raced persons,
moral motivation and collective responsibility. In his understandable desire to
challenge essentializing conceptions of black identity, 30 Shelby thinks he needs an
additional theoretical mechanism that can engender black solidarity, which will
underpin a collective response to anti-black racisms. I call it „additional‟ because
there is already a racial consciousness that creates this connectivity; it‟s the reason
Shelby‟s own pride was stirred as he listened to his colleagues at Florida A & M
University sing “Lift Every Voice and Sing.”31 The lived experience of being raced
engenders an understanding of connectivity such that raced persons do feel moved
when they hear of or share in positive affirmations of other raced persons‟
achievements and successes. These experiences cannot be separated from one‟s
political proclivities as Shelby presumes they are.
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Shelby‟s reliance of unencumbered autonomous choice doesn‟t seem to fit
what we observe in the world. Don‟t the lived experiences of the persons included
under the banner of thin blackness impact their reasoning about black solidarity and
indeed their own moral agency? Being raced and living in a society that is stratified
according to race is not the same as subscribing to a comprehensive doctrine that is
understood as separate from the political framework. This distinction between thin
blackness as a procedural category and thick blackness as a comprehensive doctrine
ignores the extent to which race is built into the political, social and moral structures
that make up American society. As a result of this entrenchment, one‟s race
fundamentally impacts one‟s lived experiences across all these dimensions. I contend
a raced person does not have the option to step outside of this racial category that
organizes the society in which they live and think politics on the side. If Shelby took
seriously the impact of racial consciousness and the lived experience, the division
between thin and thick blackness would be, as I believe it is, theoretically redundant.
While I completely agree with Shelby insofar as it is not possible to give a
definitive definition or characterization of blackness that all those who would be
classified as having thin black identity on his model would subscribe to, it certainly
doesn‟t follow that we can dismiss „thick‟ black identities as if they are optional or
additional to one‟s sense of self. For many, being black is an identity which they
embrace, take pride in and is fundamental to their understanding of themselves. The
importance of these positive and self-claimed versions of blackness must not be
trivialized; they are in part the result of black peoples‟ struggle to challenge, or at a
minimum, develop protective coping mechanisms for, the negative effects of racisms.
Even if we grant Shelby his claim that shared oppression can be a motivating
factor to challenge racisms (indeed, this seems to be a fair claim), he nevertheless has
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failed to fully appreciate that the negative procedural blackness that undergirds
racisms cannot be thin. So, the point is not that we need search for a conception of
thick black identity that all those who are victims of anti-black oppression can
mobilize around, but rather that we fully acknowledge the significance of the racial
consciousness that has already created a conception of raced groups that now impact
upon not only those persons who are raced but the entire social, political and cultural
structure that all people in societies with racial consciousness live in. The sense of
shared oppression Shelby hopes to engender with his thin black identity already
exists. His mistake is to fail to appreciate how deeply that sense of connectivity is a
part of the lived experience and raced persons‟ sense of self. Otherwise raced
persons would not experience themselves as being collectively oppressed. Such a
person would just feel that life wasn‟t going the way they hoped. For example, they
would think that the fact that a number of non-raced persons have been promoted
about them despite being the one that trained the non-raced persons was just an
unfortunate coincidence. Such a person would not feel offended when taxi cab
drivers did not stop or they received horrendous service in a restaurant, despite the
fact that other patrons were not subjected to the same treatment. Equally, as we saw
above, racial consciousness is the thing that allows raced persons to find joy and pride
in their shared sense of group identification, such that when one achieves some
measure of success, the rest of the group also experience and share the sense of
achievement. These lived realities might be frustrating and depressing or empowering
and joyous but would not speak to the empirical fact that the life chances of raced
persons are significantly disadvantaged relative to their non-raced counterparts or
meaningfully uplifted when one from within the group is able to fulfill their potential
in spite of racial injustice. Because these are lived realities, not conceptual
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possibilities or subjective interpretations, raced persons and indeed non-raced persons
are unavoidably inculcated with a racial consciousness. To further substantiate my
reasons for rejecting Shelby‟s unencumbered ideal of moral agency and collective
responsibility, in the next section, I set out a model of racial consciousness that shows
in what manner I take it to be embedded in the social and political structure of both
the United States and Britain.

Racial Consciousness
Racial consciousness refers to the awareness all persons have, in societies
where race is an organizing principle, of differentiation according to a conception of
racial groups. Whether an individual subscribes to a biological or social
constructionist account of the races is not the key issue. The point is that people do
ascribe or perceive others to have a racial identity (even if those identities are
conceived of as a mixture of the primary racial identities). Following from this
recognition of racial group, racial consciousness also includes the understanding that
persons belonging to particular racial groups are treated differently and those
differences are organized in a racial hierarchy where the non-raced are understood as
superior and the raced are understood as inferior. Racial hierarchies generally
speaking are hierarchies based on phenotypical characteristics and lineage, (as
discussed above) such that the closer one is either in physical appearance and/or
lineage to Africa, the more inferior one is. I say generally because these two criteria
are applied very inconsistently if we consider each individual case. However, for the
purposes of understanding racial consciousness these idiosyncrasies are not crucial.
More important to racial consciousness is the awareness that those who are raced are
treated worse than those who are not.
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That all persons in the U.S. and Britain have a racial consciousness is not to
say all persons experience or interpret this consciousness in the same way. Non-raced
persons will typically have a different experience and understanding of what it means
to be raced than raced persons. Despite growing discussions in academia about white
consciousness, white consciousness as a sense of self-defining identity, more
commonly associated with extremist white supremacists, is not the same as
recognizing other people as raced while experiencing one‟s own sense of self simply
as an individual.32 For raced persons, racial consciousness manifests in the awareness
of oneself as being identified as a member of a raced group. One might also selfidentify with a particular racial identity, but raced persons are aware that regardless of
their own personal preferences, their phenotypical appearance and lineage gives rise
to certain assumptions about their identity, worth, and status in society. Again, racial
consciousness must be distinguished from race consciousness, the precondition for
political action, akin to the Marxist notion of class consciousness. Racial
consciousness only requires that raced persons are aware of society‟s racial hierarchy
and the implications of this hierarchy on their social status. The awareness of one‟s
membership in a given racial group is not necessarily presumed to lead to a particular
course of political action. However, as I shall argue, racial consciousness does impact
all persons‟ moral reasoning and our understanding of moral agency more generally.
To say the U.S. and Britain are countries that have racial consciousness is not
to suggest that the content and manifestations of that racial consciousness are the
same in both countries. The racial consciousness that emerges in any given location
is a result of a unique combination of historical forces that may well share common
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elements or themes with other locations. Nevertheless, it must be analyzed and
understood in its particular context. Furthermore, as we have briefly discussed above,
racial consciousness varies between people at the individual level. However, there are
common elements that manifest in individual experiences such that we can discuss
racial consciousness as a social phenomenon. As Bill Lawson observes, “If those
who are assigned to a particular category are treated similarly they are likely to share
this experience…This is why blacks or browns around the world can talk about the
similarities of their oppression.”33 We can also speak of a common process in the
development and maintenance of racial consciousness, as Michael Banton explicates
in his book Racial Consciousness. According to Banton, there are five steps that any
government wishing to construct a „caste-like society‟ in which racial inequality
prevailed could undertake.34 I shall use this five-part framework to illustrate the
development and maintenance of racial consciousness in the U.S. and Britain.
1. Racial classification: The first step would be to establish a comprehensive
system of racial classification. If only some people are going to enjoy special
privileges, it is crucial to be able to identify who is entitled to what. Exactly how
such a system of categorization develops will differ depending on any number of
factors, including geography, existing social make-up, economic aims, physical
appearance, cultural and language differences etc. As Banton rightly notes, “Societies
in which privilege is based upon race need no such system to classify people of
wholly European descent as white and wholly African descent as black. They do
need a system, however, for determining the status of people of mixed descent and
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people from regions in other parts of the world that do not fit into a strict EuropeanAfrican binary.”35
For example, in the early stages of British colonial exploration English
travellers used a variety of labels the English used to describe the different peoples
they encountered. These labels did not take the form of race categories we are so
familiar with today. Instead they ranged from references to the country the people
inhabited (Indians) to sweeping moral judgments about their lifestyles (primitives).36
However, as exploration evolved into colonial expansion, reflecting more clearly the
interests of pirates, traders and planters, this shift later spawned the need to rationalize
attempts to dominate the groups with whom they were interacting. The development
of new colonies, the introduction of indentured and slave labor and the inevitable
mixing between various groups presented the colonizers with the challenge of
maintaining their preferred social order and the need for more sophisticated
classificatory tools.
The English were not the first to face this challenge. Indeed, they learnt much
from fellow Europeans that preceded them as colonizers of the New World. While
economic gain was clearly at the heart of the expansionist project, the assumed
superiority of whiteness extended, for example, under the guise of Christianity‟s
mission to „civilize‟ the natives, was central to its continuation. Thus what was
crucial in this context was the justification of privilege. The Europeans interpreted
unfamiliar religious and social practices of the people they encountered in foreign
lands as deficiencies rather than alternative ways of living. As such, the essence of
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cultural and later racial classifications was the idea that people of color were primitive
and uncivilized from a moral, political and social point of view.
Such interpretations formed the underlying basis for the concept of race which
emerged out of quasi-scientific biological notions of human kinds. 37 These notions
justified and later buttressed practices of social and political discrimination that
characterized Britain‟s slavery-based colonies, including those in the United States.
As the people assigned to these different groups mixed proponents of a hierarchical
racial order devised a seemingly endless list of racial categories to account for every
possible admixture of the initial four or five racial categories. These categories were
not merely superficial descriptions. The philosophical ideas upon which these labels
were based relied in themselves on the notion of a taxonomical hierarchy indelibly
linked with particular intellectual, social and moral capacities or attributes, which the
English (along with other Europeans) took to be invariably inferior to their own.38
Thus the race label becomes more than simply a way to describe the visually
observable physical differences in skin color and other phenotypical characteristics
among humans, but also a description and condemnation of unobservable intellectual
and moral properties.
In the United States and Britain, different historical and geopolitical forces
contributed to the emergence of these more complex systems of racial classification.
In what came to be the United States, a greater proportion of the population were
considered to belong to racial groups than was the case in Britain. Moreover, the
conditions of a slavery-based social structure was such that mixing between persons

37

Robert Bernasconi and Tommy Lee Lott. The Idea of Race, (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co,

2000): xii.
38

See Ibid. for examples of such theories.

32

assigned to these different raced and non-raced groups was more prevalent. As
Banton‟s model would predict, the stringency with which racial classification has
been imposed from the top down has been more pronounced in the United States than
Britain. This is because of the more pressing need to determine the status of persons
born out of intermingling across groups and those falling outside the black/white
binary in order to defend the privileges of the dominant white group. Reinforcing the
racial categories instituted as a feature of colonial slave-based plantation society, the
first U.S. census data, collected in 1790, included the all-important racial categories
(distinctions between blacks and „mulattos‟ were first made on the census in 1850).39
By contrast, the distance between England (and later of Britain)40 and the
colonies that comprised its empire meant that non-raced English people‟s interaction
with people from other cultures was by and large conducted away from their own
land. So, while racial categories were a feature of colonial societies they were of less
importance on the English mainland. However, there have been people of African
descent in England since classical times41 and racial categories had been used by the
crown as early as 1596, when Queen Elizabeth I wrote an open letter to the Mayor of
London requesting the removal of all „blackamoors‟, announcing there were already
too many in the realm. In 1601 she reiterated her request proclaiming,
The Queen's majesty, tendering the good and welfare of her own natural
subjects, greatly distressed in these hard times of dearth, is highly discontented
to understand the great number of Negroes and blackamoors which (as she is
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informed) are carried into this realm since the troubles between her highness
and the King of Spain; who are fostered and powered here, to the great
annoyance of her own liege people that which co[vet?] the relief which these
people consume, as also for that the most of them are infidels having no
understanding of Christ or his Gospel: hath given a special commandment that
the said kind of people shall be with all speed avoided and discharged out of
this her majesty's realms.42
However, it wasn‟t until 1991 that „ethnic‟ classifications were first used on British
census, comprising a range of racial, national and ethnic categories.43
Interestingly, despite the modern revelation that there are no such thing as
races in the biological or natural sense in which they were originally understood, these
categories have remained on the census in both countries since their inception and
continue to be integral to the maintenance of social and political order at the national
and international levels.44 Moreover, the association of intellectual and moral
characteristics with racial categories have proved amazingly enduring despite the
multiple changes in the actual terms themselves, shifts in attitudes to racisms, and the
existence of contemporary justifications for maintaining a system of racial
classification in the name of „equality‟ or „ethnic monitoring‟ for supposedly positive
reasons.45
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2. Segregation: The second step necessary for ensuring racial classification
as a basis for determining group difference would be to ensure people are separated in
as many domains as possible such that the meanings attached to race labels remained
unchallenged and the myths and stereotypes perpetuated without recourse. For
Britain, during slavery and the colonial period, the distance between metropole and
colony achieved this end. Indeed, it is not possible to understand race relations in
contemporary Britain without reference to its imperial history and the former British
Empire. In the early days of exploration, raced groups were inhabitants of far away
lands who the vast majority, of those able to access literature of any kind in England,
learned about through travel writing, a literary genre that became popular in the 17th
and 18th century. During the 18th century onwards, biology and the emerging
sciences of taxonomy, anthropology, physiognomy, craniology further legitimized the
narrative of racial difference and „explained‟ the weird and wonderful observations
set forth in travel logs. The intellectual establishment engaged in an ongoing
discussion of race and raced people that reified the concept with such force it
continues to shape popular perceptions of humans to this day.46 Derogatory
depictions of raced people also found their way into novels, popular fiction, and later
films and other media, again contributing to the mythology of non-European
peoples.47 Living in the proudly cosmopolitan cities of Britain and the United States
it is easy to forget that up until relatively recently the average British individual relied
almost exclusively on secondary sources to formulate their view of raced people.
Even as Britain‟s colonial exploits brought them into contact with people from across
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the globe, which in turn influenced the migratory patterns of those seeking trade,
work and refuge in Britain, immigration laws ensured the contact British people had
with their colonized cousins was kept to a minimum prior to the twentieth century.48
According to the most recent census data, all ethnic minorities in Britain
combined still only make up less than eight percent of the total population, the vast
majority of which are located in urban areas.49 The influx of large groups of
immigrants to Britain at various times in the twentieth century radically impacted the
degree of interaction between British people and the people‟s from far-away places
they had previously only read about. Nevertheless, even now, outside Britain‟s large
metropolitan cities there are very few ethnic minorities. Consequently, the
mythological tales, media representation and generationally transmitted stereotypes
have not been challenged at the personal level as they might have otherwise been.
And in regions where different groups have found themselves living together,
economic pressures often bring to the surface the old myths of white superiority,
despite the legal and political gains that have been made in recent history.50
Segregation in the United States has taken a somewhat different course. Since
European settlement, segregation has been a feature of American society. The
annihilation and subsequent confinement of Native Americans and the institution of
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slavery set the tone for how the United States would develop. Segregation remained
woven into the fabric of American life after slavery was abolished in 1865, and the
landmark case Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896) definitively made segregation
constitutional and legally binding. The U.S. case also highlights another function of
segregation: it facilitates the enforcement of differential treatment. From a purely
practical point of view, it is easier to ensure some people are afforded privileges and
others not, when the latter are kept separate from the former and vice versa. In the
U.S. the different groups of raced people make up a significantly larger percentage of
the total population than in Britain. It is not surprising then that efforts to segregate
have been far more wide-spread and more stringently enforced in the U.S. where there
was a far greater need to separate those who were to gain from those who were not.
But segregation is not only about economics. As is true for the British case, racial
prejudice is as much about very primal, personal and moral beliefs and responses as
much as it is about wealth. The ways in which Jim Crow laws were enforced speaks
to this; hence the restrictions imposed, among other things, on schools, leisure
facilities and interracial marriage.
Twenty-first century United States remains a profoundly segregated country.
Despite de jure segregation being abolished, the racial groups have been kept apart by
equally pervasive de facto policies and practices.51 For example, there has been an
ever-present effort to ensure the different racial groups are residentially segregated.
From reservations to church congregations, this segregation is so stark that some have
quite justly described the effect of this separation as “American Apartheid.”52 Despite

51

Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2010): 84.
52

Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993).

37

the often jubilant observation that interracial unions and their multiracial progeny are
increasing, the various racial groups have amazingly limited social and/ or personal
interaction with each other and, particularly outside of the major metropolitan cities,
are largely left to formulate their views of the other through the lens of the racially
conscious media and other third parties.
3. Sanctions: According to Banton, the third step to ensure a racial order is
maintained would be to punish members of either the subordinate or superordinate
group who threatened to disrupt the system being imposed. In both the U.S. and
Britain, the history of subordinate groups tells the story of the catalogue of sanctions
they have had to and are still trying to endure and overcome in order to achieve social
justice. In contemporary society where such sanctions are theoretically illegal as a
result of anti-discrimination laws, these punishments are in some ways, more subtle
and less unashamedly violent.53 Now infamous examples include the frequency with
which black men in particular, get stopped in their cars by the police; the notorious
difficulty of hailing a cab; white women who grab their purses when a raced person
passes by or cross the street to completely avoid the possibility; having to wait
significantly longer than their white counterparts to get served in restaurants...the list
goes on and on.
Such social and personal sanctions are not only met out by the superordinate
group. Attitudes about expected and accepted behaviors are also forged within what
become racial groups. Questions about a raced person‟s authenticity and loyalty to
the group are raised in regard to any number of behaviors. If a person‟s speech,
mannerisms, level of education, social and/or personal friendships and affiliations,
etc. are not deemed appropriate according to the group‟s norms a person can be
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shunned, ignored, abused or even ostracized from the family or community. Again,
the stories are endless and all too familiar.
Nevertheless, the imposition of institutionalized sanctions is well documented
in both countries across all the major social and political structures including the
penal system, political systems, employment, education, health and housing.54 In
addition to the obvious effect of reducing the life chances of raced people, these
effects also function as powerful reinforcers of the negative intellectual and moral
stereotypes wrapped up in race labels. Instead of being viewed as the recipients of
unjust sanctions, the impoverished life outcomes experienced by many raced persons
are perceived as a function of the inherent deficiencies they are assumed to poses in
virtue of their race. So, high levels of incarceration are construed as confirmation of
raced persons‟ moral degeneracy; underrepresentation in politics reaffirms the notion
that it is not acceptable for raced persons to have power over non-raced persons‟ and
perpetuates the idea that raced persons lack the ability and cannot be trusted with
important responsibilities; under employment is regarded as an expression of any
number of racially coded flaws, from laziness to professional incompetence; low
educational attainment supports the myth of intellectual inferiority; poor health is
perceived the consequence of bad lifestyles, and poor housing conditions reinterpreted
as a demonstration of raced persons‟ lack of „civility‟ and personal standards. In
modern times, these disparities are further reinforced and perpetuated by what Patricia
Hill Collins calls „controlling images,‟ which support these negative interpretations of
the inequalities between racial groups.55
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The question of sanctions for the superordinate group is perhaps less familiar,
but whites who have supported the interests of subordinate racial groups have often
also been the target of sanctions. Nowadays such sanctions typically take the
informal personal and social form rather than the more overt formalized kind,
although this was not always the case. However, some form of social ostracism is
typical of contemporary sanctions. These sanctions can range from the subtle
exclusion from conversations experienced by those with „other‟ friends to the
complete rejection for the person who against their family‟s wishes marries or worse
yet has children with someone from another „undesirable‟ racial group. The
underlying accusation of such sanctions is that the white person who fails to maintain
raced-based discrimination is disloyal to the group and should, therefore, be punished.
4. Group competition: The fourth step necessary to prevent a society
organized according to race moving towards another kind of relation, is competition
for economic resources. Indeed, it is not surprising that sympathy for the more
extreme right-wing racist groups increases during times of economic hardship.56 In
Britain, like in the U.S. this theme has played itself out repeatedly in terms of
competition for employment, particularly with respect to those perceived as
immigrants. As Banton points out,
The individual‟s search for his or her own advantage is one of the major
sources of social change and if it is not regulated it will undermine relations
based upon racial rather than economic status…So a government which wants
to prevent such change will pass laws to prevent people acting in accordance
with their individual interests if this disregards the racial status of the parties.
It will seek to channel the search for economic advantage in directions which
strengthen the racial order instead of weakening it.57
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Although under current legislation it is unlawful to deny people access to jobs
on account of their race or ethnicity, there are policies and practices at work that
clearly strengthen the racial order such that even without knowledge of what those
policies or practices are, employment and the workplace are visibly organized along
racial lines. In London, for example, one cannot help notice that raced persons are
almost absent from the upper echelons of politics or the financial sector. Or that West
Africans are more visible in a number of professions in the civil service, e.g. traffic
wardens, unemployment and housing officers and nurses. Or that Asians tend to run
post offices and newsagents. Behind these racial generalizations there is a much more
complex story of economic, political, social and personal forces that impact migratory
patterns, immigration policies and different peoples‟ apparent success. However,
every member of any society is not necessarily interested in or informed about these
wider forces and their histories. They simply experience such transformations in the
workforce in terms of their already socialized perception of other racial groups and
the perceived impact such groups are having on their way of life.58
Similarly in the U.S., employment is visibly racially organized albeit in a
different pattern to the one in Britain given the differences in the two countries‟ racial
demography. The case brought against clothing retailers Abercrombie and Fitch, in
California in 2005,59 only legally confirmed what can be seen in any number of retail
settings: Raced groups are hired to do the lower status jobs that keep them out of
sight at the back of a store or in the warehouse, while their white peers are employed
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as sales assistants or tellers. Likewise, anyone who has visited an American hotel
cannot help observing that the housekeeping staff is overwhelmingly Latino, while
managerial positions are almost exclusively occupied by whites. As in Britain, such
employment patterns may have any number of social, economic, political and
personal explanations and may not even be statistical realities, but it is the perception
of such patterns that matters. For example, it is not uncommon for those members of
the non-raced majorities who occupy the bottom of the socio-economic spectrum, in
these two countries, to assume that raced or immigrant groups are „taking their jobs‟
as if their lack of wealth is attributable to groups who are faring worse than they
themselves are. Nevertheless, whether real or perceived, that employment is
organized according to racial categories cultivates racial consciousness, which in turn
increases a sense of group competition.
Indeed, this sense of competition extends far beyond the workplace. Members
of the different groups begin to compare themselves across all dimensions of life from
sports to standard of living. There is nothing inherently negative with competition
itself; the idea of „keeping up with the Joneses‟ is not a racialized phenomenon. But
when the natural instinct to compare gets mixed with racial mythologies and
ideologies a toxic cocktail of jealously, prejudice and misinformation inevitably
emerges, which further exacerbates the tension between racial groups.
5. Transmitted inequality: The fifth step that ensures a society can preserve a
hierarchical racial order is to encourage socio-economic inequalities to be transmitted
from one generation to the next. Because such inequalities already exist, particularly
in a racially divided society, according to Banton, “a government which takes no

42

action to reduce that association [between skin color and a person‟s life chances] will
be able to maintain a racially unequal social order.”60
One of the defining characteristics of chattel slavery, compared with indenture
labor for example, was the stipulation that slave status was automatically passed from
slaves to their offspring.61 This feature of Atlantic slavery ensured the institution and
the racial inequality it maintained continued for hundreds of years. Not long after
slavery was ruled unlawful in the U.S., a legalized form of segregation was instituted
with the enactment of Jim Crow laws. The laws and the social customs that
accompanied them ensured the transmission of radical racial inequality remained a
central feature of American society. Indeed, it wasn‟t until 1964 with the passing of
the Civil Rights Bill that African Americans fully regained their voting rights and
could be, in the minimal legal sense, considered equal. These new legal measures,
however, did not eradicate the social or political disparities between racial groups.
Indeed, as Stubblefield reminds us, “legislative and institutional gains for black
Americans, such as civil rights legislation and affirmative action programs, are always
subject to being repealed or undermined by future administrations.”62 No single legal
act can instantaneously reverse such profoundly engrained attitudes, systems and
customs that have been cultivated over centuries.
The law has not taken center stage in Britain‟s maintenance of racial
inequality over generations. Rather, the mythological narratives of their colonial
relationship to formerly enslaved people as a means for skirting the question of racial
60
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inequality in post-abolition and contemporary British society has ensured racial
hierarchy remains. As the largest of the European slaveholding superpowers, British
Imperial society, like the United States (before and after independence), was racially
hierarchical. However, as the administrative center of the Empire, Britain as a land
mass was not the home of the crop producing plantations that were the source of its
wealth. As such, there has been a tendency to disconnect Britain‟s current racial order
from its colonial past. Indeed, it required the herculean efforts of two grieving parents
in the late 1990‟s to force Britain to recognize the phrase „institutional racism‟ as
applicable to the Metropolitan Police Force, a notoriously racist organization.63 Thus,
Britain has been reluctant to implement or even discuss programs like affirmative
action or other policies that proactively seek to redress race-based inequality.64 While
public funding has been directed towards support for some ethnic minorities, Britain
is loathe to take steps which enforce a definite criteria of inclusion and/or
representation in the public sector, like for example, the kind of state mandated
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minority business bidding processes implemented in the United States. Consequently,
while Britain has not legally enforced racial separation in the manner seen in the
United States, it does however, as Banton‟s definition explains, perpetuate racial
consciousness through the transmission of racial inequality by its inaction and
unwillingness to sufficiently acknowledge or directly address racial inequality.
Indeed, after hundreds of years of history, it is obvious that racisms are entrenched in
all aspects of society, hence the need to take seriously the lived experience. As
Derrick Bell claims, any attempt to reverse the negative impact of the many forms of
racisms people experience on a daily basis, must begin by acknowledging the reality
of race.65 Moreover, as critical race theorists Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic
remind us, “When we are tackling a structure as deeply embedded as race, radical
measures are required. “Everything must change at once,” otherwise the system
merely swallows the small improvement one has made, and everything remains the
same.”66
I hope the reader will forgive this rather crude overview of British and U.S.
history. It is merely intended to point to what I take to be the uncontroversial claim
that people who live in these two societies inevitably have a racial consciousness as a
result of being socialized in these contexts. Indeed, the mere use of race labels to
categorize people is evidence enough of this fact. The use of this more structured
framework, I hope, illustrates how historically, socially and morally engrained the
notion of race is and the impact this ideology has on all aspects of people‟s lives.
Moreover, given the socio-economic emphasis of Banton‟s framework, it becomes
easy to make the further connection between racial consciousness and life chances for
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raced people. Yet it is not simply the degree but the manner in which racial
consciousness is embedded that makes the kind of „thin‟ notion of blackness Shelby
suggests impossible in societies like Britain and the United States. Being raced is a
description of both one‟s lived experiences one‟s moral worth. As such, racial
consciousness not only negatively impacts raced persons‟ life experiences at the
social level, this lived experience has a profound impact on all persons‟ moral
reasoning. In this regard, it must be understood as fundamental to our moral agency.
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Chapter 2: The Reality of Multiracial Identity

Explain yuself
wha yu mean
Ah listening to yu wid de keen
half of mih ear
Ah looking at yu wid de keen
half of mih eye
an when I’m introduced to yu
I’m sure you’ll understand
why I offer yu half-a-hand
an when I sleep at night
I close half-a-eye
consequently when I dream
John Agard

In chapter one, we considered racial consciousness in Britain and the United
States and an unencumbered conception of black racial identity. We began to
compare the reality of raced persons‟ lived experience in societies with racial
consciousness with the theoretical lives envisioned by Rawls and Shelby. Shelby and,
as I shall illustrate in this chapter, Ronald Sundstrom, have not taken seriously the
lived experience. They want to place it in the background with respect to their racial
justice projects. This chapter will take up these issues further, this time looking
specifically at Sundstrom‟s argument for multiracial ontology and multiracial
identities as part of racial consciousness. I argue that the significance of the lived
experience cannot be underestimated in our understanding of what it is to have a
moral identity.
In societies like Britain and the United States that have a racial consciousness,
it is fundamentally problematic to discuss racial identities without giving proper
recognition to the impact of the lived experience on moral reasoning. The social
impact of racisms in the U.S. and Britain are there for all to see. Since the „scientific‟
basis for race was discredited in the twentieth century, metaphysically speaking many
47

in the academe have concluded race is not real.1 But with the biological reality of
race widely rejected, a theoretical gap was exposed as there was clearly a need to
explain the numerous and very real social consequences of this now „unreal‟ concept.
A social constructionist account emerged that sought to fill that gap; challenging
essentialist accounts of race while also recognizing that although race might not be
considered real in the metaphysical or naturalist sense, people have real experiences
on account of being raced and/or because of their own identification with race and
there are very real consequences that result from this racial reality.2 As Derek Bell
argues, these consequences are not only real they are so entrenched in American
society that our only option is to accept the immutability of race.3 Philosophers of
race whether it is those who embrace racial identity or those who advocate a postracial society, all concede at some level that racisms and racial consciousness have an
impact on the life experiences of those in racialized societies. However, to say that
racial consciousness in general impacts the lives of those who are raced is one thing.
To describe exactly who is impacted and in what ways is another thing entirely.
Indeed, defining race in sociological terms has proved an extraordinarily difficult
task. Determining „who‟ belongs to which racial groups is not simply a question of
sociologically identifying the disadvantaged in reference to a particular physical
description and measuring the usual socioeconomic variables accordingly. In the case
of race, the minute this process of categorical definition begins, the difficulties in
performing the task become glaringly apparent for race categories entail biological,
1

Kwame Anthony Appiah, “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race,”
Critical Inquiry 12, no. 1 (Autumn, 1985): 21-37.
2

Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to
the 1980s (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
3

Derrick A. Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism, (New York,
NY: BasicBooks, 1992).

48

physiological, sociological, psychological and moral elements, which have morphed
over time and place and are being reconstituted and transformed as we speak. This
theorizing about race places or misplaces our thinking about the lives of the persons
who are impacted politically and socially by the use of the concept of race to control
and direct the lives of citizens in both the US and UK.
The question of mixed race or multiracial statuses further complicates this
picture. Most obviously, if there is no such thing as race biologically speaking, what
does it mean to have a mixed race or multiracial identity? Even on a simplistic
biological model, the presence of persons who could be described as multiracial raises
fundamental conceptual difficulties that are underscored by the elaborate taxonomies
developed by the European slaveholding nations during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Considering the notion of multiracial identities from beyond a biological
framework leads us to a picture of society and history that simply cannot be captured
using simple race labels.
If such categories could be defined, there are still fundamental questions about
to whom these labels would or could refer. In the United States a great deal of work
has been done to articulate who is and who is not white and the legal and social status
of mixed race persons.4 Yet, even in the context of legal certainty, the historical
context would have determined a persons‟ racial identity status, depending on the
extraordinarily arbitrary decisions of a white, elite, legal minority. In the U.S., these
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legal precedents both dictate the social conception of a given racial category and
become the site of dispute as the groups they seek to define struggle to define their
own identities on their own terms. In Britain, however, where the courts have had
less impact on the construction of identity has the question of who race labels refer to
is even more theoretically ambiguous despite the more readily accepted practical
understanding of categories like mixed race. For example, when the ethnic and racial
categories on the British census were being developed and revised, the guidance notes
specifically state that the aim is not to find a theoretically sound descriptor but to
capture the way people commonly refer to themselves or each other.5 Consequently,
it is unclear whether multiracial (in its common sense usage) should refer to people
who have one non-raced parent and one parent from an „ethnic‟ minority as the census
sets forth or does it speak to those who are a mix of ethnic minorities, whose mix is
rendered irrelevant by the census categories.6 Even in the U.S. where the hegemony
of hypodescent has made categorizing persons who could be described as multiracial
a relatively simple procedural task, this has often been at odds with people‟s social
and personal interpretations of racial identity. Moreover, what about those people in
countries, like South Africa for example, who are the product of generations of people
understood to be multiracial? This is indeed a point of contention in the U.S. where
the vast majority of those currently referred to as black actually have heritages that
could be classified under multiple origins. In Britain in the near future, questions
around the scope of the definition of multiracial will assume greater relevance as the

5

United Kingdom Office of National Statistics, Ethnic Group Statistics: A Guide for the
collection and classification of ethnicity data (2003): 9
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=11040 (accessed November 12, 2010).
6

P.J. Aspinall, “The conceptualisation and categorisation of mixed race/ethnicity in Britain
and North America: Identity options and the role of the state,” International Journal of Intercultural
Relations 27 (2003), 269–296.

50

currently young population of persons who could be described as multiracial grows up
and begins to reproduce with each other and members of other so called ethnic
groups. Also, the more recent trend of tracing one‟s genetic heritage has revealed
many non-raced persons in Britain and the U.S. have some unexpectedly colorful
ancestry. Further, what of countries that openly acknowledge their substantial
„mixed‟ populations, like Brazil, where the idea of applying a mixed race label
becomes non-distinctive and practically nonsensical seeing as everyone is understood
as having multiple heritages? And what of countries like France who have
populations that could be described as multiracial and/or multiethnic but do not
collect or include racial information in their statistics? The same individual could be
black, mixed-race, colored, mixed or non-raced just by going on a few vacations!
Perhaps this confusion and the obvious contradictions in racial theories that
multiracial identities throw up contributes to the relative lack of discussion about
multiracial identities. Here the problem again seems to be the failure of theory to
meet reality. There has been a reluctance to recognize multiracial identity and an
unwillingness to openly include the experiences of persons with multiracial identity in
the social and cultural narratives of the U.S. and Britain. This silence cannot
continue. According to national statistics, the number and percentage of persons
asserting a multiracial identity in the U.S. and Britain is growing rapidly. 7 In the
American context, since the law prohibiting interracial marriages was finally lifted
from the statutes in 1967, the number of people born of interracial relationships is
steadily growing.8 Similarly, in Britain, as the country becomes increasingly
multiracial through interracial marriages and immigration patterns and the taboos
surrounding interracial relationships diminish, the population that could be described
7

Ibid.

8

Ibid.

51

as multiracial is increasing. Persons who currently live between the color lines are
beginning to assert their presence and identities.
This surprisingly recent phenomenon, however, belies a much longer and
richer history of multiracial identities in American and British society. Nevertheless,
the presence of people who could be describes as multiracial and multiracial identity
have occupied a curious cultural space somewhere between taboo and trophy;
demonized and exoticized, yet at times, rendered invisible. These omissions have
prompted a drive to address the impasse in the political, cultural, social and
philosophical domains. One such philosophical attempt is Ronald Sundstrom‟s mixed
race ontology. Sundstrom seeks to establish the reality of mixed race identity that is
consistent with liberal ideals, yet grounded in an ethics of memory that connects
mixed race individuals to their raced families (broadly conceived). However, I
contend that Sundstrom‟s ontology of mixed race is problematic because while he
attempts to situate multiracial identity in its social and historical context in a thicker
sense than Shelby, Sundstrom fails to appreciate the depth in which racial
consciousness and the lived reality influences all people‟s moral reasoning. In light of
these accounts, my concern is with the challenge of theorizing collective
responsibility such that it accounts for the intuitive sense we have that persons who
could be described as multiracial are morally connected to those persons who could
be described as black. It is my contention that an unencumbered ontology of
multiracial identity in a society with racial consciousness is not possible, because the
lived reality of race makes all raced persons morally connected, which renders
disconnected, individualistic moral agency impracticable. As we saw in chapter one,
if we posit only a thin notion of connectivity there is little with which to ground a
sense of solidarity let alone collective responsibility. In this sense, we can make no
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moral claims on raced persons‟ obligations to stand in solidarity against racial
injustice. As such, this chapter has two central aims: 1) to show that multiracial
identities are part of Britain‟s and the United States‟ racial consciousness. 2) To show
that, as part of the racial consciousness, multiracial identities cannot be understood as
socially disconnected identities. To this end, section one provides an overview of
some key themes pertaining to multiracial identities that contribute to the social
conception of multiracial identities. Section two demonstrates in what manner
Sundstrom‟s ontology is unencumbered and argues that the assertion of mixed race
and/or multiracial identities as encumbered cannot be morally neutral because of
racial consciousness, the lived experience and the constitutive nature of moral agency.

The Undesirable Desirables in Our Racial Consciousness
The presence of persons who could be or have been described as multiracial
(or some variant of it) have always presented race theorists with a multitude of
problems, whether it be biological, social or moral. The myriad strategies and
approaches to resolving these theoretical and indeed practical challenges has lead
persons who could be described as multiracial and multiracial identities to occupy
what are often very divergent and ever-changing social and moral statuses. As is the
case with conceptions of monoracial identities in the racial consciousness, multiracial
identities are not only mutable, they are also controlling in ways that negatively
impact the lives of persons who could be described as multiracial, persons who could
be described as monoracial, or both. In terms of the evolving definitions and
descriptions of multiracial identities, Britain and the United States have taken
different, although sometimes overlapping, trajectories. To provide a detailed account
of this phenomenon is far beyond the scope of this work. Instead, using the
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theoretical framework of racial consciousness set out in chapter one, I show that in
both countries, multiracial identities, despite their changing interpretations, are very
much part of the racial consciousness. In doing so, part of what I hope will become
clear is that attempts to pin down a discrete multiracial ontology actually amount to
red-herrings or distractions from the far more important task of eliminating the racial
consciousness and racisms that are so detrimental to all raced people‟s personhood.
Let us return to Banton‟s framework, this time populating it with examples of
multiracial identities and experiences. The first element necessary for a society to
cultivate and maintain racial consciousness, as we will recall, is racial classification.
This is perhaps the most central of the five principles for multiracial identities because
conceptions of race are grounded in the idea that there are distinct varieties, types or
kinds.9 In this sense, the relatively recent discussions and debates around the
inclusion of multiracial and/or mixed race identity options on the census in Britain
and the United States are rather historically misleading. Mulatto was a racial category
on the U.S. census from 1850.10 Moreover, the taxonomy of race, including
discussions of those who are understood as mixtures of the main racial groups, dates
back centuries in both societies. Indeed, natural historians of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were busy classifying all of nature‟s living things and human
beings were no exception. It is important to emphasize that these scientific and
philosophical discussions were very much part of the social and economic context. As
Naomi Zack rightly notes, “The shifting racial taxonomies have not reflected changes
in scientific consensus about race, but have expressed political power, social attitudes
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and economic interests.”11 Imperial expansion and the slave trade meant that
elaborate systems of racial categorization were employed long before robustly
theorized notions of race were developed. In the British colonies the preferred terms
were mulatto (one half black/ one half white), quadroon (one quarter black/ three
quarters white), octoroon (one eighth black/ seven eighths white), and so on.
However, it was not until the eighteenth century that justifications for this inhumane
institution were required and the practice and motives for racial classification shifted.
As Bernasconi observes, this essentially fraction-based form of classification was
born out of a different kind of racism than the medicalized racisms that came later. In
the nineteenth century, more complex philosophical and scientific debates were had
and there emerged and more robust account of the meaning of race. “The preferred
term dividing humanity into usually four or six varieties according to certain inherited
characteristics, both physical and mental.”12 And yet, those debates did not shy away
from the question of race mixing as is the case in our more recent past.
Throughout the nineteenth century the idea of race was fundamentally always
about race mixing. At the beginning of the century the possibility of race
mixing established the unity of the human species. In mid-century, with the
dominance of polygenesis, that was placed in doubt, and as a result races were
also regarded as species, but in such a way that they should not mix. The
medicalization of race mixing, particularly when it was united with Social
Darwinism, led to segregation and apartheid, as well as laws against
miscegenation and some of the uglier aspects of eugenics.13
The meaning and content of these labels, being a function of this social and
economic context, were inevitably shaped by the motives and needs of those who had
the power to so label. Perhaps not surprisingly, given their positioning in the
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established racial hierarchy, those defined by their racial mix, were condemned by
some and promoted by others.14 As, indeed, was the process of miscegenation that
produced these mixtures. For example, Josiah Nott, who was perhaps the most
vociferous contributor (in the nineteenth century) to the negative conception of
„hybrids‟ and miscegenation, believed that intermixing between Africans and nonraced Europeans would quite literally lead to the extermination of both races.
According to Nott,
The statistics given by “Philanthropist”15 prove that the Mulattoes are much
shorter lived, and it is a common subject of remark in the Southern States, that
they are more liable to be diseased, and less capable of endurance than the
whites or blacks of the same rank and condition. What then could we expect
in breeding from a faulty stock – a stock which has been produced by a
violation of nature‟s laws, but that they should become more degenerate in
each successive generation? We know that the parent will transmit to the
child not only his expression, external form, character, temperament, &c., but
even diseases through many generations, as gout, scrofula, consumption, &c.;
why then may not that defective internal organization, which leads to ultimate
destruction, exist in the Mulatto?16
The term hybrid here is used in a biological sense, following Buffon‟s law, which
claimed that if animals from different species interbred, the offspring were infertile.17
While no philosophers or scientists of this time challenged the basic assumption of
white superiority, there were those who believed that race was something that could
be produced and the degenerate characteristics of Africans and those of mixed
ancestry bred out. Despite the pseudo-scientific notions of racial purity becoming
14
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redundant after Darwinism, the commitment to biological racial purity endured.18 As
this nineteenth century march towards racial purity became infused with Darwin‟s
notion of survival of the fittest and the reality of preventing sexual relations between
the non-raced and the raced became increasingly unrealistic, the eugenics movement
took hold. However, these social Darwinists were not content to wait upon natural
selection to prevail to achieve their desire for pure and superior races. Consequently,
biological, social and legal strategies designed to prohibit and/or produce interracial
sexual relations to achieve that end became more extreme. Comte Arthur de
Gobineau, for example, believed that race mixing was necessary for the production of
certain human achievements.19 If not for such lofty goals as artistic genius, many
posited the idea that the presumed problematic characteristics of black Africans could
be bred out or at least moderated by the infusion of white stock. This idea was taken
to its literal end in the practice of interracial breeding, which occurred in a number of
different settings. As early as the mid seventeenth century the English instituted a
program of forced breeding between its Irish and African slaves. According to Marin,
“This practice of interbreeding Irish females with African men went on for several
decades and ... was stopped only because it interfered with the profits of a large slave
transport company. 20 One of the now more notorious twentieth century cases directly
associated with the eugenics movement was that of the „Stolen Generations‟ in
Australia, a then British colony. With the intent to breed out the undesirable
aboriginal traits, a series of legislation, under the banner of Aborigines Protection
18

Bernasconi, “The Philosophy of Race in the Nineteenth Century,” 506.

19

Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races. (New York: Fertig, 1999).

20

John Martin, “White Slavery: The Slaves That Time Forgot,”
http://afgen.com/forgotten_slaves.html (accessed on November 12, 2010). See also Don Jordan and
Michael Walsh, White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America,
(Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 2008).

57

Acts and the Half- Caste Acts, granted the Aboriginal Protection Board control over
essentially every aspect of aboriginal life.21 These powers included the right to
forcibly remove „half-caste‟ children from their homes, under the guise of child
protection. According to Chief Protector of Aborigines in South Australia, William
Garnet South, "all children of mixed descent should be treated as neglected"22 and
were thus, subject to all the powers of the state. Such state sanctioned interventions
Foucault collectively referred to as bio-power.23
Undergirding the more malevolent applications of racial categorization was a
doctrine of racial purity. There were two different theoretical positions regarding the
permanence of racial inheritance and how to achieve racial purity: 1) those who
believed race mixing could produce improvements in the races and effectively breed
out the errant blackness, as in the Australian example. 2) Those who believed race
mixing inevitably led to the destruction of the races and thus needed to protect the
non-raced from contamination. For those who subscribed to the latter position,
practical solutions for preserving the social separation of raced and non-raced groups
were essential. This came in the form of the second condition required to maintain
racial consciousness: segregation. In a racially stratified society that relied on
physical appearances, racial mixing which blurred this visual line was hugely
problematic. Segregating Africans and Europeans was, therefore, much more of a
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practical concern for the Europeans who were settling in the New World. For the
British who remained in Britain, the number of Africans in their geographical locale,
and the positions raced people occupied in British society made social segregation
largely a non-issue or, with respect to the colonies, a problem for which they could
deal with at arm‟s length. However, in the colonies where Europeans shared the same
physical space as the native peoples and imported African slaves, the idea that the
African „race‟ could be improved or civilized by mixing with Anglo-American blood
was abhorrent and the denigration of those who served as evidence of such mixing,
impassioned. Indeed, W.W. Wright catalogues evidence from „travellers‟, who
describe the „profligate‟, „criminal‟, „vicious‟ nature of the mulatto and consider him
the lowest element in society. Wright vehemently rejects the promotion of
„amalgamation‟ as so much theoretical nonsense that was not only impracticable but
was tantamount to destroying The Union.24 However, for commentators like Wright,
the theoretical aversion to race mixing, which relied upon a natural revulsion whites
supposedly had towards blacks, again the lived reality belied. Not sufficiently
confident that the feeling of revulsion would win out, segregation of a more
systematic kind was the next logical step for national preservation. Wright explains,
Now it is this prejudice of color, or rather aversion to hybridity (as we may
more properly term it), on the part of the whites, that will preserve the black
and white races from destroying one another by amalgamation, and prevent all
those evils which we have shown to be everywhere entailed upon the mulatto
breed. The active operation of this aversion must of necessity exclude the
blacks and mulattoes from all political privileges, and all social connection on
terms of equality with the whites. And if the reader will only reconsider what
we have written about mulattoes, and apply his reason to the subject, we think
he will decide that these social and political distinctions are founded in true
humanity.25
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Whichever side of the theoretical amalgamation debate one sat, the discussion turned
on fundamentally derogatory conceptions of those understood to be multiracial. Such
persons were either objectified as a utilitarian stepping stone to breeding out all that
was perceived to be problematic with „pure‟ blacks or represented the epitome of all
that could be wrong with a race. Indeed, it was their lack of racial purity which led
some to believe mulattos contained the worst elements of both races. As one of
Wrights travellers put it, “I can only tell you, that whatever is, in its own nature, worst
in the Europeans and negroes, is united in them, so that they are the sink of both.”26
As alluded to above, the concerns with those considered multiracial were not
simply biological but also and perhaps more significantly for our purposes here,
moral. The consequences of which reflect an example of our third condition of racial
consciousness: sanctions. The criminalization and pathologizing of those regarded as
multiracial has led to some alarming biological, legal and social sanctions. We have
already seen above the extraordinary suggestion that hybridization could quite
literally bring an end to entire nations and ultimately the downfall of civilization
itself. Coupled with the fears around „contamination‟ driven by racial purity
ideologies, those described as multiracial clearly represented a danger to society.27
The Stolen Generations in Australia epitomize the dire consequences of this ideology,
but multiracial pathology was also presented in more sanitized forms. The idea that
persons classified as multiracial were somehow psychologically and morally flawed
extended beyond the criminal to a more general conception of multiracial personality
types, which cultivated a pervasive social stigma. Sociologist, Robert E. Parks
famously characterized the „spiritual conflict and instability‟ of the „marginal man.‟
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Although for Parks, the conflicts and crises that are part and parcel of this dual
existence seem to give rise to progress; his descriptions of such a personality type are
far from complementary.
There are no doubt periods of transition and crisis in the lives of most of us
that are comparable with those which the immigrant experiences when he
leaves home to seek his fortunes in a strange country. But in the case of the
marginal man the period of crisis is relatively permanent. The result is that he
tends to become a personality type. Ordinarily the marginal man is a mixed
blood, like the Mulatto in the United States or the Eurasian in Asia, but that is
apparently because the man of mixed blood is one who lives in two worlds, in
both of which he is more or less a stranger. The Christian convert in Asia or
in Africa exhibits many if not most of the characteristics of the marginal man
– the same spiritual instability, intensified self-consciousness, restlessness, and
malaise.28
The characterization as persons forever in conflict and disharmony, plague by divided
loyalties and an inability to belong with either group, compounded the social stigma
attached to those defined as multiracial. We need not go back in time nearly eighty
years to appreciate just how pervasive the tragic mulatto conception is. Using data
from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), Roland G.
Fryer et al, conclude the following,
Mixed race children are reared in home environments that overall are similar
to those of black children. On the physical dimension, mixed race children
parallel whites. School achievement results are intermediate between blacks
and whites. Strikingly, however, mixed race children engage in substantially
more risky/anti-social behavior than either blacks or whites, especially outside
of school. Of the twenty-one different bad behavior variables that we analyze,
mixed race adolescents are worse than both blacks and whites on 15 of them;
they fall in between blacks and whites on the remaining 6 measures. Mixed
race children also fare somewhat worse on measures of psychological wellbeing.7
We argue that these empirical patterns are largely consistent with the
“marginal man” hypothesis (Park 1928, 1931, Stonequist 1935, 1937), a
highly influential, yet rarely tested description of the experiences of mixed
race adolescents.29
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The methodological and conceptual problems with the above quoted study deserve an
entire paper to themselves. Indeed, this twenty-first century study is reminiscent of
the pseudo-science of latter days that constructed black inferiority. However, what is
necessary to note at this point are the mechanisms deployed by these kinds of social
scientists that ensure the construction of multiracial identities are inherently
problematic and thus stigmatize those persons who could be described as multiracial
or who might wish to identify as such. First, the exclusive use of „health‟ and/or
„psychological‟ variables that makes no reference to the broader social context. This
strategy situates any observed social or behavioral problems squarely within the
individual and negates any consideration of structural problematics like racisms,
poverty, sexisms etc. At best there is reference to the family context, which simply
serves to reinforce the notion of generational and even inheritable pathologies.
Second, the unquestioned assumption that like matched with like is necessarily
happier, more content, etc. So, non-raced people are presumed to only relate to other
non-raced people and raced persons are presumed to only relate to other similarly
raced persons, which, clearly, the very existence of persons who could be described as
mixed race calls into question.30 Third, the assumption that white and black culture in
the United States is so radically different as to make the two utterly incompatible, and,
therefore, a source of torment for the person who must allegedly fit into one or the
other or be left in the oblivion of inbetweenity. Precisely what these cultural
differences are supposed to be is never qualified. Fourth, that it is scientifically
(whether it is biologically, psychologically, or sociologically) legitimate to use race
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itself as a distinguishing variable, such that other possible explanations for attitudes
and behaviors are precluded before the investigation has begun. For what does it
really mean from the perspective of the social sciences to say that a person is white or
black or any other race?31 The philosophical discourse reveals just how problematic it
is to meaningfully construct a racial descriptor. And yet, this socially constitutive
biopower continues to compound the marginalization of multiracial identities and
voices and manifest as social and psychological sanctions.
This, however, is not to set up a fruitless discussion about which raced group
is the more oppressed. Precisely because it is that kind of comparison between the
monoracial and multiracial that gives rise to the forth feature of racial consciousness:
group competition. In chapter one, we discussed group competition between the
raced and non-raced. Here I shall discuss group competition that manifests between
those who could be described as black and those who could be described as
multiracial. The racial hierarchy that deemed whites superior to blacks, not
surprisingly placed those described as mixed somewhere in between in terms of
intellectual and moral standing, given their proximity to whites (at least for those who
rejected the degeneration model of racial mixing).32 Life on the plantations provided
a clear illustration of the kind of group competition that reinforces racial hierarchy
and cultivates antagonisms between these groups. In competition for the more
desirable roles plantation life offered, precedence was often given to those of mixed
race given their direct familial connection to the slave owner. The social and material
distinctions, that were a consequence of this stratification between the light-skinned
house slave and the dark-skinned field slave, became entrenched in plantation
31
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societies and indeed the American psyche. Indeed, long after slavery was abolished,
observers commented on the differences in levels of achievement between these two
raced groups. In his self-explanatorily titled article, “The Superiority of the Mulatto,”
sociologist Edward B. Reuter takes the reader through a tour of all the major fields of
endeavor, politics, art, education, business, etc. in the United State and further afield,
to justify the title‟s claim. Describing the situation in the united State, he states,
A study of the more advanced groups shows a preponderance of individuals of
mixed blood and a dearth, almost an entire absence, of Negroes of pure blood.
In the numerous lists of exceptional Negroes, published from time to time by
Negroes as well as by white students of race matters, there is a regular
recurrence of a few names; various lists are virtually repetitions. The dozen or
score of men everywhere mentioned as having attained some degree of
eminence are, in all but one or two cases, men of more Caucasian than Negro
blood.33
On this reading, the inferiority of the Negro‟s accomplishments and culture is without
question. For Reuter, however, this does not lead him to conclude that there is a
difference in the intellectual capacities of the races. Rather, he attributes the
disproportionate success of mulattos to a „caste feeling‟; a psychological assumption
that they were closer to whites and thus superior to Negroes. Reuter continues,
The presence of this potential caste just above him has always been the envy
of the black man. To gain admittance to it has always been his hope and his
ambition. White is the badge of superiority. It was by catering to the blacks‟
desire to be like the mulatto and the mulattoes‟ desire to be like the white, by
means of bleaching powders and hair-straighteners, that the most widely
advertised woman of the race is enabled to maintain a villa in California and
purchase residence in the most exclusive section of Long Island far from
contact with the less shrewd and more highly colored Negroes. The racial
uniform is the Negroes‟ most heavy burden.34
Clearly, one need not take up all aspects of Reuter‟s interpretation to
acknowledge that group competition between these raced groups is also an aspect of
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the racial consciousness, just as group competition between raced and non-raced
groups is. Moreover, it is evident in both Britain and the United States that this within
raced group competition remains a significant feature of those societies. The recent
commodification of multiracial persons, in particular multiracial women, also reflects
the double-bind of oppression present in Reuter‟s example. While the successes of
any raced person in a racially conscious society are to be celebrated, there is a danger
of glossing over the pervasive „shadism‟ that privilege those persons who could be
described as multiracial.35 This tendency to blur these racial categories when it suits
is a telling feature of British racial manipulation. In the United States, one can
understand whether one agrees with this practice or not, that in accordance with the
one-drop rule multiracial persons and subsumed under a monoracial category and are
thus referred to in those terms. However, in Britain, where multiracial identities are
not conceptually contentious and are part of standard racial descriptors, there is still a
tendency on the part of the media and others with the power to constitute cultural
narratives on a national scale to refer to noteworthy persons of multiracial heritage as
black, regardless of those persons own self-identification. For example, Anna Kessel
of the Observer newspaper notes,
You have only to look at England's World Cup squad this summer. Six out of
seven of the players described as 'black' were mixed race, but this was not
mentioned on TV or in the written press. Mixed-race people account for about
1.4 per cent of Britain's population, so for mixed-race footballers to make up
26 per cent of England's elite is a huge achievement.36
The interpretation that the chief concern is the failure to acknowledge the success of
those with multiracial identities, rather than the question of how racisms are
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problematic for all raced persons, is indicative of how such group competition is
fundamentally detrimental to everyone concerned. The old principle of divide and
rule distracts us from the central aim which is to put an end to racial injustice.
This failure to challenge structural racisms and the narratives that allow them to be
maintained and perpetuated is one of the key components of the final characteristic of
racial consciousness: transmitted inequality. As we noted in chapter one, once there
is gross social, political and economic inequality, doing nothing can never be a
sufficient strategy for eliminating that inequality. This is true for all raced groups in
relation to each other and in relation to non-raced groups. That being said,
transmitted inequality is not just something that occurs as a result of passive
inactivity; „the struggle‟ continues precisely because racial injustice is actively
maintained in all aspects of life.
That racial inequality is transmitted across generations, should come as no
surprise. The codification of slavery, led by the state of Virginia in the mid
seventeenth century, was specifically designed to maintain this institution across
generations. The 1662 code stated, “Whereas some doubts have arisen whether
children got by any Englishman upon a Negro woman should be slave or free, be it
therefore enacted and declared by this present Grand Assembly, that all children born
in this country shall be held bond or free only according to the condition of the
mother.”37 Similarly, in the Barbados Slave Codes, enacted in 1661, 1676, 1682 and
1688 that set the precedent for Britain‟s Caribbean colonies, the offspring of the slave
followed the condition of its mother. The passing of this law represented a
fundamental shift from the indenture system that, at least in theory, restricted the
period of bondage to a finite period of time. Prior to this enactment, the condition of
37
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slaves‟ offspring followed the paternal line, in accordance with English common law.
However, with the growing number of slave owners who had children with their
female slaves made this legal provision economically preferable. Hickman explains,
This classification scheme had several economic benefits for white
settlers. It insulated White males from any responsibility for
supporting their offspring by Black women slaves; these offspring
became the property, and the responsibility, of the woman's
master. Thus, the birth of mulattoes provided an economic
advantage to both the father, in the form of freedom from parental
responsibility, and to the mother's slaveholder, in the form of a
new slave. This latter factor perhaps added another perverse
incentive for the sexual abuse of slave women: The birth of
mulatto children to a Black mother increased the plantation's
inventory as though the child were a lamb or a bale of cotton. The
economic advantages of rearranging the lines of descent were thus
significant.38
In our time, in the legal use of multiracial identities is perhaps less noteworthy
than in other social forum, given the relatively recent addition of those categories to
the census and other formal documentation. Following from this slave history, it is
worth noting here the gender asymmetry at work in contemporary manifestations of
oppression involving multiracial identity. Again, women are the site at which power
struggles are played out. Thus, often operating more powerfully that legal edicts are
what Patricia Hill Collins calls controlling images. There are three key features of
Collins‟ „controlling images‟: 1) The objectification of black women as the other; 2)
The controlling images operate at the intersecting oppression of multiple social
constructs such as race, gender, class, sexual orientation etc.; and 3) these images
“help justify the social practices that characterize the matrix of domination in the
United States”. 39
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Like the controlling images of black women, images of mixed race women
emerged during slavery in order to justify and maintain white male hierarchy and the
sexual abuse and exploitation of women of color (5). As we noted above, the essential
significance of the female slave was her ability to reproduce and satisfy the sexual
exploits of her owner. Not surprisingly then stereotypes about mixed race women and
their sexual behavior came to the fore. Women of color and mixed race women in
particular, were cast as sexually deviant, licentious, and insatiable. This idea of the
exotic erotic mulatto appeared and was reinforced in both the intellectual discourse
surrounding mixed race women and later in popular media forms. Our first glimpse
of the sexually deviant mulatto female is in the epic Birth of a Nation, where a
mulatto woman is seen throwing herself at her white master in sexual abandon,
fondling their own breast and lapping at her master and herself like a dog. Songstress
Mariah Carey presents us with another telling example. Ms. Carey is probably the
most notable embodiment of the exotic erotic and the tragic mulatto stereotypes. Her
racial ambiguity was always of great interest to the public and her mixed heritage has
been both scorned and celebrated.
Nevertheless, mixed race people, regardless of how ambiguous their features
might be, are non-white; they are still the objectified other. However, because of their
racial ambiguity or more European features, they provide a more favorable option for
racist individuals and institutions to fulfill their obligations to diversity. Consequently,
mixed race people and their images can be and are used to marginalize black
participation, particularly black women, in a variety of social contexts. In 1991 Robin
Givens lamented the fact that “black women are cast in only ten percent of major film
and TV projects.” More than fifteen years later, it seems that little progress has been
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made; it is hard to recall a dark-skinned black actress who has appeared in major
productions consistently since Whoopi Goldberg.
This is just one example, but we can see it is crucial to understand the role
persons who could be described as multiracial play in maintaining and perpetuating
racial injustice. Therefore, any theory of race, racisms, racial justice and/or racial
responsibility, must necessarily take seriously the fact that multiracial persons are
historically, politically, legally, socially, and culturally embedded in that racial
consciousness. I contend that this renders an unencumbered conception of multiracial
identity a theoretical and practical impossibility for precisely the same reasons that an
unencumbered black racial identity is impossible. Racial consciousness influences
raced persons lived experiences in a manner that engenders an inescapable
connectivity between them. Such a systematically entrenched set of practices and
ideologies unequivocally impacts all persons‟ moral reasoning. Additionally, racial
consciousness with its morally loaded conceptions makes an objective stance towards
race and indeed raced persons, impracticable. To further illustrate this claim, I now
turn to a model of multiracial ontology that attempts to formulate a more socially
situated notion of identity than Shelby. However, as I shall show, Sundstrom‟s
commitment to an unencumbered self prevents him from appreciating the degree to
which racisms are entrenched in all modes of life.
Given that multiracial identities are very much part of the racial
consciousness, it might seem rather a moot point, or at least a purely philosophical
exercise, to advance and ontology of mixed race. However, as with monoracial
groups, the content of previous conceptions of multiracial has been largely derogatory
and offensive, so there is clearly a need to redefine such identities in some form or
fashion. Additionally, despite the seeming obsession with hybridity, miscegenation
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and all facets of race mixing in earlier centuries, there has been a veritable silence on
the topic of race mixing and persons who could be described as multiracial. So, while
I believe the task of defining multiracial identity is somewhat of a red-herring in the
struggle towards racial justice, I do understand what motivates those who pursue this
course of action. More importantly, as I hope this analysis will show, there is
something to be learned from taking seriously the concerns of those who live at the
crossroads of racial identities in societies with racial consciousness. Namely, that the
content of racial consciousness does significantly and inescapably impact people‟s
lived experience such that an unencumbered conception of moral reasoning is
theoretically flawed and practically unsustainable.

Sundstrom’s Unencumbered Mixed Race Ontology
Sundstrom‟s aim is to set out his mixed race ontology such that it is
“consistent with the liberation of traditional communities of color.”40 Whether a
specific ontology is necessarily the best solution to the problem of mixed race
marginalization is another question. My intent at this juncture, is not to debate the
utility of this endeavor but rather to call into question the conception of the moral self
that undergirds this particular ontological approach because it has implications for
both Sundstrom‟s own attempts to formulate an ethics of multiracial identity and for
the discussion of collective responsibility and moral agency I present in chapter five
of this work. Like Tommie Shelby, Sundstrom hopes to provide a theoretical
framework that allows raced people (in this case people who want to assert a
multiracial identity) the freedom to identify as they choose, while accounting for the
realities of racisms and the ethical challenges racisms create. As we saw in chapter
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one, Shelby‟s theoretically seductive approach to this problem is to acknowledge the
social situatedness of raced persons while divorcing them from racial identities and
their substantive moral content such that we are left with blackness as an apparently
disposable, albeit politically and socially strategic, identity. Although Sundstrom
seeks to provide a more robust contextual framework in part because his aim is not to
dispense with racial identity in the name of black solidarity but rather to establish the
social reality of multiracial identity in the same manner in which mono-racial
identities are regarded. As such, Sundstrom hopes to rectify what he sees as an
omission of multiracial identity from the U.S. social and political awareness and
simultaneously challenge the racial hierarchy that both excludes that group and
perpetuates racisms.
Like many philosophers of race, Ronald Sundstrom finds himself with the
conundrum of how to combat the social injustices of racisms, while addressing the
philosophical problem of race as a metaphysical falsehood. If there is no such thing
as race – how can we make a case against the manifestations of racisms that single out
certain people with racial identities? To resolve this Sundstrom turns to metaphysical
pluralism to make the theoretical case for the reality of race. Metaphysical pluralism
is offered as an alternative to „traditional monist metaphysics‟, which only admits the
reality of “natural kinds” and doesn‟t, therefore, provide an appropriate framework for
discussing and describing social kinds such as race. On the monist model, social
categories such as race and class are understood only as nominal categories, and as
such lack reality. They are reduced to illusions or myth which, as Sundstrom rightly
notes is hugely problematic for projects that fall within the remit of the social
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sciences.41 Metaphysical pluralism, on the other hand, allows for both constructed
and natural kinds to be classed as either real or nominal. Thus, Sundstrom sets out to
establish a positive ontology of mixed race as a „constructed and real category‟ in the
U.S. context. Drawing on the work of Michael Root, Sundstrom argues that, “A
human kind is real when unified by a significant social relation; or rather when that
kind is explanatory or plays a role in the laws of the social sciences.”42 On this model
there are three social forces that unify human kinds: “the force from above, the act of
classification or labeling by some authority; the force from below, the intentional
acting under the label by the so labeled; and the lateral forces, the normative standards
that become attached to the label and are applied to those within and without the
label.”43
Sundstrom goes on to highlight what he takes to be five features of human
kinds that are crucial for understanding how this model operates.44 First, human kinds
are „institutional and intentional‟ and consequently facts about human kinds are
„institutional or social facts‟. As such, human kinds are woven into the fabric of
41
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society; they are entrenched in the structures of our institutions. Sundstrom puts it
thus, “These institutions give rise in part to two of the three vectors (above and
lateral), and have a heavy hand in ensuring the third (below).”45 Given the contextual
significance of determining human kinds, Sundstrom limits his discussion to the
United States. The recognition of variation at different sites also leaves room for the
possibility for change and the recognition that human kinds, unlike natural kinds, are
not static. The nuances of this point are made clear in the remaining features of
human kinds. The second is that human kinds can be graded or present in degrees.
Similarly, their „reality‟ may also be measured in degrees. How one ought to interpret
the reality of a given human kind is contingent on the impact of the three forces
outlined above. Depending on the presence, uptake and combination of behaviors,
labels, assumptions, practices, attitudes etc. emerging in the social context, a
particular human kind, like mixed race for example, can be real or nominal, or may
exist somewhere in between. Indeed, this is precisely what Sundstrom argues in
“Being and Being Mixed Race.” The importance of recognizing human kinds as nondiscrete categories is explicitly stated in the third feature. Human kinds, again, unlike
their natural counterparts, are not exclusive categories. One can belong to any
number of socially constructed human kinds (e.g. a heterosexual Buddhist multiracial
man). What becomes apparent from this example, Sundstrom clarifies in the fourth
feature. The idea that without the existence of a particular human kind, AfricanAmerican for example, acting as a member of that kind is not possible. Some human
kinds simply have no meaning at certain sites or during certain periods of history as
members of societies with different racial categories and conceptions of human kinds
(or none at all) will immediately observe. One could not have been mixed race in
45
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England or the United States two-hundred years ago. One could have been mulatto or
one of the numerous other categories available for those of multiracial parentage but
we cannot operate under a human kind that is yet to come into existence. Following
from this, Sundstrom again contrasts socially founded human kinds with natural kinds
and argues that the former are invented by human beings rather than „discovered‟ in
nature like the latter. Sundstrom cautions, “Once invented, however, human kinds
can later be discovered by social scientists wishing to understand the world.”46
Sundstrom goes on to demonstrate the reality of race by providing empirical
evidence of race and its impact across any number of social indicators. He shows the
unification of the three forces such that we can legitimately speak of the reality of
race as a human kind. He also takes pains to defend his claims against those who
reject the idea that race is the cause or explanatory factor in disparities in health,
healthcare, education, poverty, housing etc., so I will not repeat that task here. 47
While I think there are genuine questions regarding how the category „race‟ is used in
the social sciences, like Sundstrom I am bemused that the reality and impact of
racisms on raced persons continuously has to be „proven‟ and justified. Nevertheless,
given the social constructionalist nature of the metaphysical pluralist model, it is clear
that on those terms race is „real‟ in the U.S. The forces from above label people as
such; people do indeed refer to themselves in racial terms and understand themselves
to have racial identities, thus accounting for the force from below; and as the
discussions at the end of chapter one and at the beginning of this chapter confirmed,
there are normative standards that are attached to racial labels that are applied to those
within and without of any given label, thus illustrating the presence of the lateral force
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needed to establish the unification of forces demanded by the criteria of the
metaphysical pluralist model.
Having shown that racial categories in general are real, in “Being and Being
Mixed Race,” Sundstrom turns to his more specific concern, the status of mixed race
identity. Drawing on the account he sets forth in the article discussed above,
Sundstrom presents an argument for distinct mixed race ontology.48 Using the same
criteria of the three forces (above, below and lateral), Sundstrom contends mixed race
occupies that space between the nominal and the real and thus can be understood as
having a „degree of reality‟ in the U.S. With respect to the force from above,
Sundstrom feels official recognition of the category is still lacking, despite the
changes that were made to the U.S. census just prior to the publication of his article.
Indeed, like many other observers of the mixed race category census debate,
Sundstrom knows that the ultimate arrangements of the legislation could have gone a
lot further in officially incorporating mixed race identity into official parlance.49
Although the new rulings do alter the presence and strength of the force from
above somewhat (but in a very limited manner: what you label yourself, what
boxes you check off, is one thing, but how the public labels you is an entirely
different matter), the one drop of blood rule remains embedded in the minds
and practices of American society. Given the persistence of assigning race
through hypodescent in the U.S., the force from below and the lateral
normative forces remain unaltered.50
Similarly, while there are clearly many people who seek to describe themselves as
mixed-race; Sundstrom feels there is not sufficient recognition of mixed race persons
by society at large. Thus according to Sundstrom, while mixed race identity is not as
real (recall that metaphysical pluralism allows for reality to be graded) as the more
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widely recognized traditional mono-racial categories Black, Asian, White, Hispanic
and Native American, there is a sufficient interplay of the three forces to conclude
that mixed race identity has a degree of reality in the U.S.
I am not concerned with debating the merits of Sundstrom‟s mixed race
ontology. Whether one agrees with Sundstrom‟s theoretical justification for the
“reality” mixed race ontology is not the crucial issue for the purposes of this
discussion.51 At the social level on which Sundstrom essentially focuses his analysis,
I do not dispute the fact that there are people in the United States who have shared
experiences that are a function of what is understood to be their multiracial parentage
and the racial consciousness in that country. Instead I want to ask, with Sundstrom‟s
account so firmly grounded in the social context, in what manner can it be considered
unencumbered? My contention is that Sundstrom‟s account does not go far enough in
reformulating collective responsibility because, like Shelby, he fails to appreciate the
extent to which racisms are embedded in the social and political order in a manner
that means all people‟s reasoning is affected; not just socially in the sense that a
person‟s values and political ideals are influenced by their place in the social order
and their own identity. Far more significantly, reasoning itself is unequivocally
impacted by racisms. As such, we have no tools with which to theorize the
connectivity between all raced people, which in turn makes it difficult to discuss
eradicating group-based racisms. Indeed, both Shelby‟s and Sundstrom‟s accounts
are evidently motivated by a genuine desire to address racial injustice. Yet, one feels
unconvinced that either Shelby‟s solidarity of Sundstrom‟s mixed race politics will
actually materialize let alone challenge the entrenched inequities in the U.S. that are a
function of racial consciousness. Both accounts ultimately rely on a notion of
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individual obligation that we must hope is felt with enough force to propel people to
action even though we cannot assume such persons have a sense of being deeply
concerned with their connection to other raced persons or the group‟s collective
plight.
First, Sundstrom assumes that multiracial identity is not necessarily connected
to one‟s social or political status. Indeed, most of the challenges Sundstrom cites
against the assertion of multiracial identity are essentially calls to remind people
wishing to adopt a multiracial identity about its social and political impact, both actual
and/or perceived.52 I do not necessarily take issue with the need for people to express
their identity; my concern is the validity of the ethical framework used to justify the
process, if indeed it needs justifying at all. My second concern is that to prioritize
asserting a particular racial identity over what I take to be the more important concern
of eradicating racial injustice, is problematic. The difficulty for Sundstrom (and other
philosophers championing multiracial identity) is: Can we name ourselves without
reinforcing white privilege and reifying racial hierarchy? Sundstrom claims that it is
possible and notes that „selling out‟ is not something that necessarily follows from
multiracial identity nor is the phenomenon one exclusive to multiracial people.53 For
Sundstrom seeking a higher position in the racial hierarchy (which these critics equate
with asserting a multiracial identity) is equivalent to pursuing a higher class status,
which no one would object to despite the potential risks of reinforcing the current
racial order. To answer his detractors, who claim multiracial ontology exacerbates
racial injustice, Sundstrom has a practical solution. He explains it thus:
To avoid the problem, a strategy must be adopted that specifically resists
complicity. Such a strategy might include the following:
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[1] A rejection of naïve popular conceptions of race (e.g., melanism, or racial
essentialism), and biological conceptions of race.
[2] An understanding of race as a social category made real by social forces.
[3] An understanding that race, via racism, is a mode of oppression: Social
status, privileges, and burdens are parsed out according to a racial
hierarchy that places whiteness at the top and darkness at the bottom.
[4] A rejection of, and a commitment to resist, racial hierarchy and white
privilege.54
Interestingly the strategy is a purely cognitive one, which is consistent with
Sundstrom‟s commitment to liberal autonomy. Its adoption and implementation all
takes place in the multiracial individual‟s mind. There is nothing wrong with
cultivating a non-racist, politically astute attitude, of course, but it suggests that the
maintenance of racisms and the oppressive manifestations of white privilege and
racial hierarchy Sundstrom is so keen to reject, are purely a function of people‟s
thinking. However, as his metaphysical framework and our discussion of racial
consciousness clearly show, this is simply not the case. Racisms are embedded in the
very foundation of or social and political and economic structures in our policies,
practices, mores, cultural expressions and behaviors. We cannot simply think them
away. Moreover, racial identities are necessarily social identities – indeed, they are
social constructions according to Sundstrom. Yet the implicit assumption here is that
one can, if one so chooses separate one‟s attitudes about race and racial justice from
one‟s own racial identity. So long as the appropriate understanding of the social
context is in place, the articulation of multiracial identity is of little moral
consequence for Sundstrom. There is no broader discussion of the impact of racial
consciousness or of multiracial as a racial identity that is a part of that consciousness.
Sundstrom does not consider the lived reality that emerges from racial consciousness
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and as such the concerns pertaining to the social implications of expressing
multiracial identity are too quickly dismissed.
Insofar as it is part of the racial consciousness, the role and significance of
multiracial identity in maintaining that consciousness and the inequalities it engenders
must be taken into account. It is important to note here that the impact of asserting a
multiracial identity need not be negative. However, to fail to consider racial
consciousness and the social context of multiracial identity in deliberations about its
manifestations in the world increases the likelihood of such assertions being
detrimental to the anti-racism agenda. This seems to be a glaring omission from the
current multiracial discussion in the U.S. (in Britain there is little discussion at all).
While the war rages about the right to have the identity recognized, there seems to be
little said about what it actually means and few attempts to unpack its conceptual
content in the context of racial consciousness. As we saw in Banton‟s fifth element
(transmitted inequality) required to maintain a racial consciousness in a country, if a
definitive and concerted effort is not made to address the inequalities entrenched in
the political, social and cultural foundations of that country, the existing order will
remain. How that order is maintained clearly will shift over time; racisms have an
incredible ability to mutate and adapt to achieve their ends in any environment.
However, the hierarchy Sundstrom is concerned about remains. Multiracial identity is
not simply an opportunity to tell the society one has interracial parents and thus one‟s
experiences are different from one‟s parent groups; as Sundstrom and others have
shown.55 Rather, multiracial identity (formerly mulatto and numerous other variants
depending on the parent groups), like all the other racial labels in the racial
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consciousness, has moral, cultural and social meaning. Indeed, racial consciousness
could not function as it does if racial identities didn‟t carry these meanings. And as I
demonstrated in Shelby‟s case, to reduce the identity to an empty, neutral label is
hugely problematic. Consider for example the force and scope of the cultural
revolution that was necessary to shift the meaning of black such that it could retranscribe and deviate from its historically entrenched negativity. Even with this level
of cultural transformation black (African-American), racial identity can by no means
be understood as having rid itself of its historical legacy or as having completely
reversed, eradicated or re-written the meanings of its earlier fundamentally negative
content. Is it reasonable to assume (if we grant Sundstrom his ontological position)
just because mixed race has a lesser degree of reality than mono-racial identities that
it can discard its historical baggage without a similar cultural challenge or even a
thorough discussion? Given the power of racial consciousness, it is equally hard to
imagine that the racial identities that have been established in opposition to the nonraced norm can ever be truly neutral in the way an unencumbered model of self
requires.
Second, Sundstrom often conflates the motives of the people who seek to
articulate mixed race identity with mixed race identity as a concept.
First, the accusation that claims of mixed race identity simply represent
attempts to ascend the racial hierarchy is false. As I argued above, mixed race
identity is presently to some degree real, and is based on mixed race
experience. The only thing mixed race people are trying to escape is the denial
of this identity. As for the accusation that mixed race serves to devalue the
communities and identities of parent groups, the above strategy would curtail
that problem.56
In doing so, Sundstrom side-steps the fundamental question regarding the real life
impact this identity potentially could have on the present racial order in the U.S. or
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indeed, anywhere else – why would we assume multiracial people will adopt this
strategy? Or on what grounds can we morally claim they should? Surely the
principles in Sundstrom‟s four-part political strategy are ones that all people should
adopt into their thinking. Yet, as I cautioned against Shelby‟s solidarity, with an
unencumbered conception of self, what is the motivational force that will allow us to
translate the nice theoretical idea that people „should‟ treat each other justly and seek
to cultivate just societies, into meaningful shifts in actual behavior?
Shelby calls on a notion of group solidarity that would include multiracial
people in the thin black category. While I don‟t think Sundstrom directs his
comments directly at Shelby, he rejects the idea of group membership as a basis for
solidarity. In responding more broadly to those who would ground their objections to
multiracial identity in a socio-political call for solidarity, Sundstrom invokes the
traditionally liberal right to freedom of association. Opposition to multiracial identity
often cites the detrimental impact a reduction in group membership could have for the
raced groups whose numbers are currently swelled by the inclusion of those who have
only one parent of that racial category. However, despite recognizing these social
and/or political implications, Sundstrom rejects those claims,
What group has rights to membership? Such a right would entail that an
individual‟s right to freedom of association can be trumped by a group‟s need
to claim that individual on membership rolls. That scenario, in our liberal
political tradition, is unacceptable. This objection is not objection at all, since
groups do not have rights to membership.57
Sundstrom, however, does acknowledge that we may have moral obligations
to certain groups. Again the claim is explicitly liberal in origin. “As autonomous
individuals, we have moral obligations to other individuals, and we may in some
cases have moral obligations to groups, but we do not have any moral obligation to
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maintain membership in any group.”58 Yet even Shelby recognizes that given the
social context in the U.S., it is virtually impossible to avoid racial group membership.
Individuals might be able to change their religion without the outside world knowing
of their change in values and spiritual practices, but they cannot so easily change the
way other people and society racially classifies them. This is precisely why
Sundstrom only claims „a degree‟ of reality for mixed race identity; it lacks the
legitimacy provided by the lateral forces in society. But here the point is not to argue
for some kind of forced acceptance of an all-encompassing blackness, particularly for
those who do not feel comfortable with such an identity. Rather, the concern is how
such an individual shift is possible in a society in which racial consciousness is so
entrenched; what does it actually mean to reject ones racial identity? And, is it only
within the reaches of those who are multiracial? Is it that there is a unique
opportunity for these individuals to seize the historical moment and step beyond the
racial consciousness as Naomi Zack suggests?59 More importantly, in what fashion
can we speak of group obligations when the moral foundation is one that allows for a
wholesale rejection of group identities?
For Sundstrom the key is again, understanding how certain social group
categories function in our society. Indeed, it is clear that the better a person
appreciates the social context and the implications of their actions, the more
effectively they will be able to exercise their moral fortitude. However, the group
obligations Sundstrom speaks of consist of refraining from what we would generally
call immoral behavior for any individual. He explains it thus,
For example, take a Chicano who rejects his membership in that community,
and acts in a manner that is racist and denigrating to other Chicanos. In his
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racist actions he has failed to fulfill his moral obligation to his fellow
Chicanos; however, his rejection of his membership in that community is not
itself morally problematic – it is only in conjunction with his racist behavior
that his rejection of his community is morally problematic.60
Yet, surely such recommendations about racist behavior apply to all people and do not
indicate any particular group obligations a person might have. More importantly,
again I think this move is too quick if we take racial consciousness and the lived
experience seriously. For in societies like the U.S. and Britain where racial
consciousness necessarily contain negative and denigrating assumptions (despite the
efforts of historical and cultural revisionists), we must pose the question why the
Chicano, the multiracial, or the African-American person wants to reject or
disassociate themselves from their racial community and/or identity in the first place.
What exactly are they rejecting in this process of rejecting their community? If a
person rejects the unequal treatment they are subjected to as a result of the imposition
of a racial identity that is one thing, but it surely is not the same as and would not be
described as rejecting one‟s community in any way I can conceive of this phrase. If a
person rejected their immediate community; in the sense of wanting to distance
themselves from their family or neighborhood that for them was an impoverished
environment in some form or another, that again would be understandable but
similarly would not be described as rejecting one‟s community in a racial or ethnic
sense. Surely we would assume that if the person relocated or changed their circle of
friends they would not select their new environment according to a set of purely
racially determined criteria. And if they did, wouldn‟t we find that morally
problematic? Similarly, if a person rejects their racial identity, either the actual
imposition of a designation or the perceived derogatory or insufficient content of a
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particular racial label, the form of this rejection would not be considered as a rejection
of one‟s community. It might be described as a rejection of one‟s identity but only
insofar as the socially predefined content of the label did not match who the
individual understood themselves to be. As such, the process might more aptly be
described as a desire to express one‟s own sense of self more accurately. Moreover,
in the context of a racially conscious society, the manner in which this reassertion of
identity is carried out profoundly impacts the moral merits of the endeavor. For these
reasons, the moral import of rejecting any identity or community cannot be so easily
captured in an appeal to the right to freedom of association. Rejecting a person,
community or wider group is not a small thing. As the birds of a feather adage attests,
who we associate with, which groups we belong to and who we identify with, says a
great deal about who we are. More importantly, however, is the point that such a
„rejection‟ of either community or identity is simply not possible in a society with
racial consciousness where one‟s lived experiences are fundamentally impacted by
one‟s racial embodiment. Where could such a person relocate to in order to escape
their raced community? Even if a raced person lives in an all non-raced neighborhood
and works among all non-raced colleagues and only has relationships with non-raced
people, they do not achieve the individualism of the non-raced as the many stories of
those who have intentionally tried to pass attest.
Sundstrom tries to rectify this individualistic bent and the fissure between the
social context and moral obligation in chapter five of The Browning of America in
which he sets forth a (re)vision of a „responsible‟ multiracial politics. In this revised
multiracial politics, Sundstrom recognizes some of the shortcomings of the political
strategy he outlined “Being and Being Mixed Race” (reproduced above). It becomes
clear that Sundstrom is not satisfied with the unencumbered picture to the degree
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Shelby seems to be. There is an evident desire to find a theoretically plausible and
morally acceptable balance between peoples‟ freedom to express themselves given the
difficulties inherent in a society with racial consciousness and the responsibility to
resist perpetuating racial injustice. Yet this responsibility is not derived simply from a
purely procedural and pragmatic notion of racial victimization as Shelby would have
it. It is not only those who are subjected to racism who can contribute to resolving the
problem of racialized injustice. The ideas that we should make the changes in attitude
towards simplistic conceptions of race and broaden our understanding with respect to
how racisms operate in society, as Sundstrom rightly concludes, are endeavors that all
persons should embark on, not just multiracial persons. And yet, if multiracial people
have no particular moral obligations beyond those negative duties to refrain from
restricting or interfering with other peoples‟ rights, in what manner can we claim that
they have any responsibility to consider the injustices their darker brothers and sisters
experience – especially if to do so limits their personal freedoms? Moreover, what
are we to make of the instinctively unsatisfactory conclusion that ultimately falls out
of Sundstrom‟s political strategy – that multiracial persons‟ moral obligations to their
mono-racial parent groups are no more robust than those of anyone else? Somehow
this just doesn‟t seem right, particularly since arguments for multiracial ontology are
often explained and justified on account of loyalty to one‟s parents.61 While such
arguments are typically understood as referring to the need to recognize their nonraced parent, it would be highly irregular to assume that a similar degree of respect
would not be extended to their raced parent. So how can the multiracial person be
morally responsible in a society with racial consciousness and still maintain their
61
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freedom of expression? If one accepts the premise that social identities do not
necessarily contain moral import, how can the moral theorist bridge the gap between
the „is‟ and the „ought‟ that inevitably exist between the lived reality of being raced
and the moral imperatives this seems to imply? For while most liberals will accept
such identities emerge out of the social context, there is not a deep enough connection
between a social identity one might choose and one‟s sense of morality from which
one can theoretically make a case for collective responsibilities. Consequently,
anyone working from these assumptions must generate the contingent conditions upon
which we can acceptably assume special moral responsibilities for others on the
backdrop of a moral framework that only requires obligations to be true to oneself.
Sundstrom‟s answer is an ethics of memory, grounded in care ethics. He tries
to establish a „special‟ obligation for multiracial persons on account of their
„experience‟ and „place‟ in the racialization process. This unique position multiracial
persons occupy, and the moral obligation derived from this particular positioning, is
grounded in the multiracial family context and the need to heal the „brokenness‟ that
apparently is part and parcel of this racial status.
Multiracial persons find themselves born into a world riven by racial fault
lines, a situation the frequently feel they carry within their bodies and
identities…Multiracialism is burdened with its special measure of
responsibility to repair the ruptures around race in their lives, families, and
communities. Multiracial individuals are thrust into brokenness, into the
ruptures that mark their condition. They can react like libertarians and assert
absolute autonomy and disconnection, or they can acknowledge the broken
world that surrounds them.62
For Sundstrom, the latter is the morally responsible choice and thus he turns to claims
of family belonging give rise to multiracial moral responsibility. More specifically,
this ethics is grounded in the memory, albeit possibly abstract, of one‟s grandmother.
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Sundstrom reminds critics of this approach that themes of familial repair have
consistently been a feature of attempts to assert multiracial identities. True to this
tendency, Sundstrom invokes the appeals for white maternal recognition and reverses
it to demand respect for our raced mothers. According to Sundstrom, an
individualistic approach to our moral responsibility is not sufficient if we are to meet
the obligations we have to our mothers and family.
Sundstrom then makes an additional move and extends these seemingly
immediate familial obligations to a much broader notion of family; not unlike the
notion of kinship bonds commonly adopted in raced communities. Ironically, despite
Sundstrom‟s liberal inclinations and determination to escape the trappings of
community, his ethics of memory take a rather traditional approach. He argues,
The assertion of obligation to the memory of our mothers links us to
obligations to the memories of our African American, Asian, Latina, Native
America, and Anglo grandmothers to their and their children‟s welfare. This is
a special obligation that multiracial children must face that is grounded in their
experience of family ties. The demand for the recognition of multiracial
identity, then, ought to be grounded in children‟s recognition of particular
responsibilities (psychological, social, economic, and political) to their
mothers and grandmothers.63
However, for all the contextual propping up, it is not clear how we can arrive at the
broader social and political notion of obligation with a kinship model of responsibility
without some claims to a „thicker‟ sense of what multiracial identity means morally.
Without that, it is hard to envisage exactly what these psychological, social, economic
and political obligations might look like in practice. For instance, what of the many
multiracial children who are adopted, whose parents have divorced, have died, or for
whatever reason do not know, let alone remember their grandmothers literally,
historically or metaphorically? And what does it mean to „remember‟ these
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grandmothers such that we can derive a sense of obligation to repairing or restoring in
the face of injustice? Surely what is necessary here is a more accurate and
comprehensive understanding of American history, both in terms of the narratives of
those grandmothers and their peoples, and also of the country‟s history of racial
discrimination and oppression. Moreover, it is not entirely clear to what extent
Sundstrom is committed to this new position such that the appeals to freedoms of
expression he articulated in the earlier work might be erased or at least fundamentally
reduced. Should, for example, the multiracial individual support the NAACP in their
campaigns for racial justice, even if they oppose multiracial identity? Should the
multiracial person patronize the store their own white grandmother works in while the
store run by the African American woman (which is being financially squeezed out of
the market as a result of the majority white community‟s refusal to patronize the shop
and the slightly higher cost of her goods compared to that of the superstores five
minutes down the highway), who is not biologically related but on this extended
ethics of memory is connected through racial identity?
How to behave morally is always a messy, difficult business, whether one
wants to assert a multiracial or not. But if Shelby‟s account is too thin and
Sundstrom‟s attempt to walk a fine line between the thick and the thin doesn‟t work,
how can we speak of collective responsibilities for raced persons in societies with
racial consciousness like the U.S. and Britain? Above I suggested Sundstrom‟s ethic
of memory was too thin if he is to stay true to his desire to ensure freedom of
expression is upheld. Indeed, I share Sundstrom‟s reservations about more
conventional communitarian approaches that would have us playing predetermined
social roles and having to adhere to traditions and customs in a manner that the
modern individual would find repellent. One might argue this is particularly the case
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for those with multiracial identities who, due to the cleavages between their racial
heritages, place great value on being able to define their identity as they please. Yet
Sundstrom tried to imbue his liberal account of identity with some of the thicker
commitments communitarians subscribe to; so what is it that is problematic here? I
contend there are three key points on which Sundstrom and indeed Shelby have failed
to recognize how we can move beyond these identity wars without losing the
freedoms we are accustomed to in modern liberal society such that we can
meaningfully discuss morality in a way that is consistent with how humans actually
experience their sense of morality. 1) They do not appreciate the degree of impact
racial consciousness has on people‟s lived experience and moral reasoning. 2) They
do not take seriously the role the lived experience plays in moral reasoning and moral
motivation. 3) They accept the unencumbered conception of self that views humans
as essentially morally neutral beings insofar as they can separate their identities and
lived experiences from their political ideals through an objective and impartial
process of rational reasoning. Point one, and to some extent point two, I have
attended to in the above chapters (although I will explore this further in chapter four).
I now turn to the work of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor to do justice to the
third concern and offer an alternative to the unencumbered conception of self.

89

Chapter 3: Purpose, Evaluation and Language: A Morally Encumbered Self
“I am a Republican, a black, dyed in the wool
Republican, and I never intend to belong to any
other party than the party of freedom and progress”
Frederick Douglass

In the discussions in chapters one and two, I argued that it is crucial in any
attempt to engage in the philosophy of race to appreciate the depth and impact of
racial consciousness and the lived experience on questions of morality and/or social
and political justice. It is not at all my intention to suggest that philosophies of race
borne out of the liberal tradition do not consider communities or the social context at
all. One would have to achieve a profound level of philosophical abstraction to talk
about race and social justice in the United States or Britain without recognizing the
impact of racial consciousness. However, as we saw with Shelby and Sundstrom, in
their commitment to the liberal paradigm and the unencumbered self, the ability to
theorize collective responsibility becomes particularly problematic for those persons
theorizing race within a paradigm of ideal theory, ill-equipped to deal with the reality
of racial consciousness. Although Shelby and Sundstrom acknowledge the social
context in which discussions of race are held, their moral agent remains one who
makes free and unfettered choices about who they are, who they can associate
themselves with and who they believe it is good to be. As a result, neither scholar
fully takes up how the lived experience impacts on a person‟s identity and the
normative dimensions of one‟s life. Consequently, race and the reality of racisms are
acknowledged but in a fashion insufficiently robust to meaningfully address the
manner in which racial consciousness impacts the lived experience of the subject who
is raced, and the moral context in which all persons engage in moral reasoning.
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Ironically, both also must rely on essentializing notions of the racial group to ground
their arguments for black solidarity and multiracial responsibility, respectively. I
intend to show that racial identities can be identified in virtue of their psychological
impact on moral reasoning, which escapes the charge of essentialism but enables us to
address the reality of living in societies with racisms and racial consciousness.
Contrary to what seems to be the prevailing understanding of moral
motivation in Anglo-American philosophy I, like Charles Taylor, am not convinced
that we can accept whatever flaws there are in the unencumbered conception of the
self on the grounds that they do not meaningfully impact questions of justice.1 I
suggest a reconsideration of the view of human agency that relies on the capacity for
moral neutrality and objective reasoning. Instead, I propose a shift to the application
of an encumbered conception of the human self. The encumbered conception of self
offers an alternative human ontology that is robustly situated such that social, cultural,
historical and political forces are understood necessarily to impact moral motivation
and moral reasoning. As such, the encumbered self provides us with the tools to
theorize more effectively the two crucial kinds of connectivity not accounted for in
the unencumbered conception of self, namely: 1) the manner in which our actions,
desires, and motives are directly connected to what we understand our purpose/s in
life to be and 2) the manner in which the social context impacts both the formulation
of that life purpose and our moral deliberations that occur in reference to it. As such,
this chapter highlights the historical emergence of the subject-as-object as a backdrop
to a discussion of Taylor‟s model of the „purposeful human agent.‟ Next, I discuss
hypergoods, a person's most fundamental value commitments, and the manner in
which our evaluations constitute the self. Finally, I explore the role of language in the
1
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formulation of moral frameworks. Ultimately, this discussion is intended to show
how this encumberedness impacts moral reasoning, specifically in reference to a
person's racial identity and status.

Emergence of the Subject as Object
One can easily be excused for assuming the immutability and importance of
the idea of a rational, impartial human agent so central to Anglo-American
philosophy. This conception is a fundamental component of much of modernity from our political and legal systems to our personal ideals of independence and
personal growth. The paradigmatic shift in our understanding of the physical universe
that marked the move from the ancient and medieval conceptions of the cosmos is
now, hundreds of years later, something that is easy to take for granted. Yet, the idea
of a rational human agent has not always been at the heart of our moral and social
understanding. We should also note that liberalism is very much a Western
experiment; the unencumbered human characterized in chapter one bears little
resemblance to the familial and communally situated person with deeply held and
fully acknowledged moral commitments envisaged outside of Western societies.2 The
naturalist, mechanized view that lay the foundation for the scientific model of enquiry
we are now so familiar with is just one version of an ever-evolving understanding
humans have of the universe of which we are a part. Nevertheless, this scientific
model has undergirded and enabled remarkable advancements in countless fields that
have impacted our universe in ways Galileo and Newton could have never imagined.
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What is, perhaps, less obvious are the accompanying developments in philosophical
ideas and their implications for our conception of human nature.
In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor takes up the monumental task of
charting the historical and philosophical evolution of the conception of the self. This
is not to imply that Taylor, or indeed I, approach this topic from an objective
historical perspective; in Human Agency and Language in particular, and throughout
Taylor‟s work, the reoccurring theme is actually a rejection of the naturalistic
approach that buttresses the methodologies of modern social sciences.3 I share
Taylor‟s concern with our reliance on what I believe is now a very outdated view of
the best methodology for understanding human psychology and sociology. While it is
true we need to recognize the value and significance of the scientific model we can
also appreciate that it is part of the ongoing historiography of ideas that serves as a
platform from which a „new‟ and more fruitful understanding of human life can
emerge. Indeed, despite our dominance on this planet, it is abundantly clear that all is
not well with how we manage our relationship with the Earth and each other.
As far back as our knowledge of intellectual history goes we can see humans
asking questions about the world they live in and their relationship to it. From that
starting point comes the inevitable metaphysical question “what are we?” Each
successive generation of thinkers has built on existing knowledge and new
perspectives have emerged about who and what we understand humans to be.4 For
this dissertation, the crucial development in the liberal conception of self that I have
referred to as ontologically unencumbered, occurred as a result of transformations in
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how people understood the world, and by extension human beings, during the
scientific revolution of the enlightenment in Europe. Fundamental to this
transformation of the concept of the self was the move to a representational account of
knowledge, reality and meaning, ushered in by Descartes‟ dualism.5 On the Cartesian
model certainty is a result of building and ordering one‟s clear and distinct
perceptions. Thus, reality is a function of the mind as the cogito famously reminds us
– I think therefore I am. The challenge for a Cartesian soul, therefore, is to
disentangle itself from the confusion of the material world where the body is no
longer a vehicle through which truth can be revealed. As Taylor explains, “Coming to
a full realization of one‟s being as immaterial involves perceiving distinctly the
ontological cleft between the two [mind and body], and this involves grasping the
material world as mere extension…We have to objectify the world, including our own
bodies, and that means to come to see them mechanistically and functionally, in the
same way that an uninvolved observer would.”6
This new ontology of subject-as-object, Taylor explains, gives rise to a new
epistemology and also a new view of morality. With a mechanized body, reason‟s
role is to instrumentalize desires in accordance with the mechanical principles that
govern the universe. Self–mastery, then, becomes about our ability to control the
passions through reason. We do not seek to eliminate our emotions but rather to
channel them in the right direction such that they serve and support our rational
choices and the good life becomes a function of the agent‟s sense of dignity as a
rational being capable of performing this task. “So [on one view], what makes an
agent a person, a fully human respondent, is the power to plan. My interlocutor
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replies to me out of his power to make a life-plan and act on it. This is what I have to
respect.”7 According to Taylor, this shift to a conception of control through
disengagement comes into its own through enlightenment thinkers like John Locke, in
which the subject, the „punctual self‟ becomes objectified. However, this
objectification differs from that of the classical period in the sense that one is urged to
look at an objective external order. In other words, on the modern view, we are
encouraged to separate ourselves through a process of self-objectification – in which I
analyze my own thinking, behavior, desires and objectify them. Taylor calls this
process „radical reflexivity.‟ “To turn to oneself is now also and inescapably a turn to
oneself in the first-person perspective – a turn to the self as a self.”8
The net result of this process of objectification is that our experiences lose
their significance; we can no longer draw on them to find meaning because they are
understood as distinctly separate from the self. As such, our experiences are
neutralized and deprived of their normative force.9 Consequently, on the
unencumbered conception of personhood a person is morally obliged, on the weak
version, to ensure they do not interfere with another person‟s life-plans and, on the
strong version, to maintain social and political conditions that ensure other people are
free to formulate and pursue their life-plans. Thus the motive for moral behavior or
the force that can bring the „ought‟ to life is derived from the objective conditions the
moral agent exists in and the possibility of the loss of conditions that are necessary to
exercise one‟s personhood. The notion of equality comes into play here because the
source of moral motivation essentially arises from the rationale that all those persons
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with this capacity to make ends have the right to exercise it and if it is taken away
from one such individual we are presented with the possibility or even likelihood of
losing that right for everyone or being unable to justify the grounds upon which we
assert the right. Thus, rather than run that risk one concludes it is better to maintain
the minimal conditions to exercise personhood for all. When there is evidence of
injustice we are obliged to fix the situation. At the political level, insofar as there is a
fissure between public and private, the state must ensure these conditions. The
difficulty comes where de jure equality seems to be in place and yet gross social
inequality still remains – as is the case with racisms. Another concern is with moral
motivation more generally which impacts political and social justice insofar as it is
the behavior and attitudes of the members of any given society who constitute social
reality and carry the potential for social change. However, because the unencumbered
individual is not meaningfully connected to his/her context, he/she is merely another
object in the world, the question becomes who is obliged to address social injustice
and why. Clearly it is not realistic to expect everyone in an entire society to take up
action against any and all infringements on another person‟s right to personhood. We
are no longer beings of significance for whom things matter. Thus ethics becomes an
exercise in constructing the conditions and contingencies under which a person is
obliged to help another.

Charles Taylor’s Purposeful Human Agent
The concern with connectivity (or lack of) between the social, political and
moral, is not a new one. The unencumbered liberal conception of self has adapted
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and responded to its many detractors and has proven itself to be enduring.10 That
being said, I suggest that the impact of racial consciousness and the lived experience
on our conception of self are factors that have not been satisfactorily incorporated into
the larger discussions of the ontology of self and/or social justice within the liberal
paradigm. The entire body of Rawls‟ work, the canonical figure in contemporary
Anglo-America philosophy, barely mentions race, despite the fact that his watershed
book, A Theory of Justice, was published at the height of the most significant racial
and social upheaval in America‟s post war history.11 Even works that seek explicitly
to take up the challenge of theorizing justice for oppressed groups, like Will
Kymlicker‟s widely cited, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights, do not consider or accommodate raced groups.12 More importantly,
contemporary race scholars, like those discussed in the previous chapters, seem too
willing to accept the tenets of the unencumbered position even as they struggle within
those confines to find theoretical solutions to the very real problems they hope to shed
light upon. The central concern here then, should not be ontological descriptions of a
group or particular definitions of group identity, but rather how to eradicate racial
injustice. If a viable theoretical framework for liberation does not emerge when we
accept certain assumptions about the nature of the self and its relationship to the
historical and social context, surely we must question those assumptions no matter
how embedded in our philosophy and social structures they might be. The idea that
the moral agent cannot be conceived without moral purpose is an important step in
10
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this paradigmatic shift. Indeed, I suggest that the commitment to the unencumbered
conception of self, such that the moral agents‟ freedom of choice and association are
prioritized and the moral environment is construed as both objective and abstracted
from the moral agent herself, force us into discussions about special obligations that
are beholden to a framework of moral agency that cannot yield viable solutions for
racisms.13
But what if we begin by presuming a different metaphysical picture; a picture
in which humans are necessarily situated partial moral beings? What if we accept that
human beings are never without a moral orientation? Does this alter the lens through
which arguments pertaining to our moral duties, obligations or responsibilities must
be viewed? This is the move Charles Taylor makes as he rejects the contingent,
procedural moral ideal of an unencumbered self. Conversely, for Taylor, humans are
beings who have purpose; but unlike machines, humans are beings with „original
purpose‟ not merely „derivative purpose.‟ Insofar as they have original purpose,
humans are beings for whom things matter. “We cannot simply identify agents by a
performance criterion, nor assimilate animals to machines.”14 The machine has a
purpose only insofar as we designed it to perform a certain task. The cooker‟s
purpose is to heat up our food; the radio‟s purpose is to play music, etc. However,
Taylor explains, without the „user-relative‟ context, the function of the machine is
simply what it is „doing,‟ not its purpose. In this sense the machine does not have
what Taylor calls original purpose. “By contrast, animals and human beings are
subjects of original purpose. That the cat is stalking the bird is not a derivative, or
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observer-relative fact about it. Nor is it a derivative fact about me that I am trying to
explain two doctrines of the person.”15 Our actions, desires, and motives are not
merely born out of a pragmatic plan designed to maximize or moral utility. Rather
they are directly connected to what we understand our purpose/s in life to be or to
some matter of „original significance.‟ This is not to suggest humans have one
specific purpose that we all strive towards. As I shall discuss in more detail in chapter
four, our social and moral context, life experiences, and a host of other factors
influence and shape a person‟s conception of their purpose and aspirations. The point
here is to suggest that we begin discussion of moral agents‟ obligations or
responsibilities with the assumption that they are beings with some kind of original
purpose.
Yet, this ability to have an original point of view does not distinguish us from
other animals or other agents, as Taylor seeks to do. Taylor‟s concern here is those
thinkers who understand consciousness as the definitive boundary between humans
and other agents. On this model, consciousness is the ability to frame representations
of things. However, consciousness is not a boundary Taylor believes is taken
sufficiently seriously and results in a performance criterion of agency. As such the
„nature‟ of agency is not given the appropriate philosophical attention.16 According to
Taylor, original purpose must not be understood as consciousness, for consciousness
as representation does not help us understand what is important about human agency.
“Built into the notion of representation,” Taylor argues, “is the idea that
representations are of independent objects. I frame a representation of something
which is independently of my depicting it, and which stands as a standard for this
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depiction.”17 However, Taylor rejects the idea that our emotions can be objectified as
disengaged or separate from our self in this way. For some distinctly human feelings
like pride, shame, guilt, sense of worth, and love etc. the mechanistic, instrumental,
representational model of agency just doesn‟t hold.
One could say that there is a judgment integral to each one of these emotions:
„thus is shameful‟ for shame; „there is danger‟ for fear, and so on. Not that to
feel the emotion is to assent to the judgment. We can feel the emotion
irrationally; and sometimes see that the judgment in question holds
dispassionately. It is rather that feeling the emotion in question just is being
struck by, or moved by, the state of affairs the judgment describes…It follows
from this that I can describe my emotions by describing my situation, and very
often must do so really to give the flavor of what I feel.18
These kinds of emotions not only highlight the inadequacy of the unencumbered
ontology of human agency insofar as they render this objectified picture untenable. If
the defining human emotions require some kind of initial judgment, the objective,
disconnected, subject as object conception of human agency doesn‟t work because its
starting point is impartial.
Further, these emotions provide the basis for distinguishing between human
and other agents. Taylor argues that human agents must be understood as „subjects of
significance.‟ Insofar as humans are subjects of significance, there are matters of
significance, revealed by our emotional lives, which are unique to humans and have
no equivalent with other animals – like morality.
These human matters are also connected with consciousness in some sense.
One could indeed argue that no agent could be sensitive to them who was not
capable of formulating them, or at least of giving expression to them; and
hence the kind of consciousness which language brings is essential to
them...To be a moral agent is to be sensitive to certain standards. But
„sensitive‟ here must have a strong sense; not just that one‟s behavior follow a
certain standard, but also that one in some sense recognize or acknowledge the
standard.
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Animals can follow standards in the weaker sense. My cat will not eat
fishmeal below a certain quality. With knowledge of the standard I can
predict his behavior. But there need be no recognition here that he is
following a standard. This kind of thing, however, would not be sufficient to
attribute moral action to an agent.19
To be a moral agent is to have some kind of standards that orient one‟s life and to be
able to distinguish which of the standards one might subscribe to are higher or lower,
more or less worthy. Moreover, given that these standards entail judgments, I
suggest that for something to be significant it must be valuable in one‟s life. What
becomes significant to any person does not emerge randomly nor is it an intellectual
abstraction but rather a function of that person‟s situated life experience. The
recognition and evaluation of and/or subscription to any particular set of standards
does not arise out of a detached contemplation of competing notions of justice.
Rather it emerges through a dynamic, evolving conversation with other people and the
language community in the broadest sense. What is important about this ontological
conception of the human self is that it gives a completely different picture of selfmastery and moral reasoning. In questioning the conception of consciousness as
representation as the definitive characteristic of human agency, “what springs to view
is that persons have qualitatively different concerns. In other terms, once one raises
the question of agency, then that of the ends of agents comes into view.”20 For beings
of significance, the sense of self is derived from where the person stands in relation to
their standards; their moral framework. Taylor sums it up thus, “The center is no
longer the power to plan, but rather the openness to certain matters of moral
significance.”21 What follows from this alternative metaphysical picture is that
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establishing moral responsibility is not an exercise in formulating the conditions
under which persons can legitimately be required to have moral sensitivity to a
particular issue. Rather, the question becomes: How can we ensure ending racial
injustice is a matter of significance for all persons?
Recognizing where one is in relation to one‟s moral framework, exploring
what is significant and making qualitative deliberations (as opposed to contingent
ones), are fundamentally evaluative processes. Taylor argues that evaluating the more
or less worthy is central to moral agency and humans are inimitable in their ability to
engage in reflective self-evaluation.22 This point is not a new revelation; humans‟
capacity for reflection has long been seen as fundamental to agency. Like other
agents, humans have desires and make choices. However, according to Frankfurt,
humans have „second order‟ desires – they make decisions about which desires are
more desirable. Taylor takes this notion of second order desires and develops it to
make a further distinction that is central to his ontology of the self. For Taylor, there
are two kinds of second order evaluations: weak and strong. Weak evaluations then
are those in which, “for something to be judged good it is sufficient that it be desired.”
Taylor goes on, “It follows from this that when in weak evaluation one desired
alternative is set aside, it is only on grounds of its contingent incompatibility with a
more desired alternative.”23 Strong evaluations however, use terms like ‟good‟ which
indicate the worth of the desire or action. For Taylor, it is this question of worth that
is the critical distinguishing component of human agency.24 Humans make
evaluations about whether their motivations are noble, courageous, virtuous etc. As
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such, deliberations about what to do when desires are incompatible are not merely a
matter of contingencies, but also they rest on and reflect the comparative worth of the
action to the person evaluating. However, those motivations and desires that are
considered higher, more noble, more worthy, etc. are not evaluated as isolated
entities, unrelated to any kind of broader framework such that they can be set aside
when we no longer have any use for them. Rather, Taylor claims, “Motivations and
desires do not only count in virtue of the attraction of the consummations but also in
virtue of the kind of life and the kind of subject that these desires properly belong
to.”25
Yet how do we determine which of those goods will trump the other when we
have a moral decision to make? According to Taylor, there are some goods which are
of incomparable value to a person; they simply play a more fundamental role in
orienting the person‟s life. For many of us, there is not one single good that reigns
supreme in all situations; even those who are devoutly religious probably consider
dying for their beliefs rather extreme. Nevertheless, it is the case that there are goods
that we consider comparatively higher than other goods, which form the basis of our
discriminations between other goods. These „higher-order goods‟ Taylor calls
hypergoods.26 Hypergoods do not orient our moral decisions only in the sense of
allowing us to determine what to do (as in the case of a traditional ethical approach).
Rather, hypergoods set out who we think it is good to be.
For those with a strong commitment to such a good, what it means is that this
above all others provides the landmarks for what they judge to be the direction
of their lives. While they recognize a whole range of qualitative distinctions,
while all of these involve strong evaluation, so that they judge themselves and
others by the degree they attain the goods concerned and admire or look down
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on people in function of this, nevertheless the one highest good has a special
place. It is orientation to this which comes closest to defining my identity, and
therefore my direction to this good is of unique importance to me.27
Hypergoods speak to the kind of person we believe is ranked morally higher and thus
are a compass for our moral aspirations as a person. What follows from this
alternative metaphysical picture that is crucial to this discussion is that establishing
moral responsibility is not an exercise in formulating the conditions under which
persons can legitimately be required to have moral sensitivity to a particular issue.
Rather the question becomes, what matters to a person and why?

Hypergoods and How Our Evaluations Constitute the Self
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, this relationship between our
actions, motives, desires and our hypergoods, is central for theorizing the first of the
two forms of connectivity that dictate the manner in which a moral agent must be
understood as encumbered. Insofar as a person‟s hypergoods are a reflection of their
identity – who they see themselves as being and who they strive to be - the strong
evaluations that are made in reference to those hypergoods are constitutive of the self.
At first glance, this might sound like a strange claim given that most observers of
human motives and behavior would acknowledge much of what we come to
understand as our own personal moral framework is comprised of ideals and values
we have not actively or even consciously chosen to subscribe to. Our behaviors and
thinking are an amalgamation of years of socialization from family, school, wider
societal and cultural influences that we often have no choice about or cannot avoid
even if we might like to. And yet, the fundamentally human process of evaluating
and formulating our values impacts us in two crucial ways that are ultimately
27
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constitutive of who we are. First, how we describe and assess our experiences, other
people‟s actions and the wider society affects how we in turn experience the world
and is the basis for how we evaluate ourselves. Second, these strong evaluations
determine whether we are open to matters of significance and indeed, which matters
we will understand to be of significance, thus shaping our desires and aspirations. It
is in this regard that Taylor describes humans as self-interpreting. He explains it thus,
We can say that our self-interpretations are partly constitutive of our
experience. For an altered description of our motivation can be inseparable
from a change in this motivation. But to assert this connection is not to put
forward a causal hypothesis: it is not to say that we alter our descriptions and
then as a result our experience of our predicament alters. Rather it is that
certain modes of experience are not possible without certain selfdescriptions.28
So, let us explore further how our self-interpretations are constitutive of our
experience.
We can describe the seemingly infinite little moments and events that come to
be the total of what we call our lives in concrete ways i.e. I woke up at seven thirty,
had pancakes for breakfast, went to work on the train, prepared the presentation for a
meeting at eleven o‟clock etc. However, what turns these benign facts into the
animated, impassioned narrative that we call our lives are our perceptions and
interpretations. It is the infinite possibility and often uniqueness of the subtle
differences of interpretations from one person to the next that make the exploration of
the human condition so endlessly fascinating and indeed illusive. To get to the heart
of and to understand how a person describes their experiences and the world around
them provides an insight into how that person experiences the world because on the
encumbered model of self, these descriptions are constitutive of our experiences. Let
us consider a concrete example. Picture this scene:
28
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A couple strolls hand in hand through the park on a beautiful
summer’s day. Their two children run on ahead vying to get to the one
empty swing first – the younger of the two determined this will be the day
she gets the better of their elder sibling. The couple sits down on a bench,
happy to take the weight off their feet, tired from a long week at work but
uplifted by the sight of their children playing so freely, enjoying that
blissful not-a-care-in-the-world feeling we associate with the young. The
couple is grateful that they too share that feeling, even if only for these
fleeting moments in the park.
As the hypothetical observer of this scene, how we choose to describe it can
and will have an impact on our own experience of it. In any situation there are
concrete observations we can make and then there is the story or interpretation that we
add.29 As a person born and raised in the city, the tranquility and beauty of parks
inevitably represents something positive to me, hence my description above.
Moreover, as a Londoner forever plagued with the too often grey unpredictability of
the English weather, a sunny day always warms my heart. A vision of my own two
nieces, who I love dearly, crosses my mind and my belief in the importance of
ensuring children get to have that feeling of unfettered freedom and fun is reinforced.
So as the language in the description above conveys this, is a happy scene, at least as I
perceive it. I can appreciate the scene for the good in it given my interpretation and
how that resonates with my own values.
However, there is much that has been left out of the description, left to the
readers/ other hypothetical observer‟s imaginations. What happens when we fill in
more of the details about who these people are? For example we could start with just
29
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their physical appearances, which we inevitably see. Physical appearance is typically
all the information we have to formulate opinions on unless we intend to introduce
ourselves to these strangers for some reason. The facts are:
the man in the scene is five feet- eleven inches tall. He has dark
brown skin and short curly hair. He is wearing a fresh pair of sneakers,
blue jeans, with a red t-shirt and he has a wedding ring on. He is smiling
and engaged in a conversation with the woman whose hand be is holding.
The woman is five feet five inches tall and has long blond hair. Her skin is
a cream color but her cheeks are flushed red from the brisk breeze in the
park. She too is smiling as she talks to her husband, occasionally rubbing
her wedding ring as they stroll at a leisurely pace behind their children.
We don’t know the exact age of the children but they look to be
approximately six and eight years old. The oldest, a girl, is dressed in a
matching pink outfit while the youngest, also a girl, is dressed in blue jeans
and a multicolored striped t-shirt. They have shoulder length curly hair
but the older child’s is slightly straighter than her sister’s. They both
arrive at the swing at the same time but eventually the elder of the two
sisters wins out in the tussle to get the first ride. The younger of the two
runs back to her parents, gets the words of consolation she needs and goes
and plays on the climbing frame.
Despite the claims of proponents of color-blindness, in a society with racial
consciousness, the material „facts‟ about this family‟s appearance will necessarily
impact the observer‟s interpretation. In turn, that interpretation will be impacted by
the observer‟s description. For example, if the hypothetical observer chooses to
describe this scene whether out loud or in their own mind (the latter we assume would
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be most probable), as yet another example of these oversexed black men preying on
innocent white women who don‟t know any better than but to succumb to their
advances and who end up with these confused, coffee-colored little mutts who don‟t
fit anywhere in society, then the whole scene in the park is unlikely to generate the
feeling of empathetic, contentment – the warm feeling one gets when seeing someone
else‟s joy – I as the nature starved, sun loving Londoner who has nieces that make me
smile might experience. The person who interprets this scene as an example of
racialized, sexual exploitation that leads to social disaster will experience an entirely
different set of emotions. They might experience shouldering resentment, disgust,
contempt, even outright anger.
Yet we need not draw on the flagrantly prejudiced to make the point here.
There are those who might describe the scene, as many do in such instances, albeit
rather naïvely, as a promising example of how the races can learn to live together in
harmony. The corresponding emotional experience will be a sense of hope and
promise; optimism for the future. Others might think of their own childhood and the
absence of such joy and thus experience a sense of regret. Indeed, for as many people
there are, there are as many possible interpretations and corresponding experiences to
be had.30 Two points are crucial here: 1) in any of these descriptions, present is the
language of evaluation which informs and reflects the strong evaluations of our own
lives, and 2) that these evaluations constitute our emotions. Whether this scene is
good or bad, worthy of our contempt or admiration, the language of strong evaluation
takes us beyond the mere facts that we could have used in our descriptions and into a
deeper level of reflection that speaks to our values and moral framework. The person
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who experiences contempt understands themselves to be above such social
indiscretions. They will further feel a sense of righteousness because of their own
perceived ability to resist stooping down with those who fail to exercise restraint. The
person who felt regret, will inevitably ask themselves when was the last time they
experienced the contentment the family seemed to enjoy and judge themselves and
their family circumstances accordingly. The person who felt the scene represented
something good, must have made reference to a certain conception of race relations
that they interpreted this scene as fulfilling.
However, the point is not simply that the observer will or will not experience
certain emotions depending on their own evaluations. Our strong evaluations will
open us up or close us off from certain interpretations of our emotions and
experiences and, therefore, either open us up or close us off from certain conceptions
of the world. The person who describes the family in the park as a social indiscretion
will not believe that it is indeed possible for people who might be described as being
from different racial groups to have happy relationships with well-adjusted children.
In failing to even conceive of such a thing, it certainly will not be something such a
person has aspirations to bring about. Similarly, the person who believes such unions
are shining examples of how to achieve racial harmony, might well fail to appreciate
the monumental political and social battles that have been fought to bring society to a
point where lynching a raced man for looking at a non-raced woman is no longer
common place and so called inter racial couples are more acceptable than they were
say fifty years ago. They might also be less likely to register the gross inequalities
between the raced and the non-raced despite the proliferation of so called interracial
unions and the children born out of them. Thus the second way our descriptions come
to constitute our experiences is a result of the manner in which our strong evaluations
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increase or decrease our ability to see new interpretations and alternative descriptions
and possibilities in the world - or, as Taylor puts it, being open to certain matters of
significance.31
Further, this stance of being open to matters of significance shapes our desires
and aspirations. Recall that strong evaluations are second order evaluations, such that
the value of the evaluation and/or experience itself is subject to question. Our
observer who has a problem with non-raced and raced people marrying and having
children, despite her negative evaluations and emotional reaction, still has
opportunities for further reflection. Upon having the visceral reaction on account of
their first assessment, this person can ask themselves was that the right reaction? Was
this response a good one? Is it consistent with my values and the person I would like
to be? If the answer to any of these questions is no, then she might well engage in
further reflection about why such a response is not her preferred outcome and more
importantly, what can she do in the future to ensure that her responses are closer to
her desired image of herself. In making a value judgment that such behavior is
inappropriate or at least undesirable, implicit in this judgment is the beginnings of the
formulation of different desires – indeed, desires that prior to this process of reflection
this person might not have considered. Indeed, the extent and direction the reflection
takes could be endless. Nevertheless, it is clear that the openness to such reflection
and the outcomes of the reflections themselves are impacting this person‟s aspirations.
Conversely, if the first response to the call for strong evaluation yielded yes and this
person was satisfied that her behavior was consistent with who she aspired to be and
contributed to her life purpose as she understood it, then the door to envisioning new
or alternative matters of significance, alternative perspectives and thus new
31
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aspirations is closed. Such a person will not explore the possibility that perhaps such
a degree of hostility is inappropriate. Therefore they will not ask themselves why they
even had such an emotional response in the first place as it will be taken as quite
normal and acceptable. Without these first steps, the possibility of even deeper
reflection about the basis for their own prejudices will certainly remain out of reach as
will the desire to change those prejudicial attitudes.
In this sense, we can argue then, as Taylor does, that a person is ultimately
responsible for re-evaluating their evaluations.32 He conceives this in two
fundamental ways that correspond with the two causal directions in which our
descriptions can be constitutive as described above. First, insofar as we can
rearticulate the descriptions of our experiences, we are responsible for re-evaluating
insofar as our descriptions of our experiences can actually impact how we experience
things. Second, we are responsible for re-evaluating because we are responsible for
what we see or don‟t see which in turn can provide us with new insights or a different
perspective. However, the reason the constitutive nature of strong evaluations gives
rise to moral responsibility is because, as Taylor rightly notes, we can have more or
less accurate evaluations.
Because of this constitutive relation, our descriptions of our motivations, and
our attempts to formulate what we hold important, are not simple descriptions
in that their objects are not fully independent. And yet they are not simply
arbitrary either, such that anything goes. There are more or less adequate,
more or less truthful, more self-clairvoyant or self-deluding interpretations.33
Indeed, those persons who are on the extreme end of the spectrum of self-delusion are
understood as having severe psychological problems, even pathologies, as in the case
of those with bipolar disorders, schizophrenia, multiple personality disorders etc. At
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the less extreme end, we judge people and hold them accountable for being morally
inconsistent and incongruent. The person who walks the talk is invariably held in
higher esteem than the person who just keeps talking and fails to live in accordance
with their own values. Failure to re-evaluate in this sense is viewed as a character
flaw in and of itself. However, it can obviously have deleterious effects for the
individual and other person he/she comes into contact with. The person who doesn‟t
listen to others or is unable to empathize is often insensitive or even rude; he/she
makes poor moral choices which can be perceived as offensive or undermine his/her
own wellbeing or the wellbeing of others. Moreover, we readily speak of those who
are deemed ignorant or narrow minded, unwilling to consider other people‟s
perspectives or unable to empathize and in this sense, we hold them responsible for
their unwillingness and/or ability to develop descriptions that are faithful to the
objects they seek to describe. It is not just that we have the capacity to gather new
information about the world but also that as we do so our experience of the world
changes at a deeper level and our journey towards the righteous, courageous, noble
and generous moves to higher ground. This higher ground requires that our
evaluations and re-evaluations and the judgments, desires and behaviors that result
from them at least strive towards accuracy in the form of our personal integrity but
also with regard to how we treat others and the world around us. We do not look
favorably upon the bigot even if they genuinely believe being narrow minded and
offensive is their personal ideal and they are fulfilling their own aspirations with
aplomb!

Language and Morality
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As we saw above, the process of making strong evaluations can only take
place against the backdrop of our hypergoods (our personal moral framework).
Likewise, the evolution of our hypergoods necessarily occurs in the context of the
mores, standards and customs of our particular social and historical time (the social
context).34 Evaluation is central to Taylor‟s account of moral frameworks. However,
Taylor further claims that the kind of strong evaluations required by moral agency can
only be formulated linguistically.
[Thus] for us language –animals our language is constitutive of our emotions,
not just because de facto we have articulated some of them, but also de jure as
the medium in which all our emotions, articulate and inarticulate, are
experienced. Only a language animal could have our emotions: and that
means, inter alia, emotions which involve strong evaluations.35
This brings us to the second problem with situating morality in the individual‟s
conscience. Abstracting a persons‟ own sense of morality from the social and
historical context, severs the moral agent‟s personal moral framework, and indeed
their own lived experience from the social context. Thus, on the unencumbered
model of self where subject is object, the world is seen as a neutral stage on which
humans play out their lives. The stage is merely the platform on which the internal
choices of individuals are brought to life. On an encumbered conception of self,
neither the players nor the stage can be neutral. As Charles Mills notes, “the historic
legacy of white racism has been a social ontology in which race has not been
abstracted from, but used as an indicator of one‟s personhood, so that those with a
certain “phenomenal” phenotype have been seen as less than human and so
undeserving of full (or any) respect.”36 The significance of language in the ontology

34

Taylor, Sources of the Self, 20.

35

Taylor, Human Language and Agency, 74.

36

Charles W. Mills, “Do Black Men Have a Moral Duty to Marry Black Women,” Journal of
Social Philosophy 25 (1994): 148.

113

of the self is important for this discussion because it allows us to fully appreciate the
impact of racial consciousness on the social context, which in turn impacts people‟s
life experiences and moral agency.
And so to language and its context. The idea that language evolves within the
historical context is itself not a contentious one. Indeed it is an observation that has
consistently been made by language scholars and is also evidenced by the use of
language as an overarching framework to explore a diverse range of other social and
cultural phenomenon. However, as Taylor explores in his essay “Language and
Human Nature” there is great disagreement on the relationship and manner in which
language is connected to meaning. For Taylor the disagreement lays between two
schools of thought: designative and expressive. Designative theories of language
assume that “the meaning of words or sentences is explained by their relation to
things or states of affairs in the world.” Conversely, expressive theories maintain that
“meaning cannot be fully separated from the medium, because it is only manifest in
it.”37 Like Taylor, I subscribe to the latter for it is consistent with the moral ontology
of significance outlined above.
The crucial distinction between the designative and the expressive theories of
language parallels the distinction between an unencumbered and an encumbered
ontology of self insofar as Taylor sees both the designative model of meaning and the
unencumbered self as originating from the same source – namely the objectification
of the world that emerged out of enlightenment ideals. Thus, unlike language on the
designative model, language as expression is expression of the subject and, therefore,
is not and cannot be neutral. “We see that language is no longer an assemblage of
words, but the capacity to speak (express/realize) the reflective awareness implicit in
37
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using words to say something.”38 But to „say something‟ that actually means
something requires that the words can be understood both insofar as meaning of the
word itself can be identified and also in the sense that there is a community of
language users with whom these articulations can be shared. Words cannot simply be
representations of objects in the world. Thus, words and phrases, like the subjects
that utter them, must invariably be understood in relation to other concepts and within
their language community, social, cultural and historical context. “The new coinages
are never quite autonomous, quite uncontrolled by the rest of language. They can
only be introduced and make sense because they already have a place within the
web.”39 For Taylor, language as expression is a language of contrast; we can only
really know the meaning of concepts insofar as we compare and contrast them with
other concepts. For example, we understand what it means to have a multiracial
identity because we can distinguish it from black or white. This web of meaning is
ever present, and it impacts the subject as a language user right from birth. Indeed, it
is the backdrop into which the newborn learns what it is to be a member of a language
community.
Ultimately language means something because it means something to the
people that speak and listen to it. While Taylor‟s definition of expression is very
broad, including works of art and other kinds of symbolic expressions, speech is the
activity via which our capacity for language finds its voice. Language (in all its
forms) is fundamentally about a dialogue; a conversation that shapes and reshapes our
understanding of words, phrases and meaning. But language is not merely about selfexpression, for a dialogue is a relationship. Indeed, Taylor ponders whether the
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subject of speech is not always in some sense the speech community. Language
always has collective ownership. The new painting or piece of music can never exist
in a vacuum regardless how „original‟ it may appear and regardless of how reclusive
its creator was. It invariably evolves out of and enters into the backdrop or aesthetic
expression that has gone before it, not to mention the social and political context of
which it is a part. For example, „N*****‟, „Negro‟, „colored‟, „black‟, „AfricanAmerican‟ are not only designative labels that have allowed us to pick out certain
people in the world; as we saw in the first two chapters, they carry much deeper
meanings about who we understand those persons to be and the relationships,
particularly power relations, between those who are racially labeled and those who are
not. However, we can only understand those deeper significations from within the
historical and cultural context. The transition from „black‟ to „African-American‟
could have only happened in the United States as blacks from other countries who
visit or live in the United States and are frequently referred to by others as AfricanAmerican are starkly aware! Similarly, to live in the United States and refer to
oneself as „colored‟ in the twenty-first century would be a peculiar state of affairs
indeed; yet not if one was a South African of multigenerational, mixed black and
white ancestry where the term carries a completely different, albeit not unrelated, set
of meanings. Similarly, Gordon Parks‟ now iconic photograph of the AfricanAmerica woman standing in front of the United States flag, holding a broom, derives
some of its power not just from the aesthetic and technical genius required to create
exceptional photographs, but from the meaning the image conveys to the speech
community that is its audience, an audience with racial consciousness. As Howard
McGary states, “we can‟t have a correct understanding of institutional racism if we
don‟t take into account how cultural images influence the design of social
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institutions.”40 Indeed, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, the more subtle
forms of racisms that are manifest in cultural expression and informal dialogue are
every bit as powerful as the overt, institutional kind in shaping racial consciousness.
Our language communities are the ongoing conglomeration of every conversation,
every piece of literature, legislation, work of art, theatrical display etc. This reality is
neither a positive or negative thing; it is the articulations themselves that can be
assessed for their value. Once Parks' stark image so aptly captured the tragic irony of
race relations in the United States, both the lives of the blacks for whom that life of
drudgery was an everyday reality and those whites who enjoyed the benefits of those
iniquitous power relations were, in some important way, transformed in that very
expression. The question then becomes, what is the moral criteria against which such
value judgments will be made? If white supremacy is our social hypergood, then
Parks is probably not our favorite photographer. However, if our assumption is that
there must be an end to racial injustice then Parks‟ photograph is of great value for it
contributed to a social reality where the power of photography was reasserted, an
African American artist was appreciated by a wider audience and social commentary
could be viewed and discussed for generations to come. In any case, language and its
meaning remains a dance between the speaker and the speech community of which
he/she is a part. In this regard, racial consciousness must be taken seriously insofar as
it is the narrative that underwrites U.S. and British society. As such, racial identities
must be discussed in terms of their psychological impact on moral reasoning and
racial justice must be understood in terms of dismantling the social, moral and
psychological manifestations of racisms, which give rise to a racialized lived
experience.
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Chapter 4: Multiracial Identity and the Lived Experience

“If I were white, I could capture the world.”
Dorothy Dandridge
Taylor‟s history of the self illustrated that conceptions of moral agency are not
set in stone; they change and evolve as our understanding of humanity and the
universe of which we are a part develops. If an unencumbered self does not yield the
moral understanding and theoretical tools we need to challenge racial injustice,
insofar as we are committed to finding solutions, we must continue the philosophical
quest until we find greener pastures. One possible line of exploration that has not
been sufficiently explored is that of an encumbered self. As we noted earlier, the
communitarian critique that championed the encumbered conception of self has, for
the most part, been subsumed into the liberal paradigm. I contend this assimilation
was too hasty because the communitarian critique, like other challenges to liberalism,
did not place racisms at the center of their analysis. In doing so, those discussions of
the importance of racial consciousness and the lived experience for theories of moral
agency, particularly collective responsibility, have not yet been taken sufficiently
seriously. Indeed, if we take up an encumbered conception of the human agent, then
racial consciousness and a person‟s raced lived experiences must be brought to the
center of moral discussions. For as we saw in chapters one and two, racial
consciousness distorts our understanding of different so called racial groups. This
distortion presents a challenge for an impartial, unencumbered conception of moral
agency that rests on our ability to reason rationally and objectively. Consequently,
theorizing about racial identities and the responsibility to end racial injustice must be
reconsidered.
119

In societies with racial consciousness where white superiority has a
constitutive role in moral reality, the option to „escape racisms,‟ as any raced person
hopes to do, is at best a misguided dream. It is also unsatisfactory to conclude that
persons who wish to be described as multiracial must simply accept that they are
black just because they too are impacted by anti-black racisms. For persons who
could be described as multiracial, this desire to escape racisms is often conflated with
the desire to escape blackness in a manner that demonizes the articulation of
multiracial identity. This conflation of the two kinds of escape often results in the
desire to vehemently defend and define multiracial identity, which detracts from the
more pertinent aim of challenging racial injustice. In societies with racial
consciousness, if the criticism being leveled at persons who wish to articulate a
multiracial identity what is meant by „escape‟ is that such persons cannot morally
detach themselves from other raced persons, whether it be by a change in race label or
any other means, then the accusation is justified. It is accurate precisely because
racial consciousness makes escaping from blackness, insofar as one is affected by
anti-black racisms a relevant aspiration. However, there is something meaningful that
connects raced persons; it is legitimate to talk of shared experiences and ideas like
solidarity. I contend, the lived experience gives rise to connectivity among raced
persons that in turn gives rise to collective responsibilities such that we can consider
attempts to „escape‟ those collective responsibilities as morally problematic. Thus,
this chapter has two primary aims: 1) to provide a picture of the lived experience of
persons who could be described as multiracial and the manner in which it connects
such people to those who could be described as black and 2) to show how our
articulations constitute social reality such that in societies with racial consciousness it
is perfectly legitimate to discuss collective responsibilities.
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Multiracial Lived Experience
So what experiences of living in a society with racial consciousness do
persons who could be described as multiracial share and how do these experiences
connect such persons to those who could be described as black? As we saw in
chapters one and two, racial consciousness generates certain collective understandings
and assumptions about individuals identified as belonging to certain racial groups.
Persons who could be described as multiracial understand the meaning of the question
just as non-raced persons understand. Racial consciousness is an understanding of
how persons identified to certain racial groups are treated, perceived and valued (or
rather devalued) by others. Insofar as raced persons‟ lived experience is one that is
adversely impacted by racial consciousness, raced persons are connected. Yet, not
merely as a thin procedural connection in the way Shelby seeks to show. Nor in the
way Sundstrom claims because his move to a kinship model of care ethics and
memory is still detached from people‟s actual lived experiences. The theoretical
problem is that it‟s fallacious to presume the disconnect between persons with
multiracial and monoracial identities in the first place. Raced persons never
experience the individualism their non-raced counterparts enjoy. Donna Dale
Marcano explains,
In an anti-black world, a world that is founded on the superiority of whites, the
existence of the black body must be justified as a value in itself; as such it is
Absence. Justification of the value of the black body is conferred upon via the
gaze of whites. Conversely, the white body is already justified as valuable and
as such it is Presence, it is already an individual seen in its individuality.1
As Cornell West explains, raced people‟s experiences incorporate reactions and
responses to modern justifications of white supremacy. West organized these
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responses into four ideal types: 1) Humanist, 2) Exceptionalist, 3) Marginalist, and 4)
Assimilationist. These four types West describes as,
A hermeneutic of Afro-American history that focuses on the diverse
conceptions of self-image and self-determination during the prolonged AfroAmerican entrance into the corridors of modernity: the long-overdue reaping
of the harvest that Afro-Americans helped cultivate, the seizing of
opportunities previously closed, and the bruising encounter with the
emptiness, sterility, and hypocrisy of post-modernity.2
Thus, the first section of this chapter explores the lived experiences of persons who
could be described as multiracial through a series of hypothetical scenarios. Each of
the scenarios depicted here presents a multiracial archetype which, like West‟s ideal
types, can be understood as conceptions of self-image and self-determination.
Perhaps not surprisingly, these multiracial archetypes mirror West‟s AfricanAmerican ideal types. Thus, I shall show, these shared multiracial experiences are
raced and cannot be divorced from the experiences of other raced persons insofar as
they are a function of racial consciousness.
Before I begin, a few notes on the structure of this section. The four scenarios
are set up as multiracial archetypes,3 which are divided into two categories – 1) those

2

Cornell West, “The Four Traditions of Response,” in Prophesy Deliverance!: An AfroAmerican Revolutionary Christianity. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982): 69.
3
While I hope these archetypes will allow the reader to envision the link between the
particular and wider social trends, it is not my intention to outline what will be yet another set of
limiting frameworks that confine people‟s experiences and choices to narrow and/or inflexible
stereotypes or fixed racial identities. Thus I explicitly remind the reader that to speak in terms of trends
or archetypes is utterly different from presuming absolutes. Additionally, if a particular multiracial
experience is not reflected in what is offered here, that in no way suggests that experience is any less
valid, important or relevant to this discussion. Also, the scenarios I have chosen, do speak specifically
to the black/white multiracial experience rather than multiracial experience in general. While I believe
the philosophical arguments presented in this work are relevant to that more general discussion, the
particular personal and social details differ depending on the kind of raced and non-raced heritage a
person has. Similarly, although the scenarios are organised such that one particular articulation of
multiracial identity is explored through one archetype, this is for simplicity and clarity only, it is not to
imply that there is a one-to-one relationship between the archetype and identity. Peoples‟ identities,
particularly multiracial identities, are not static or one dimensional. A person embodying any one
archetype most likely will have embraced all or some of the identity choices presented here. Likewise,
a person may have embodied all of the archetypes at one time or another. Indeed, it is typical for those
who could be described as multiracial to have very fluid racial identities that change across the lifespan
and differ from one context to the next depending on any number of factors from political strategy to
personal connectivity. Moreover, as we shall see in the last scenario, not all persons who can be
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for which the racial identification of the protagonist fits within socially recognized
racial identity options and 2) those for which the racial identification of the
protagonist lies beyond widely socially recognized racial identity options for those
persons who might be described as multiracial. The identity choices this work will
explore are: raced - multiracial, raced – black, raced – uniquely, and non-raced.
The archetypes of these differing identity choices I explore in this work are as
follows:4 1) The Realist – This type typically addresses their racial identity in a
pragmatic though not dispassionate way. They acknowledge the racial injustice in the
world but do not subscribe to simplistic ideologies or solutions for addressing that
injustice. Typically persons in this archetype believe in their own personal power and
ability to channel that power to impact society. They will most likely self-identify
racially with whatever identity they think gives the most accurate account for who
they are relative to their social circumstances. Sociologically speaking, this type
tends to be raised in a racially and culturally diverse environment and there is a mix of
racial influences whether that is a result of family or wider social involvement. Like
West‟s Humanist, the Realist,
Makes no ontological or sociological claims about Afro-American superiority
or inferiority. Rather it [humanist/ realist] focuses on the ways in which
creative Afro-American cultural modes of expressions embody themes and
motifs analogous to the vigorous cultural forms of other racial, ethnic, or

described as multiracial according to the social conception that is a function of racial consciousness
necessarily accepts or identifies themselves as multiracial or raced in any form.
4

Thus far, books about the multiracial experience have tended to present personal testimonies
from those persons who might be described as multiracial. This research is extremely useful and it is
not my intent to dismiss or diminish the contribution of such works. However, there is very little
research dedicated to a systematic analysis of these experiences such that we can begin to speak of (if
the research finds it so) multiracial phenomena and/or group behaviour, attitudes and/or needs. There
seems to be a general consensus that there are such things as multiracial experiences, which broadly
include experiences and feelings related to not fitting in the black/white or raced/non-raced binary and
responses (both positive and less positive) to those experiences. It is less clear exactly what causes
those experiences, if they are shared by all persons who could be described as multiracial and which
environments or circumstances heighten that sense of living beyond the racial boundaries.
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national groups. This tradition affirms Afro-American membership in the
human race, not above it or below it.5
2) The Militant – this type tends to be passionate about racial justice and its
eradication from society through group level solutions. They have a tendency to be
idealist and typically subscribe to more sweeping grand theories about society and
social justice. Persons in this archetype tend to lack a sense of personal power but
believe in the power of the group and of social structures/ forces more generally.
They are most likely to identify with the group most starkly impacted by racisms as
an act of group level solidarity. Sociologically, this type tends to be raised in less
racially diverse environments (either raced or non-raced) but where the raced
influences come to dominate either through the significance of raced family members
or of raced people in the wider social or intellectual circle. Similar to West‟s
Exceptionalist, the Militant is self-congratulatory about their racial heritage such that
they “stand above other racial groups because of certain values, modes of behavior, or
gifts acquired from their endurance of political oppression, social degradation, and
economic exploitation.”6 3) The Individualist – this type is not individual in terms of
being disconnected from their group or heritage. Rather they tend towards a
philosophy of human uniqueness. While they do not deny the reality of being raced in
society, they do not feel the need to identify with these external ascriptions. Persons
in this archetype tend to believe in their own power and the power of the individual
more generally. As such, they tend to subscribe to more individual and/or personal
approaches to racial injustice. Sociologically speaking, this type tends to have
experiences a range of racial environments and influences and as such rejects racial
identity determinism. Similar to West‟s Marginalist, the Individualist “promotes a
5
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self-image of confinement and creativity, restriction and revolt. It encompasses a
highly individualistic rebellion of Afro-Americans who are marginal to, or exist on
the edges of, Afro-American culture and see little use in assimilating into the
American mainstream.”7 4) The Avoider – this type while not necessarily oblivious
to racial injustice, does not subscribe to a confrontational approach to dealing with it.
Persons in this archetype tend to lack a sense of personal power but also believe there
is a limit to how social structures/ forces can impact their life. As such, this type
prefers to diminish the impact of racisms by avoiding or choosing not to engage with
them. Sociologically, persons in this archetype tend to be raised in majority nonraced environments and/or where non-raced influences dominate. Like West‟s
Assimilationist, the Avoider rejects their raced culture in an effort to assimilate into
mainstream society. “It [assimilationist/ avoider] assumes that the universal must
wipe clean all particulars, that cosmopolitan society erases all provincialities.”8 So,
let us explore the scenarios.

Self-Identifies within Socially Recognized Racial Categories
Scenario 1. The Realist (racial identity - multiracial): Our first protagonist,
Elliot, is from London. As a child Elliot had a sense of being different in some way
because he didn‟t look the same as the other children in the class but did not
personally encounter any overt racism at this age. Elliot‟s raced father left the family
home when they were quite young and so Elliot had little contact with that side of the
family. Consequently, as a child, Elliot‟s understanding of his father was limited to a
few key facts – he was from the Caribbean, was strong and outgoing, liked sport and
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music and didn‟t like flying or talking about his emotions. Nevertheless, Elliot felt
close to his father as he seemed to be the most powerful member of the family and
tended to have things his way. This picture was juxtaposed to Elliot‟s image of his
mother who had a very different personality. Elliot‟s mother was English. She was
also much more passive, although liked sport and music too. Unlike his father, she
saw it as very important to talk about emotions and feelings. Because of their
differences, Elliot‟s parents came to represent opposites, which included their race, in
spite of neither one ever having explicitly spoken of or self-identified as a particular
race.
As a teenager, Elliot becomes more aware of the larger social context and
questions of class and race as a result of other people‟s reactions to his race and the
fact that he is from a relatively affluent area. He notices too that there is only one
other family with raced persons in his neighborhood despite attending a culturally,
economically and racially mixed school. Elliot notices that the teachers in his new
school treat the other raced children, particularly the boys, differently from the other
children – they get told off more and are put in lower sets for certain subjects, even
when this does not reflect their academic abilities. Indeed, one of Elliot‟s childhood
friends who had always done well in primary school was labeled as a trouble-maker
and not very bright, and was put in the lower set in math – a situation Elliot knew was
grossly inaccurate and unfair. Although Elliot, with his ever-increasing sense of selfdetermination, does not feel he can be held back as a result of being raced, he does
identify with his raced friends because he knows he is perceived by society as a „black
male.‟
The conspicuous absence of anything to do with raced people, as part of the
curriculum, throughout his education begins to increasingly frustrate Elliot. This
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theme is again echoed in the media and wider society. Like other raced families in
Britain, Elliot recalls him and his siblings‟ inevitable rush to the television to watch
the Cosby Show, the Oprah Winfrey Show and Desmond’s because these are the only
occasions when raced people are visible in the media (at least in a positive light).
Indeed, Elliot can never reconcile the media image with his own experiences with
raced people – teachers, youth workers, sports coaches and friends at school – which
have been overwhelmingly positive. Moreover, Elliot has always been top of the
class in predominantly non-raced schools, which makes the idea of raced persons‟
inherent negativity and inferiority strikingly unsustainable.
As Elliot moves into adulthood he continues his (self-taught, non-mainstream)
education, discovering a world of independent bookshops and counter-culture
thinkers. Knowing his mother‟s reverence for articles, books and documentaries,
Elliot seeks to bridge the gulf that has grown between them by sharing his new-found
knowledge with her. Yet, while Elliot‟s mother does listen she invariably dismisses
and devalues the significance of race as an explanatory factor for social injustices.
She is of the belief that individual efforts are what really make a difference. This
reflexive response to reject the apparently glaringly obvious fact that racial injustice is
entrenched in British society is both hurtful and offensive to Elliot. No matter how he
tries to explain or how many times it happens, she never really appreciated that he
hated driving because he was tired of being stopped by the police for no reason. For
her the police were always just doing their job; making sure all members of society
were safe. Moreover, given that (to her at least) her son was a bright, middle-class,
articulate boy, who did well in school and hadn‟t apparently been held back by
racisms, she didn‟t associate him with this marginalized raced group he was speaking
of. But for Elliot, there is no success in being the light-skinned token.
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Having completed his undergraduate degree in Caribbean Studies and an MA
in sociology, something Elliot is well aware makes him an exception among his peers,
Elliot goes to work for his local authority (LA) as an Equality and Diversity Officer.
However, after a couple of years looking at the standard forms with ethnic and racial
categories, checking that minorities were not being excluded from jobs and working
with the legal department on a number of tribunals where the LA had been charged
with racial discrimination, Elliot became extremely frustrated and disillusioned.
Having been powerless to stop the LA systematically, albeit completely unfairly, get
rid of four black female deputy heads of law in a row because on paper the LA had
„complied‟ with the Race Relations Act, Elliot had seen enough.
Elliot decides to initiate a complete shake up in the traditional approach to
„ethnic monitoring‟ as a method of promoting racial equality. Elliot knows from his
own work that categorizing a person as an ethnic minority does not impact the
likelihood that they will not be discriminated against because of their race. Moreover,
there are no minimum percentages or affirmative action policies with which to hold
companies in England accountable for racial equality. Therefore, counting how many
people have been categorized as an ethnic minority is largely irrelevant; it in no way
protects a person from wrongful dismissal or from being unfairly passed over for a job
in the first place. Moreover, being classified as mixed, black, multiracial, other or
anything else is equally spurious if the issue is racial equality. Instead of a form that
categorized ethnic minorities, Elliot begins to devise a questionnaire and set of hiring
procedures that enables companies to identify persons who discriminate. When we
want to prevent the rapist or the burglar we do not go about identifying the set of
possible victims - all women and men or everyone who lives in some form of
accommodation – rather, we try to identify the perpetrator of the crime and so should
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it be with racial discrimination Elliot reasons. On a personal level, whenever Elliot is
required to fill out the traditional ethnic monitoring forms or when people inevitably
asked him where he is from (code for what race are you?), he does not comply with
the expected format. Elliot acknowledges his history and culture but does not couch
these aspects of his life in racially essentialized categories. Instead of using racial
labels, he answers with the facts – that his father is Jamaican, his mother is English
and he was born in London – and leaves the listener to interpret it as they please.
As racial consciousness and Elliot‟s lived experience dictates, his moral
reasoning is encumbered. From the unsophisticated observations of his early
childhood to his adult choice to try and challenge racisms, Elliot is responding to his
experience of being raced in a racially conscious society. Even though he has
achieved a lever of educational and professional status a-typical for a raced man in
Britain, he continually has to attend to the racial consciousness that impacts his own
thinking and experiences and that of other people he interacts with. Indeed, it is not a
coincidence that Elliot reads Caribbean Studies and Sociology at University. It is not
an accident that he pursues his particular career path. Nor is it by chance that he
chooses to articulate his own identity in the manner that he does. Yet, all these
„choices‟ do not amount to an unencumbered sense of self.
Elliot is clearly a conscientious person who is trying his best to navigate the
racisms that are part of the society he lives in. Some of these race-based judgments
are directed at those who could be described as multiracial. For example, some will
feel compassion for Elliot‟s difficulties with his mother; others will say, well that‟s
what happens with interracial relationships and those confused multiracial children.
Many however, will mirror those experienced by those raced as black. For example,
some will respect the fact that Elliot has pursued an advanced level of education;
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others will see him as lost and trying to act white. Some will admire Elliot‟s attempts
to challenge equal opportunity policy in Britain; others will wonder why a black
person is working for „the system‟ in the first place. Some will applaud Elliot‟s
determination to define himself in a meaningful way that tries not to reify race; others
still will take this act to be insignificant and naïve. The point is that a person‟s moral
judgments are a function of their lived experiences in a racially stratified society and
the racial consciousness which skews people‟s perception of raced person‟s moral
worth. It is in this regard that persons who could be described as multiracial are
connected to those who could be described as black.
Scenario 2. The Militant (racial identity - black): Our protagonist, De
„Andre, currently lives in Baltimore. His parents are married but the family has
experienced quite substantial upheaval as they were forced to move from their
neighborhood in North Carolina due to attacks on the family home from non-raced
people in the area who disagreed with the interracial make-up of their family. Tired
of the constant harassment and for fear of their children‟s safety, De‟Andre‟s parents
moved north, when he was four, in an attempt to avoid the racisms that had become
an ongoing feature of their life. Once in Baltimore, they moved into a predominantly
raced neighborhood and the overt harassment ceased.
During these formative years in Baltimore, De‟Andre‟s African American
mother sought to educate her children about African American history and
discrimination to help them understand and cope with the problems the family was
experiencing. Unfortunately, after the move to Baltimore, while the violent
harassment from neighbors stopped, the inevitable encounters with racisms could not
be avoided. In school, De‟Andre and his siblings are teased about being light-skinned
and their „blackness‟ is called into question by their peers and the wider cultural
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representation of „the black male‟. Again drawing strength from their community,
De‟Andre‟s parents got back involved with the local church and chapter of the
NAACP. De‟Andre went along with them to services and meetings instead of
hanging out round the neighborhood with the other kids. De‟Andre‟s siblings, on the
other hand, were sick of all this constant disruption –marching, writing letters and
arguing for things that seemed to never change. They just wanted to be normal like
other families, go to after school clubs and play sports with their friends.
However, as De‟Andre journeys through his teenage years, he begins to
realize this racism stuff is not a joke or merely a way to endear himself to his parents.
Life in inner city Baltimore had two faces; the lives of his school friends appear very
different from the world De ‟Andre had experienced which included well-to-do
church socials and the proceedings of NAACP lawyers debating their next strategy.
Moreover, De‟Andre‟s father, a television producer with a comfortable job at one of
Baltimore‟s major production outfits, clearly has a very different life than that of his
friends‟ fathers who often work uninteresting and unrewarding jobs if they are lucky
enough to be employed at all. Others still are reduced to signing up to participate (for
cash) in one of the numerous studies on „the inner city population‟ the major research
university in town is conducting that month.
One after another he sees his raced friends drop out of school and get involved
in crime. Then one day De‟Andre comes home to the news that his best friend has
been shot by the police in a case of mistaken identity. David had been like a brother
to him; De‟Andre was definitely closer to David that he was his siblings. They had
done everything together as boys, even sealed their friendship with the age-old fingerprick of brotherhood. De‟Andre is heartbroken by this loss. To make matters worse,
the trial is a complete shambles. It appears to be an open and shut case - the police
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were clearly in the wrong and there are a number of witnesses who can verify events
including the fact that there was no provocation on David‟s part. Moreover, David
was not involved in any criminal activities and never had been; he was a good student
and had a bright future ahead of him with offers from top universities. As the trial
proceeds, however, De‟Andre watches his already dead friend‟s character
assassinated by the police department and their lawyers. David is characterized as a
stereotypical thug and suggestions are made that he was involved in all kinds of
destructive activities – none of which are true - in order to justify his untimely,
unnecessary and unjust murder. To add insult to injury, it turns out that David‟s
family has been assigned a totally disinterested and incompetent lawyer to argue their
case. De‟Andre, raised in the long tradition of articulate and powerful NAACP
lawyers, had assumed that was just how lawyers were generally and was horrified by
the incompetence of the lawyer and the substandard representation his friend received.
De‟Andre becomes increasingly angry and frustrated as he watches David vilified,
powerless to do anything in his defense. De‟Andre is outraged and devastated when
ultimately the police are acquitted.
De‟Andre‟s siblings, although sympathetic and sad about the situation, are far
more cynical about the supposed power of the law to provide justice. They mock
De‟Andre for being so naïve about the world and the way power and race work. They
also dismiss their parent‟s ongoing activism and De‟Andre‟s „foolish‟ attempts to
copy their parents. As the trial and the injustice of the senseless killing showed,
nothing ever changes and all that fruitless „struggling‟ comes to naught. When
De‟Andre questions his parents about what they think and asks why they couldn‟t get
the NAACP involved in David‟s case, De‟Andre is disgusted with the passivity and
dismissive manner of their responses. De‟Andre‟s mother tries to console him about
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David but doesn‟t explicitly acknowledge the injustice of the situation; she doesn‟t
seem outraged by the incident as De‟Andre thinks she should be. His father is equally
apathetic. He says it‟s a tragic loss but acts as if David is just another casualty in this
long and ugly war against injustice. When De‟Andre challenges his dad to get the
NAACP involved, he says they have more important, bigger cases to deal with. There
is a distance in the way De‟Andre‟s dad talks; he just doesn‟t get it, not really. For all
the activism and talk of fighting for the cause he will never know what it‟s like to deal
with racisms every day of his life.
De‟Andre becomes completely disillusioned with the world, society, his
parents and all that he has been taught and experienced up until that point. However,
he finds solace and comfort in the teachings of Malcolm X. De‟Andre had received
the gift from a friend who was trying to lift his spirits after David‟s death. Curious to
know more, De‟Andre asks his friend where he got the book and is subsequently
introduced to one of Baltimore‟s independent black book stores and the community of
people who hang out in the incensed filled basement, talking politics and revolution.
De‟Andre spends hours sitting listening to the older guys talking of struggle and
reminiscing about the black power movements of the 1970‟s.
One day the group was at the bookshop talking politics as usual, discussing the
significance of Obama‟s presidency. The conversation was animated as usual with
everyone jostling for their opinion to be heard when one guy who was relatively new
to the group said, “Obama isn‟t black anyway so why is everyone getting so happy.
He‟s one of those mixed up dudes and we know how they roll when the s*** hits the
fan. Ain‟t that right De‟Andre?” De‟Andre is hurt and embarrassed and for a
moment is tongue-tied. But in a split second his friend steps in to his defense, letting
this new guy on the block know that De‟Andre is black like them and has always been
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down for the cause. “He knows black history better than anyone sitting here” the
friend exclaims. An angry retort flies back, “Well he might have all that book
knowledge but he won‟t ever know what it‟s really like to be black, he don‟t know
nothing about the ghetto.” De‟Andre‟s friends all jump in the argument, defending
his authenticity and letting it be known in no uncertain terms that De‟Andre is one of
the 'brothas'. This emphatic and vehement act of loyalty was not one De‟Andre had
expected at all; he had always wondered whether he was genuinely accepted and seen
as one of them. But his surrogate family had come through for him in a way his
biological family never had. For De‟Andre this is what family is about; having your
back no matter what. Sticking up for each other without a second thought; without
pondering about how practical it might be.
So, later when the group is organizing an event to speak out against the „Tiger
Woods‟ Bill that is being debated and denounce the legitimacy of multiracial identity,
De‟Andre is more than happy when the group ask him to make the key note speech.
Everyone agrees their message, that promoting mixed race identity just divides the
black population and is a way to escape from being black, would be more powerful if
it were delivered by De‟Andre. On the day crowds are gathered and De‟Andre gives
an impassioned and eloquent speech declaring his own black identity and urging all
black people to be unified, particularly those who might be thinking about checking
more than one box. There is a resounding applause as De‟Andre finishes. Then out
of the corner of his eye, De‟Andre sees his parents at the back of the hall. He can‟t
quite make out their reactions…perhaps a sense of pride, tinged with disappointment?
For a second, De‟Andre feels a pang of guilt as he sees his mother and father standing
there together, having come to watch their son in his proudest moment. He, like his
parents, is filled with conflicting emotions; there are no easy answers here.
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The point here is that although De‟Andre might have been able to avoid being
a statistic of the inner city, his lived experiences are still profoundly impacted by race
both directly and indirectly. His own thinking, moral reasoning and loyalties arise out
of his raced experience. De‟Andre‟s moral agency is already connected to other raced
persons because he is subject to the same meta-ethic of white superiority embedded in
the racial consciousness. He is outraged and upset because he knows, David‟s
passing could have easily been his own; equally unjust and equally tragic. He knows
that the reason this is the case is because they are raced and there is a judgment about
the value of raced persons‟ lives. That raced persons find ways to defy the negative
impact of racisms and racial consciousness to find value in their lives and in their own
understanding of themselves is beside the point. These lived experiences have
already forged connectivity among those who must embark on this alternative route to
a positive self-image and self-determination.

Self-Identifies beyond Socially Recognized Racial Categories
We‟ll remain in the United States for our next scenario.
Scenario 3. The Individualist (racial identity – uniquely raced): Our
protagonist, Jodie, and her family live in New Orleans, as have generations of their
family before them. Jodie‟s mother comes from a long matriarchal line of families
with multigenerational multiracial identity and is proud of this long and rich heritage.
Jodie‟s father is also multiracial but of Caribbean descent. When Jodie and her
siblings were growing up their mother would often tell stories of the wonderful social
events she went to when she was younger where multigenerational „coloreds‟, as they
were called back then, socialized, networked and came out into „society‟. Her parents
were strict and had high expectations for all of their children. They were very
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particular about how they dressed, spoke and behaved, particularly in public, as they
expected their children to uphold the standards and behaviors of the generations that
preceded them. However, to Jodie, her mother‟s memories seemed like an
unimaginable universe as those social events and cultural mores that were the bedrock
of the „colored‟ community have gradually dissipated in the hustle and bustle of
history and modern living.
Unlike her parents, Jodie attended a majority non-raced school as a result of
desegregation. Although Jodie was very light-skinned and could have passed if she
wanted, everyone knew she was „black‟ as she lived on the „black‟ street in the
neighborhood. Anyway, the presence of any of her family members would have
revealed her as such. As a child this didn‟t present any problems at first as Jodie
happily fitted in with the other children despite always feeling she was unique.
Indeed, her parents had always taught her and her siblings they were special because
they were different from non-raced people and dark-skinned blacks. This philosophy
was born out of the rejection people with multigenerational multiracial heritage
experienced from both raced and non-raced people. It served as a coping mechanism
that allowed them to feel a sense of pride in themselves, in the face of prejudice from
both sides of the black/ white binary.
One day at school a new girl came to class. She had recently moved from
Mississippi and was raced. The other children began to tease the new girl about her
„country‟ accent and used racial slurs. One of Jodie‟s friends called the new girl a
„nigger‟ and encouraged Jodie to join in, explaining that her father said that‟s what
people who look like that are called. Jodie was mortified. She knew what „that‟
meant and she also knew that „that‟ was who she and her parents were. Yet Jodie also
remembered that her family was different and she wondered if these differences
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explained why the other children hadn‟t teased her before. When she got home she
told her mother what happened. Jodie‟s mother began to tell her about slavery and the
prejudice attitudes non-raced people in the United States often have. Jodie‟s mother
told her to ignore the other kids in school when they say unkind things because she is
a special little girl no matter what anyone else says.
However Jodie never felt quite certain about her and her friend‟s shared
blackness because of the mixed messages around this idea she so often received.
While Jodie knew she was black, the reason she was special was precisely because
she was light-skinned and therefore significantly different from those blacks, like her
new friend, with darker skin. Dark-skinned blackness was routinely denigrated and
Jodie learned very young that she was not to go round „acting black‟ in public lest
people thought you were like those other dark black people. The pride persons with
multigenerational multiracial identity shared came from being light.
This became clearer as Jodie and her siblings got older. She began to notice
that her older (and favorite) sister, Janine, was always getting in trouble with her
parents. Their parents always seemed to be criticizing Janine and were much more
strict and harsh with her than Jodie and their other two siblings. Whenever they went
to visit their grandparent‟s house or saw extended family at bar-b-ques, someone
always made a comment about Janine‟s „nappy‟ hair and told her things like not to
stay out in the sun too long and get all black. Despite being quite reserved in public,
their family had always been very outspoken and assertive when they were in their
own company.
Jodie and her sister hated those occasions and spent much of their time off
hiding and talking to each other in order to escape other people‟s glare. Janine often
cried and lamented not being „light‟ like the rest of them. Despite having beautiful
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hair, she wished it was straighter like Jodie‟s so that mum and dad would love them
both the same. Jodie reassured her beloved sister that their parents did love them the
same but in the back of her heart she knew that wasn‟t true. The sisters wondered
how come people with multigenerational multiracial identity didn‟t stick together like
they used to. They wondered about whatever happened to the „good old days‟ that
always sounded so full of fun when their mother used to tell her stories.
In high school Jodie attended a more racially mixed school and spent much of
her time tagging along with her older sister and her raced friends. Jodie went on to
college, as her parents expected. She attended her parent‟s alma mater, an Ivy League
university on the east coast. It was a very strange experience as for the first time in
her life Jodie got a taste of what it might be like to be non-raced. Having moved right
across the country and away from her family network, no one knew she was black.
All the other students and professors just assumed she was white and with no relatives
around to expose her, Jodie went along for the ride for a time. Despite getting along
well with her college friends she felt that something was missing. No matter how
close her friends were Jodie knew such relationships could not be truly fulfilling
because people did not know who she really was. Jodie couldn‟t talk freely about her
family and her past, where she came from and all the little details that shape who we
are without exposing her race and the facade that had now built up. Jodie‟s friends
did not know an aspect of her identity that was really important to her and they did
not know how being raced had contributed to that her life experience before
university she now had to keep hidden.
After a semester of this non-raced life, Jodie „came out‟ and revealed her
racial identity, much to the surprise and disbelief of her friends. This revelation was
met with mixed reactions from her friends. Many were perplexed but most responded
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positively and accepted Jodie as they had before they had been presented with this
new information. However, when she tried to join the black student‟s union to lend
her support for their current campaign against the universities admissions policies she
got a rude awakening. Jodie was completely rejected by her fellow raced students.
They questioned her racial authenticity and commitment to the cause. According to
them, people „like her‟ never had any trouble getting in to university anyway. They
accused Jodie of passing and remarked that, just because she decided to change her
identity recently, which might have been a shock to her white friends; it was of no
consequence to them. According to them, as Jodie had already proved, light-skinned
blacks don‟t even experience racial prejudice like dark-skinned people, so why should
they care about such matters – the only time they want to act black is when there is
minority scholarship money available.
Anyway, Jodie was sick of this endless talk about race and the good old days
and she was still angry with her family for the way they had treated her sister. She
was not going to be silenced by anyone anymore, not by her parents and their
expectations and not by anyone else no matter what color they were. If her parents
had taught her one thing it was how to express herself and be assertive. So, instead of
aimlessly trying to please raced and non-raced people Jodie decided to reject the
racial identities she had previously been assigned both by her family and society in
general. While she fully appreciated the way race organized and shaped the society
she lived in, she was not going to be pressured into the confines of racial labels she
didn‟t fit into. So, Jodie began to think of herself as blended. She was not multiracial,
mixed race, black or anything else; Jodie was just Jodie.
While Jodie can choose to try and transcend her social context, she is already
immersed in it. It is not possible to be racially unconscious once one is racially
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conscious and her lived experiences bear this out. Despite her phenotypical
ambiguity, the effects of racial consciousness, both her own and the wider society‟s,
means she can never escape or be oblivious to the impact of racisms on her life
experiences. Long before she has the maturity, understanding and sociological
understanding of this „choice‟ to be „just Jodie,‟ here life experiences have already
been significantly impacted by race and shaped her perceptions of how to live.
Although the messages about race she has been exposed to were often conflicting or
incongruent, they came through people and impacted situations that were of real
significance to Jodie; family friends, and acquaintances all play their role. How such
a person will interpret these experiences might change over time, but some
interpretations, as we saw in chapter three, are fundamental to our moral agency, and
so will inevitably occur. Her internal dialogue with life, no matter how personal or
individual is necessarily connected to others who are also denied the opportunity to
explore their own humanity without reference to race. And, as a raced person (selfidentified, passing or externally identified), one must attend to this consciousness
whether one wants to or not; that is part of what is oppressive about racisms and this
kind of moral confinement.9
Scenario 4. The Avoider (racial identity – raceless): Our protagonist, Sarah,
lives and grew up in the leafy county of Kent, England. Her dad was also born and
raised there since his parents had settled in the area after arriving from the Caribbean
in the 1960‟s. However, before Sarah reaches her second birthday, her father leaves
the family and Sarah has no further contact with him.
Sarah‟s non-raced mother is quite a conservative, parochial person. She lives
a quiet and respectable life working as a midwife and is heavily involved in the local
9
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church, which is the center of the community‟s social life. Sarah‟s mother is widely
liked and respected in their locale. Growing up, Sarah receives a great deal of
attention; she is a very pretty child and gets looked at by people wherever she goes.
Being one of only a handful of raced children in her area, she has spent what seems to
be a lifetime hearing remarks like “Isn‟t she just the cutest and such unusual coloring”
or “what beautiful curls, however do you mange her hair?” or “what a lovely little
brown thing, isn‟t she just edible.”
As an only child Sarah is accustomed to entertaining herself. Sarah enjoys
school as she gets to play with other children and, although seen as a bit different, is
well liked by her peers. Sarah goes to gymnastics and piano class in the week and
ballet on a Saturday, all of which are welcome alternatives from the silence and
solitude of the family home. However, what Sarah is most curious about and longs
for is an extended family. Other children in her area seem to have loads of cousins to
play with and talk about things like going over to their grandmother‟s house for
Sunday dinner. They tell jokes about crazy uncles and granddad‟s false teeth and
their homes seem to be bustling with visitors and the stories they bring. The children
always seem to be having so much more fun.
Finally, one summer Sarah‟s aunt on her mother‟s side comes to visit from the
United States. It is great to have someone else in the house, and Aunty Mary; is a
great story teller. She tells amazing and funny tales about how she and Sarah‟s
mother were thick as thieves when they were young. Mary tells of their life growing
up in Kent and describes one magical summer the two sisters spent in the Caribbean.
They had gone on a missionary trip to help out a church that was partnered with their
local church here in Kent. Aunt Mary spoke of eating wonderful food and getting up
to all sorts of mischief when the pastor wasn‟t around. Mary also tells of how Sarah‟s
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mother met and fell head-over-heels in love with this boy who she met at the church.
Aunt Mary grins cheekily as she tell how Sarah‟s mother wouldn‟t stop talking about
him long after they returned back from the trip only to find that this mystery boy
actually lived in Kent too! It is then that Sarah realizes aunt Mary is talking about her
father. Apparently he had been on holiday visiting his family in the Caribbean. Sarah
wonders whatever happened to her parents, how could they have been so in love and
it all go so wrong? Sarah bets her Aunt Mary would have the answers, but she
doesn‟t have the courage to ask.
Knowing Sarah‟s love of stories, Aunt Mary leaves Sarah a copy of Maya
Angelou‟s I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings as a parting gift. Sarah devours the
book; it is the first time she has read anything where the main characters were brown
like her. She goes to the local bookshop in search of the other sequels of Angelou‟s
biography and is told they don‟t stock that kind of thing. Sarah goes to the library but
the librarian looks at her blankly and asks if she is sure she has the correct name and
titles. Sarah is incensed and eventually finds the books online. Yet the more she
reads the more questions she has. Sarah asks her mother what it was like for her
growing up and what her family was like. Sarah wants to know what her mother
thinks of the comments people always used to make and why her mother never
challenged the people about what they were saying. Sarah wants to know why her
mother married her father and why did they chose to live where there are no other
people like them? And does she know her father‟s family? And why hasn‟t she ever
taken her to visit her own grandparents?
Gradually the family history begins to unfold in these almost forbidden
conversations. Sarah learns that her mother‟s parents were opposed to their daughter
marrying her father and refused to attend their wedding. As a result of their
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objections Sarah‟s father‟s family also had their reservations about the union.
However, the couple were defiant and in love and went ahead with their plans.
However, Sarah‟s grandparents on her mother‟s side made their lives very difficult
despite their daughter and new son-in-law‟s attempts to make them welcome. There
came a point where both of Sarah‟s parents were tired of the constant criticism and
not so subtle comments. Sarah‟s father had shouted at her mother for never defending
him against her parent‟s racisms. He accused her of being racist like her parents and
ashamed of him and their marriage. Ultimately there was a big argument and Sarah‟s
mother told her parents she no longer wanted them in her lives. Since that day
unspoken feelings had gradually infiltrated their relationship causing a rift between
the couple. That rift eventually became a way of life; just a silent agreement between
them never to talk about or go back to those difficult days. They had thought Sarah‟s
birth would bring them back close again; thought it would be a new beginning that
would allow them to put the past behind them. But Sarah‟s birth only caused more
friction. Sarah seemed to be a constant reminder of the family feud. Who was going
to help when her parents needed a baby-sitter? Who was Sarah‟s mother supposed to
ask all the questions that flooded her mind as the mother of a new baby? Ultimately
the stress became too much for Sarah‟s parents and her father left.
Sarah now understood the tension that had been the dominant feature of their
household. Thus the first thing Sarah decided to do was to reject all race labels and
refuse to acknowledge race period; all race did was divide people. Sarah was
determined that race related problems were not going to impact her life and she was
going to do her best to prevent them impacting other peoples‟ as well. Sarah didn‟t
feel she had anything in common with other black people anyway. Indeed, she had
felt very uncomfortable and out of place when she had gone on a trip to London with
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their church to fellowship with other churches and the black kids had told stories
about „getting licks‟, eating ackee and salt-fish with dumplings for breakfast on
Sundays, and screaming when their mothers braided their hair. They all laughed
along and Sarah pretended to laugh with them, but her mother vehemently
disapproved of parents hitting their children and she always had fried eggs for Sunday
breakfast and she certainly couldn‟t imagine spending her whole Saturday afternoon
sitting on the floor just to do her hair. Her mother had no idea what to do with her
hair and said it looked lovely if she just left it out naturally. Moreover, as she had
learned in church, we are all human beings; it doesn‟t matter what color a person is, it
matters how you treat each other. Indeed, what little she knew of her father, people
had always praised him for being the kind of person who didn‟t walk around with a
chip on his shoulder.
Now as coordinator of the pastoral activities at her local church, Sarah travels
outside of Kent more frequently, organizing interfaith activities and planning charity
events with other churches. Often at these joint church gatherings Sarah notices that
the congregations of the black churches don‟t mingle much with the congregations of
the white churches. Sarah tries to bridge these gaps and bring people together, after
all we are all Christians she reminds them. She refuses to entertain talk of race and
dismisses such topics as attempts to divert their greater mission as Christians. Indeed,
Sarah is often selected by the church elders to attend the functions in London and
Birmingham with the „more colorful churches‟. Sarah is an excellent ambassador for
their church they often remind her, with her most uplifting views on diversity and
community, she can show those city folk we here in the country know a thing or two
as well. Moreover, Sarah reasons, as the United Nations - the most important secular
humanitarian organization - rightly concluded decades ago, there is no such thing as
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race, so to call oneself multiracial or black or anything else didn‟t make sense and
only reinforces the idea that people are different in ways they were not. Sarah takes
great pride in what she sees as her own ability to live beyond racial lines and
encourage others to do so by spreading her message of racelessness in her own
community and across the country through the church networks.
Despite her noble intentions, Sarah‟s approach to challenging racisms through
a vacuous notion of racelessness is problematic. In this overwhelmingly non-raced
community, Sarah‟s voice, whether she likes it or not, has and will become
representative of raced people. Her congregation has encouraged her to become the
poster-child for a message that precludes the opportunity for substantive dialogue
about the very real problems with racisms in the church. What Sarah has not
acknowledged is that her very presence raises the issue of race. Whatever the racial
or cultural mix of the community in which she lives, her embodied self carries
meaning in a society with racial consciousness. Being phenotypically identifiable as
raced precludes the opportunity to ignore the issues her community and the broader
society lay at the door of all raced persons. She must prove her moral worth; justify
her presence, show she is not like those other raced persons even though her personal
experience is very removed from this group to which she is presumed to belong. If
racisms were purely conceptual prejudices one could dismiss them as simply ignorant
ideas or the attitudes of other people whom we can ignore and distance ourselves from
if we choose to. Yet, where can a raced person go to avoid racial consciousness and
live their life free of their own racialized identity such that their moral reasoning
could be unencumbered?
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How Our Articulations Constitute Society
For those persons who could be described as multiracial, the idea that one can
„choose‟ their identity in a way that is a) fundamentally different from the racial
identity options those who could be described as black have before them and b) not
morally connected to those persons who could be described as black are myths that
are a function of an unencumbered self. I reject both of these assertions because they
are inconsistent with what we know about the pervasiveness and impact of racial
consciousness. Moreover, as we have seen above, these claims are also inconsistent
with the lived reality of persons who could be described as multiracial. I contend that
persons who could be described as multiracial are necessarily connected to those
raced as black because one can neither live outside or beyond the meta-moral
framework of racial consciousness and because one‟s own being and articulations
(understood in the broadest sense of expressions as discussed in chapter three)
constitute social and moral reality in at least three crucial ways: 1) they shape the
conceptual landscape; 2) they define our cultural and historical narratives; and
following from the first two 3) they impact the distribution of social and political
goods – all of which impact and are impacted by the lived experience.
As we saw in chapter three, a person‟s evaluations are constitutive of the self
insofar as they impact how we respond emotionally and thus experience our lives.
Our evaluations directly impact the extent to which we are opened or closed to certain
matters of significance. Indeed, the encumbered self is not the individualist,
disconnected self of liberalism. The strong evaluations that engender our values and
hypergoods, on this conception, are necessarily social. As such, there is an embedded
connectivity between and among people and the socio-historical and linguistic context
they live in. The uniquely human ability to formulate hypergoods and engage in
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strong evaluations is a function of our linguistic ability and manifests itself through
speech and the ongoing dialogues we have with our speech community. Similarly,
our attempts to articulate what matters to us is not a purely internal, subjective process
that is limited to references to ourselves individually. Instead, these evaluations not
only occur in reference to expressions outside of us, they also inevitably speak to
objects beyond ourselves. To express one‟s feelings, ideas, identity, perceptions, and
beliefs on one‟s own terms is transformative and constitutive of the relations within
our speech community. It is in this regard that Taylor proposes the constitutive role
of language in the social context. On the expressive view, Taylor asserts,
Speech also serves to express/constitute different relations in which we may
stand to each other: intimate, formal, official, casual, joking, serious, and so
on. From this perspective, we can see that it is not just the speech community
which shapes and creates language, but language which constitutes and
sustains the speech community.10
„New coinages are never purely autonomous‟ and the articulation of new words and
meanings invariably impact relations within the speech community. Our articulations,
as expressions of our evaluations, desires and ultimately our values, impact our
speech community much in the same way they constitute our sense of self. The
significance of this assertion only increases with the impact of globalization,
international communication technologies and the spread of a common language.
As part of racial consciousness in the U.S. and Britain, the articulation of
multiracial identity influences the parameters of available identity choices for both
those who would be described as multiracial and those currently understood as outside
that demographic. It is often argued that multiracial identity is redundant in the
United States given that at least seventy-five percent of blacks have mixed ancestry.11
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The more recent trend in documentary reality TV that traces people‟s ancestry back
through their DNA has also revealed the commonality of multiplicitous racial
backgrounds.12 However, as the often referred to multiracial model in Brazil reveals
accepting everyone as multiracial does not eradicate racial or color prejudice. Brazil,
like Britain and America must come to terms with its colonial, imperial past. Slave
trading, racialized political practices and racialized economics indelibly left their
mark on these societies. Similarly, another example of the impact of this kind of
conceptual framing is the dominance of conceiving multiracial experiences through
the black/white binary. For example, the tendency to discuss multiracial AfricanAmerican identity through the narrow lens of slave descendants negates the
discussion of the more complex and international experience of raced persons in
America. When those persons who could be considered multiracial assert their
identity choices whether in intimate, private or personal circumstances that history on
the public scale may never record or for those few whose lives play themselves out in
the public eye, the conceptual boundaries of racial identities that are available are
subtly or sometimes dramatically shifted. Such expressions need not be explicit
expressions of a specific label. If a person who could be called multiracial chooses
not to respond to that identity at all or answers only to a particular form of it – mixed
race - for example, the people in that individual‟s circle of influence will necessarily
respond to those choices. Articulations of identity can obviously take a more direct
form of assertion. Even if the response to assertions of multiracial identities is
complete dismissal, social reality is being constituted. Perhaps a person declares
herself multiracial and a younger family member who previously only believed a
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black racial identity to be available to him hears this expression and now begins to
imagine his own identity and life experience in a new way. John Agard‟s poem, HalfCaste and its subsequent inclusion in the English National Curriculum has not only
given voice to the author‟s ideas, it has enabled a whole nation of people to imagine,
empathize and discuss a way of being in the world that prior to the poem‟s publication
they might not have had access to. The assumptions and prejudices pertaining to
those of us previously called half caste were laid bare for all to see and challenge.
The emergence of what we can loosely describe as the mixed race movement in
America is an example of these phenomena on an even larger scale. Indeed, the
tyranny of the one-drop rule in America has silenced the recognition of multiracial
identities in that social context in a manner that British people (unfamiliar with this
aspect of American history) would find hard to imagine. Likewise, Americans
unfamiliar with Britain‟s brand of racisms will find it equally hard to imagine the
racial hostility that smolders beneath the unexamined acceptance of mixed race
identity.
Nevertheless, each expression of an existing identity reinforces the validity
and social relevance of that identity, even as it may slightly re-transcribe its meaning.
Likewise, each expression of a new or nuanced version of an existing identity opens
up possibilities and impacts what are socially perceived as acceptable racial identities
and again subtly shift the meaning of existing racial identities. Indeed, those who
have been identified at different historical and contextual junctures as belonging to a
given racial group become the communicators of meaning for that racial identity,
whether their presence has the effect of challenging stereotypes or reinforcing them.
So the black person who doesn‟t „act black‟ is both an exception (often the exception
that proves the rule) and a sell-out and the black person who displays a behavior that
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is „characteristically black‟ can both prove the stereotype or is celebrated as
representing what the race does best. Woods was cast as an anomaly which was
channeled through the obvious fact that in a golfing sense he is. However, it is
interesting that his exceptional golfing talent was often shadowed by the anomaly of
his racial presence in the white world of golf. While attention to that social reality is
indeed understandable – Woods the „black golfer‟ was further infused with other
racialized stereotypes. He is also an anomaly because he did not fit the traditional
„black‟ stereotype – he wasn‟t from the ghetto, he didn‟t speak slang or wear baggy
clothes, etc. Describing himself as a Cablinasian (a portmanteau of Caucasian, Black,
American Indian and Asian), regardless of his own motives, simply confirmed the
already present question of his lack of racial authenticity. However, the fact is
Woods, despite his apparent lack of authentic blackness, is still a professional athlete.
So while he clearly is not the ultimate personification of the „naturally athletic black
man‟ he nevertheless can be seen as proof of the superior physical prowess of black
men.
While stereotypes imposed from outside the racial group are oppressive, the
reification of essentialized racial types from within the group is also problematic. In
either case, we are not powerless and our own expressions of identity are influencing
this social landscape all the time. Recall for example the public reaction to Tiger
Woods‟ articulation of his „Cablinasian‟ identity. Being what is typically understood
as an African American in his own particular national, social context, Woods whether
intentionally or not, was altering the social conception of what it meant to be African
American. Similarly, this multiracial mix presented a challenge to multiracial labels
that only allow for or presume a two way split, like biracial. Additionally, Woods
might have coined a nice new phrase other multiracial with a similar heritage could
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have adopted. However, given the largely negative response this articulation
received, particularly from the African American community who condemned the
move as a rejection of or unwillingness to acknowledge his blackness, the word has
not been widely used other than in reference to Woods himself. Even with Woods‟
then global status as role model and endorsement king, the phrase is unlikely to be the
label of choice for those wanting to give voice to their multiracial identity.
Nevertheless, his name was used as shorthand for the bill that tried to get a multiracial
category included on the 2000 U.S. census, despite Woods himself not supporting the
bill.13 While I obviously would not go so far as to suggest any person is responsible
for other people‟s reactions to their articulations of racial identity, I am claiming that
we are collectively responsible for reflecting on the congruence of our expressions
with our own values and motives and we are also responsible for considering the
impact of our articulations on the society of which we are a part because as members
of that society, our expressions constitute social reality.
Yet social reality is more than just which racial identities we have to choose
from. The myriad concepts that contribute to what we have been calling racial
consciousness are not discrete ideas. Rather they form part of the cultural narrative
that undergirds a society‟s understanding of itself and its collective expression of
identity. In a society with a racial consciousness, these narratives shape and are
themselves shaped by the meaning and content of racial identities. As cultural
narratives are constituted, the social milieu is impacted in a multiplicity of ways.
Cultural expressions, again both personal and public, influence other people around us
and there are consequences, good and bad, from both action and inaction.
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Articulations of racial identity and the narrative spun around those articulations
impact whose narratives are told and how. Indeed, this is not something people who
seek to assert multiracial identities are oblivious to. For advocates like Sundstrom,
the precise intention of his philosophical project is to change the meaning of racial
identities and the power dynamics they constitute that marginalize multiracial people
in the U.S. So for Sundstrom, articulating mixed-race ontology is seen as a challenge
to the black/white binary that operates as the dominant narrative in the United
States.14 Interestingly, however, in Britain, despite the widespread acceptance of
mixed race as an identity, there is a very telling absence of any narrative that speaks
to the people, events and situations that such an identity might be relevant to.
Commentators are often reminding the media and public at large that many persons
being labeled as black are in fact multiracial.15 Invariably, these national and global
histories are told and interpreted through the lens of race.
Therefore, we must ask questions about how the narrative surrounding our
articulations of racial identity influences cultural commentary, interpretations of
social reality and ultimately people‟s experience. Consider for example the difference
in how Barack Obama and Tiger Woods have chosen to articulate their multiracial
identity and experience. While we cannot claim to know their true motives (Obama
has more directly articulated his personal and political philosophy of race), we can
question their motives, actions and the outcomes of their actions in their particular
historical contexts in reference to the extent to which they further entrench racisms or
liberate raced persons from racial injustice. For example, why has Wood‟s never
14
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really engaged in a richer dialogue about his racial identity, which, in the context of
his society and sport, is the pink elephant in the room? Was the switch from Eldrick,
his „unmistakably black given name‟ to Tiger a camouflage designed to downplay his
blackness is an effort to appeal to the overwhelmingly non-raced world of golf as one
biracial commentator suggests?16 If indeed Woods attempted to avoid the issue for
whatever reasons, what has been the impact of those choices? Can we accept his
choices about how to articulate his racial identity in the knowledge that the observed
impact and symbolic significance of his achievements do more than enough in terms
of challenging racial stereotypes and racisms? Clearly these are not simple questions.
However, in societies with racial consciousness, where articulations of racial identity
can have a detrimental impact on millions of peoples‟ lives, it is quite legitimate to
evaluate and speak in terms of better or worse ways to articulate (or not articulate)
one‟s racial identity. This is not to imply there is some objective, Euclidian point
from which we can draw our conclusions. Such questions about humanity will always
be a matter of interpretation. At the same time, however, this does not preclude the
validity of discussions on these topics or the conclusions that can be drawn from
them. It is in this way, as McClain DaCosta rightly claims, that Obama‟s approach to
race relations is certainly one that is more progressive and promising than others who
think quite literally in terms of black and white. Citing Obama‟s race speech of
200817 that was in part a response to Jeremiah Wrights comments, McClain DaCosta
exclaims,
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Obama ended up providing a compelling and honest description of the hard
work that dealing with these contradictions requires. He eschewed both
avoidance and condemnation-the typical ways in which the uncomfortable
facts of racial division are so often handled in American politics. In so doing,
Obama's speech represents a maturing of the public discourse on race and
mixed race, one that moves beyond the limitations of the debates of the
1990s.18
The point of highlighting these examples is not to suggest that all articulations
achieve broader social recognition or become a matter of historical record in the way
famous politicians, athletes, actors or musicians experience by virtue of their
celebrity. The reality is most of us will not achieve celebrity status or become notable
cultural icons. However, while we must never be naïve about power differentials and
the opportunities the social and political infrastructure provides for the promotion and
reification of certain narratives, this fact, does not render our expressions irrelevant,
meaningless or something immune to normative evaluation. Indeed, the very act of
expression can and does go beyond its potential to affect contemporary narratives in
an immediate way; expressions of racial identity can ultimately assume significance
in becoming the historical narrative. The least we can do, therefore, is reassure
ourselves with the idea that our expressions, while ignored or underappreciated in our
own lifetimes, are nevertheless there to be passed on to or discovered by a future
generation. This might take the form of a very intentional revisionist historical
project or the subtle acceptance fact that our contemporary culture will someday be
someone else‟s history. Often even the iconic heroes and sheroes for later generations
were not fully aware of the magnitude of their own times and story – such is the
inevitable irony of hindsight. If only Zora Neale Hurston were alive to see her work
become a staple on the reading lists for African American literature courses. Could
18
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Hurston ever have imagined what an important figure she actually was in the
evolution of African American literature and an inspiration for future generations of
women of color? And what if Alice Walker had not undertaken such a determined
quest to recover Hurston‟s work?19 Thus, although it is true and indeed precisely one
of the features of racisms that certain narratives are marginalized and/or excluded, it
does not follow that we should adopt a nihilistic perspective that renders our
articulations meaningless. This is particularly important if that sense of nihilism also
ushers in a relinquishing of our own responsibility and ultimately our own power to
be the change we seek. Hence, while the position of „racial realist‟ must be properly
acknowledged and taken into account insofar as we must not ignore the very real
impact of race and racisms, it would not be accurate to conclude that we cannot make
choices within those constraints. And more importantly we must claim our own
power in our ability to do so, which ultimately will challenge and dismantle those
boundaries. For surely the oppressed is in part responsible for his or her own
liberation. If, for no other reason, than it is absurd to think that oppressors, who have
the power to do so if they so choose, are going to be the architects of their own fall
from grace.20 Moreover, we, in our relative freedom, must believe we can bring
about change in societies we can rightly call our own, when our ancestors – bound
and enslaved – managed to do just that in societies from which they were excluded in
every sense.
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As we have seen, racism operates at the level of the group.21 Racial
consciousness and the lived experience render such individualism impossible. The
notion of race in all its manifestations aims to describe, categorize, or explain the
characteristics of a group. Racial identities, like other group identities, seek to
articulate who belongs to a particular group and who does not. One cannot be raced
in purely individual terms; to be ascribed or to assert any given racial identity is to be
assigned or to declare membership to a certain group. While the specific content of
what such identifications might consist of can vary from one person, or context, to
another, for example, whether you are being racially profiled or are proudly
expressing your cultural heritage, they are only fully understood insofar as they are
part of the society‟s racial consciousness and as such have implications beyond one‟s
personal identity choices. It now becomes apparent why the move to a mixed race/
multiracial ontology is not as promising as it might first appear, if the overarching aim
is dismantling racisms. Even if the group construct mixed race/ multiracial is
redefined in a more positive light, as we saw in chapter two, it is still unequivocally
part of the racial consciousness. But more than this, the problem is that the raced
person can never be just his or herself. He or she is at once - „an example of why
these people can‟t be trusted,‟ „not like the others,‟ „bringing down the race,‟
„indicative of the best of what the race has to offer,‟ etc. Whether the characterization
is positive or negative, one thing it is not is individual. Describing the experience of
pain when confronted with the horrors of Africans crammed into slave ships during
the middle passage, Marcano explains, “I do not suffer that pain as an individual
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looking at individuals, I suffer that pain because in some small way that could be me,
my parents, my grandparents, my very possibility for living life.”
Articulations of multiracial identity also impact the distribution of social and
political goods. Thus far we have looked at how expressions of racial identity are
constitutive of our social reality at a theoretical or conceptual level. However,
articulations of racial identities also constitute social reality in a very concrete way.
This can be understood, in part, as the fallout from the concepts and narratives that
prevail in a society both in terms of cultural collateral and policy driven agendas. The
extent to which a group is understood as socially distinct or associable with social and
political goods impacts the distribution of wealth, power, opportunity and various
kinds of capital within society. Similarly, the narrative that characterizes and tells the
story of a particular social group (in this case a racial group) will also impact
judgments about what they deserve, are owed, have a right to etc. Indeed, an
important dimension of oppression is the restrictive, myopic and limiting mainstream
„controlling narratives,‟22 which negate or distort perceptions about what social
justice for a particular group could look like and even whether the injustice that group
has suffered is even acknowledged as deserving redress. Consider, for example, the
narrative that characterizes persons who could be described as multiracial as
„confused‟ and necessarily „torn between two worlds‟. This serves to silence the
voices of members of that group, particularly on questions regarding race. It
functions to discredit and/or dismiss their perspectives as the testimony of people
whose mental and psychological state can be called into question. Imagine how
different the concerns and interests of those who could be described as multiracial
would be received if the narratives of such people were constructed differently. What
22
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if these people aren‟t confused? What if none of us have to choose a side? What if
rather, the principle undergirding their narratives were inclusion for all people?
Narratives can be controlling not only in their description of the group or
persons but also of the social and historical context. Ironically, contrasting social
narratives often work in tandem. Take for example the „things are nothing like they
used to be‟ narrative. This ignores the reality of enduring albeit shifting racisms and
dismisses all kinds of structural race-based injustices are dismissed as either
unfortunate coincidences or even the result of some inherently self-destructive
characteristics on the part of those who are oppressed. The counterpart to this
narrative is the „nothing ever changes‟ narrative, equally problematic simply because
it is historically inaccurate. As Maya Angelou rightly noted in response to the events
in Jena, Louisiana in 2006, there was public outcry about the nooses swinging from
the tree; fifty years ago there would have been bodies in those nooses.23 Important
changes are also evident in the race-based laws, policies and opportunities that are
attached to racial categories born out of civil rights struggles in the US.24 From
college scholarships to state-funded contracts, significant amounts of social and
political resources are very explicitly connected to a certain conception of race and
change in the US. Similarly, in Britain, there is public money that is allocated
specifically for programs for ethnic minorities. However, in Britain, the „things are
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nothing like they used to be‟ buttresses the persistent refusal to introduce anything at
the political or social level that looks like affirmative action, or could be considered a
proactive approach to redressing racial injustice. Thus the reference to public funding
is not to suggest that either country provides enough or can even begin to compensate
for the monumental cost of slavery, exploitation and oppression, but they do reflect a
shift in attitude towards raced persons‟ status and deservedness of compensation,
retribution and/or reparations.25 What is crucial here is how narratives control
behavior and narrow the sociological, political, economic and cultural opportunities.
As long as raced groups of all descriptions are confined to dividing up between them
an already completely inadequately sized pie, collaborative and mutually supportive
strategies for eradicating racial injustice will be difficult to achieve. However, the
minute we can imagine the possibility of an all-you-can-eat pie or of starting our own
bakery, a new spectrum of opportunities presents itself.
The impact of such two paradoxical narratives can be observed in very
concrete ways that are detrimental to efforts to forge a more just society. Raced
groups continually have to justify and defend policies designed to redress racisms as
if it no longer exists. Advocates of racial justice are continually having to mobilize
those impacted by racisms in part because on the one hand, the „things are nothing
like they used to be‟ narrative suggests that in so far as there has been some change in
25
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race relations there is no need to address racisms today. On the other, the „nothing
ever changes‟ narrative is demotivating and reinforces the notion that we are
powerless in the grand scheme of things to bring about the justice we seek. These two
mutually reinforcing narratives are also problematic insofar as they control the
parameters of what can be said about racisms. The former makes it almost impossible
to get discussions of race and racisms on the social, cultural and political agenda.
Silencing voices of all raced groups is a tremendous problem.
As encumbered moral agents, persons who could be described as multiracial,
like all other encumbered moral agents, play a constitutive role in the society of which
they are a part. While we must take seriously the lived experience and racial
consciousness, it is also important to acknowledge these realities are pervasive but
they are not immovable. Moral agents‟ behaviors, actions and expressions impact
their own moral framework, racial consciousness and their social context whether
they intend to or not. Taylor rightly claims this gives rise to moral responsibility. 26
This is not to suggest that there is one simplistic explanation, interpretation or strategy
for how, when or why mixed-race identity can or should be articulated because the
responsibility lies in asking these questions in reference to the context one is in. Here
there is no place for blame. What is required is recognition of raced person‟s moral
connectivity and consequently, their collective responsibility to eradicate racial
injustice.
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Chapter 5: Collective Responsibility and the Problem with an Unencumbered
Self
“Change will not come if we wait for some other
person or some other time. We are the ones we've
been waiting for. We are the change that we seek.”
Barak Obama

Chapter four illustrated the complex and messy process from which our racial
identity and racial connectivity emerge. This lived experience of being raced in a
society with racial consciousness, I have claimed, is best described and understood
within the framework of an encumbered conception of the self. As we saw in chapter
three, the encumbered self is a being with „original purpose‟ where morality is
considered a uniquely human characteristic. For this being with original purpose,
self-mastery becomes a question of being open to certain matters of significance.
What is significant is a function of our values - our conceptions about what is noble,
righteous, admirable – and ultimately who we think it is good to be, which are
invariably shaped by our social, historical and moral context.
The case for an encumbered self has been argued before and is now generally
accepted or incorporated into some versions of liberalism. However, for those who
wish to take a harder line and take these two models to be fundamentally different,
why not just chalk it up as an ideological difference of opinion? So what if Shelby‟s
person with a thin black identity derives their sense of solidarity from contigent
circumstantial factors? It‟s not as if anyone in the U.S. or Britain anticipates waking
up and suddenly finding themselves in a society with no racial consciousness. And if
this person doesn‟t find their shared oppression a sufficient motivation to resist
oppression in the kinds of ways we might suggest are necessary to bring about such
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structural changes, what can we do other than conclude they must have their moral
priorities in a different order which is not morally reprehensible providing they are
not perpetuating or maintaining racial injustice? Like Sundstrom‟s politically
conscientious multiracial moral agent, if at the end of the day it is more important to
express one‟s racial identity in a manner that is consistent with one‟s sense of self
than to take up the complaints from some quarters of the black community, can we
really consider this morally problematic? Indeed, I do not wish to make any claims
about which racial identity, if any, persons who could be described as multiracial
should assert. Ultimately, I think that the discussion regarding an ontological
multiracial category is a red-herring that distracts us from the fundamental moral
issue, which is ending racial injustice. As such, the answers to questions of personal
identity choices require an analysis of particular individual circumstances before we
begin condeming people for making what are often very difficult moral decisions.
Nor do I wish to make any commitment to whether we should abandon the notion of
race or not. The problem is not only that there is a racial consciousness, but that this
racial consciouness powerfully impacts peoples lives in profoundly detrimental ways.
Thus, the answer to whether we should conserve the notion of race at this moment in
history in the U.S. or Britain will be based on whatever brings us to a point where
belonging to a particular racial group no longer negatively impacts raced persons‟ life
chances.
The scope of my concern, then, is not only to deliberate the oughts and ought
nots of particular cases. Rather it extends to our understanding of moral reasoning
and moral motivation such that we can theorise the most effective way to mobilise
people to engage in the process of eradicating racial injustice. In this regard, despite
its enduring popularity, the unencumbered model of self doesn‟t seem to provide the
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theoretical force required to effect a meaningful change. In this chapter my specific
aim is to raise a concern about the impact of this conception of the unencumbered self
on attempts to theorise collective responsibility. The worry here is not only that
human beings are necessairly social creatures or that the notion of community is of
fundamental important to some people as previous attacks on the idividualist liberal
self have argued. While these issues are obviously relevant, the question I want to
take up is the extent to which hegemony of the liberal paradigm blocks us from
envisioning and exploring alternative solutions to our most pressing moral concerns.
This can be seen clearly in the difficulties scholars have in theorising models of
collective resposibility that can satisfactorily attend to instances of moral injustice that
operate at the group level that do not easily fit into the acceptable definitions of
aggregate responsibility tied to group membership – like racisms. As such, this
chapter will analyse three recent attempts to formulate strategies or ways of thinking
about moral responsibilities and oppression. First, I will look at Thomas Hill‟s case
for the “Moral Responsibilities of Bystanders.” Second, I will explore Bernard
Boxill‟s claims about “The Responsibility of the Oppressed to Resist Their Own
Oppression.” Third, I will discuss Sarah Buss‟ “Reflections on the Responsibilty to
Resist Oppression, with Comments on Essays by Boxill, Harvey and Hill.”
Ultimately, I conclude that each scholar‟s commitment to an unencumbered model of
self and/or the assumptions associated with this model, despite the many valid and
indeed valuable observations presented in their respective articles, prevent them from
arriving at a real theoretical breakthrough that will enable us to grapple with the
challenges of theorising moral responsibility in societies with racial consciousness.
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Thomas Hill’s Unencumbered Bystanders
In his article, “Moral Responsibility of Bystanders,” Thomas Hill Jr. sets out
to frame „forward-looking‟ moral responsibilities – those responsibilities that are the
result of “social relations I did not choose, for example, being a son, a brother, or a
white man in a racist and sexist world.”1 Hill aims to show that those who can be
categorised as „bystanders‟ to oppression can be held accountable for three kinds of
„second order‟ responsibilities: 1) the duty of due care in moral deliberation, 2) the
duty of moral self-scrutiny and 3) a duty to develop moral virtue. All of these duties,
he notes, are presented in Kant‟s later work, The Metaphysics of Morals.
Perhaps not srprizingly, Hill‟s account accepts the traditional model of moral
agency such that intentionality is central to moral responsibility even as he takes up
considerations that do not fit squarely within the paradigm. Forward-looking
responsibilities are juxtaposed to those commiments and associations in which we
„willingly participate.‟ Similarly, Hill seems to accept the conclusion that follows
from a morality based on intentionality, namely that we can only be held morally
responsible for harm we caused purposefully.2 As such, Hill‟s bystander is
juxtaposed to the „primary oppressor‟ precisely insofar as it is characterized by a
number of features that highlight the lack of intentionality in his/her morally
questionable behaviour,
(1) they do not intend to harm, exploit, or oppress anyone; (2) they are either
unaware of the wrongful oppression or they think that they have no
responsibility to do anything about it; (3) there is in fact serious oppression in
the situation all around them; (4) they do have at least forward-looking (firstorder) responsibilities to try to eliminate, oppose, diminish, and/or ameliorate
1
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the effects of the oppression; (5) they see themselves as basically people of
good will, well-meaning people who would not tolerate atrocities, gross
injustices, or systems of abuse in their communities, at least not if they had
any legitimte and effective way to prevent or stopp them; (6) for the most part,
they are in fact fundamentally people of good will who would not knowingly
and entirely willingly tolerate preventable atrocities, gross injustices, and
systems of abuse in their communities; and (7) among the things that keep
them from a more realistic, painful, and effective awareness of their actual
situation and first-order responsibilities are reluctance to disturb a familiar
way of life, aversion to effort and risk, habits of making excuses and blaming
others, a public culture that masks oppression, the influence of primary
oppressors who intentionally put a favourable “spin” on its symptoms, the
support of other self-justifying bystanders, and other social conditions that
promote conformity and undermine confidence in one‟s ability to think for
oneself.3
The distinction between primary oppressor, bystander and victim and Hill‟s
subsequent description actually highlights one of the problems with accepting the
premise that we can only be morally responsible for our intentional actions. Whether
we accept the definitions of the roles in oppression Hill sets out or not, it is clear that
to link moral responsibility to intentionality is hugely problematic, particularly if our
aim is to address racial oppression.4 Given the definition of the bystander, it becomes
apparent that so many of the bystander‟s behaviours deeply impact the lived
experience of the oppressed group and indeed constitute part of what we call that
system of oppression. Indeed, in addition to the more overt violent and legal forms of
oppression, the accumulation of the more subtle forms of social and cultural racisms
is precisely what we are talking about when we refer to the lived experience of raced
persons in societies with racial consciousness. In her discussion of civilized
oppression (where neither violence nor the use of law is involved), Jean Harvey
rightly notes,
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Civilized oppression is inherently more difficult to recognize, even by its
victims…unlike violent oppression, there is often nothing conspicuous and it
often involves acts of ommission. Unlike law-based oppression, the acts of
omission are often not codified in any formal document. Unlike violent and
law-based oppression, this sphere of oppression often involves matter that
cannot sensibly be made the subject matter of law. The most troubling forms
operate in realms of the informal where neither law, nor even explicit
institutional policy, can feasibly operate.5
This is not to suggest that all forms of civilized oppression occur without intent. Nor
do I intend to give the impression that the violent and legal kinds of oppression are no
longer features of U.S. or British society such that we should be less concerned with
these more overt forms of oppression. The point is that for those kinds of civilized
oppression where we can genuinely say there is no intent to harm, we would
nevertheless be remiss to discuss such behaviours as not properly under the purview
of moral responsibility in some form.
The intentionality criterion is related to another set of assumptions that falls
out of the unencumbered model of self: voluntarism. Insofar as personhood is defined
by consciousness, the capacity for rational thinking is the cornerstone of morality.
Hence, the familiar notions of freedom of choice and freedom of association are of
paramount importance for the unencumbered moral agent. As Diane Jeske states,
The place of consent theory in liberal thought can largely be explained by
implicit or explicit acceptance of voluntarism, the thesis that special
obligations, over and above natural duties, can only be acquired as a result of
some voluntary action or actions that the agent knows or ought to know
generates such special obligations.6
Thus the force that can bring the „ought‟ to life is derived from the objective
conditions the moral agent exists in and the possibility of the loss of conditions that
are necessary to exercise one‟s personhood. The baseline assumption is that human
5

Jean Harvey, “Victims, Resistance and Civilized Oppression,” Journal of Social Philosophy
41 no. 1 (Spring 2001):14.
6

Diane Jeske, “Special Relationships and the Problem of Political Obligations,” Social Theory
and Practice 27, no. 1, (January 2001): 19.

166

beings are understood as having certain natural duties, but that with respect to such
constraints, morality is cashed out in terms of obligations. On the weak version, the
moral agent is obliged to ensure they do not interfere with another person‟s life-plans
and, on the strong version, to maintain social and political conditions that ensure other
people are free to formulate and pursue their life-plans.7 To make a moral claim on a
person we must identify the relevant contingencies that might permit us to impose on
this otherwise free agent. For Kantian deontological models, a sense of duty is the
factor that legitimately restricts free will, hence Hill‟s use of the tripartite roles in
oppression (primary oppressor, bystander, and victim). These enable us to deduce
who has the greatest burden of duty. For consequentialist models, as we shall see in
the discussion of Boxill‟s article, ethics becomes an exercise in constructing the
conditions and contingencies under which a person is obliged to help another: Who
caused the harm?; Who has the power to address it?; and what are the costs of taking
up this obligation? Because in either the deontological or consequentialist case the
unencumbered individual is not meaningfully connected to his/her context, he/she is
merely another object in the world. Thus, even when there is evidence of injustice
and oppression, the onus remains on those who hope to engender justice to make a
case that can identify who is „obliged‟ to address the moral impasse and why.
For Hill, we are bound to take up his second order responsibilities as general
requirements of self-respect. He argues,
At least in broadly Kantian theory, we are rational moral agents deeply
disposed to respect moral requirements, not as externally imposed, but as
essential aspect of our humanity…Thus, in the Kantian view, as bystanders it
is our own nature and personal commitment that we fail to respect when we do
not do what is right to the extent that we can.8
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And so, for the bystander and indeed as Hill notes, all persons who play a role in an
oppressive system, there is a duty of due care in moral deliberation which,
Calls for us to be sensitive to potentially relevant moral considerations, to
check our facts, to make sure that our particular moral opinions follow from
our basic moral commitments. It is a requirement to be conscientious in moral
judgment and its recognition presupposes, among other things, some degree of
commitment to morality and awareness of its basic values.9
To address those moral failings that are the result of defects of motivation we have the
duty of self-scrutiny, which further requires us to, “guard against a natural tendency to
self-deception and excuse-making that keeps us from facing squarely our real
motives.”10 The final expectation pertains to our persistence. While we all may falter
in our moral endeavors, we have a duty to develop moral virtue. Given the nature of
an oppressive system, Hill urges us to, “try to develop more strength of will, if we
can, so that we can overcome pressures and temptations to remain passive when we
realize that we should resist oppression.”11 We can fully appreciate the value of all
these duties. Interestingly, they are very compatible with the kinds of responsibilities
that are born out of the encumbered model of self. The general idea is that as
reflective beings we can evaluate ourselves and hold ourselves morally accountable.
The question then becomes, how will we know we have made accurate moral
observations and taken account of the relevant facts as Hill suggests? Against what
standard of morality will these deliberations be judged? And, what will motivate us
to engage in this process in the first place? On the unencumbered model, as we saw
above in Hill‟s first duty to moral deliberation, the assumption is a universal moral
ethic that we can ultimately all appeal to. The problem with this is not so much that
9
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we can‟t identify some basic values that seem to be relatively universal across
cultures, not committing murder etc. but rather, as Harvey notes, these more obvious
and clear-cut cases do not capture all the kinds of moral deliberations we must
consider in systems of oppression.12 The less overt forms of oppression are social,
cultural and informal and as such are a function of particular contexts not universal
ideals or taboos. An unencumbered model does not give due import to these kinds of
context specific factors; we are expected to abstract ourselves from our lived
experience. However, if, as we have said earlier, by definition a system of oppression
is something that is „all around‟ us, how can we step outside of our lives and/or this
system to this epistemologically objective view point in order to come up with a
clearer moral direction?
I don‟t think we can. However, the encumbered model provides us with
another way to approach the problem. If we are willing to take as our starting point
the idea that human beings are beings with purpose whose values emerge out of the
multifaceted and complex interplay of our history, social context, personal
experiences etc., and we can also agree that the eradication of racial injustice is our
aim, we can approach our problem of moral reasoning in an oppressive system in a
different way. The dialogue and processes of reflection suggested by Hill, instead of
being in reference to an abstract sense of morality, which in a society with racial
consciousness will inevitably be influenced by white superiority, can now be a
discussion in real terms and in reference to the desire to build a society where racisms
no longer negatively impacts life outcomes of certain groups of people. Such a moral
framework, while not being necessarily ideal, can be understood as a result of our
own moral reasoning; our ability to envision what such a society would look like and
12
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the changes we need to make as members of that society to achieve it. This moral
reasoning will be historically and culturally defined and filled with human
imperfections for sure, but it will also be characteristically human in its potential for
engagement, development and goodness. Insofar as moral exchange can now take
place in real terms, the moral yard-stick then becomes, not an abstract ideal but the
lived experiences of all those persons in that society, which are far easier to observe
and more meaningful to discuss, particularly for the oppressed. As the extensive
sociological and psychological research documents, we can see that raced persons' life
outcomes are being negatively impacted by racisms. As long as we are aware of these
lived injustices, we know there is more moral work for us to do.
The second concern is the question of motivation. It is obvious why we
„should‟ seek to resist oppression; it is quite another thing to ask why we would. We
are all aware of the infinite deterrents given the busy lives people lead and the
competing moral commitments that are a feature of modern life, before we even begin
to consider questions of social justice. Indeed, as we shall see in our discussion of
Buss‟ article, discussions about responsibility and resistance often amount to a cost
analysis. However, both an unencumbered and an encumbered model of self urge us
to consult our own moral commitments and out of „self- respect‟ strive to be
consistent with our own values. Again, in principle, I have no objection.
Nevertheless, even as a person with forward-looking responsibilities derived from my
social role, on an unencumbered model my own values are not meaningfully or
robustly connected to my purpose, identity, social role or political ideals. As Hill
repeatedly comments, “Everyone in a context of oppression (and other morally
problematic situations) has the responsibility of due care in deliberation, self-scrutiny
regarding one‟s motives, and doing what one can to strengthen one‟s will to do what
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is right.”13 This vague connection to moral duty, particularly with regard to issues I
might not be aware I am contributing to (as is the case for the bystander), makes it
quite plausible and perhaps even probable that I can understand myself to be living
very much in line with my own values, while simultaneously contributing to the
oppression of others. If I articulate a multiracial identity in the U.S., even amidst the
complaints from some sectors of the black community, I am not failing to live up to
my own moral commitments. Actually, I understand myself to be morally sound
because I have the courage to stay true to my own and indeed this society‟s moral
value of freedom of expression, despite the resistance from others and potential
persecution I might experience in doing so. This is in part why the exercise of
establishing a distinct multiracial ontology is beside the point. As long as our
principals can be disconnected from social reality in this way, we have little to draw
on to compel another person to subscribe to any particular course of action or to
prioritize it over any other, such that the bigger social picture can be taken into
account. On an unencumbered model of self, our motivations are not connected to
our social context and moral deliberation remains an essentially individual exercise.
Again an encumbered model leads us in an alternative direction. As a being
with original purpose, my version of the good is inextricably tied to my moral sense
of self. As such, the inertia of objectivity that requires the moral agent to construct
contingent reasons for engaging in a particular moral action becomes obsolete.
Instead, motivation is built into conception of the moral agent. The moral agent is
compelled by his/her own sense of original purpose and driven to measure his/her
actions and behaviors against his/her own hypergoods and his/her social context.
Moreover, these evaluations impact the moral agent‟s emotions and how they feel,
13
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such that as the moral agent engages in a process of self-reflection (or even fails to do
so) she/he has a feedback mechanism that impacts his/her sense of self-worth. As an
encumbered moral agent, I care about whether I have done the right thing in a
fundamental way; not because I may have failed to walk on some moral high ground,
but because who I am as a person is at stake. Moreover, this measure of who I am as
a person does not occur in a vacuum; it is always and inevitably, in part, a function of
my social, historical and moral context. In this sense, an encumbered moral agent‟s
scope of moral reference is necessarily beyond his/her own personal and individual
moral concerns. So, in a society with racial consciousness, it is not morally
acceptable to simply ignore racial injustice just because there is a particular identity I
wish to express. I must evaluate that desire to express an identity against the broader
social concerns as well.

Boxill’s Disconnected Oppressees
In chapters three and four we saw that the constitutive notion embedded in an
encumbered self, operates along the individual and social moral axis. If Hill‟s article
highlights the former, a closer look at Boxill reveals the challenges an unencumbered
conception of the self raises for our moral rationales that seek to tackle the latter.
Boxill directs his attention to another category of roles in a system of oppression: the
oppressed. Boxill does not want us to lose sight of who he takes to be the principle
players in systems of oppression by getting side-tracked by what bystanders should or
should not do. Boxill begins with the premise that while, “Oppressors can always
stop the oppression they are engaged in, they often find it very difficult to choose to
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do so.”14 By way of analogy, Boxill provides an analysis of American slaveholders
through a critique of Mill‟s harm principle and the related conceptions of threat and
blameworthiness in the case of domestic violence. He rejects the premise that
opportunity to harm is equivalent to the threat of harm. Consequently, he also rejects
the „seductive conclusion‟ that oppressors are damned if they do or damned if they
don‟t insofar as by virtue of always having the opportunity to harm, they must
necessarily always represent a threat.15 Boxill claims it is this faulty reasoning leads
to the idea that oppressors in actuality cannot stop oppressing, which in turn leads (at
least in the case of American slaveholders) to discussions of oppression revolving
around the blameworthiness of the oppressor. The logic being that if one cannot stop
oppressing then one cannot be blamed for being an oppressor. Despite having shown
the flaws in this line of reasoning, Boxill, it seems, would rather turn to what
presumably will be more fruitful soil for sowing the seeds of resistance.
Contrary to “a widespread tendency to assume that they [the oppressed] are in
no position to resist [oppression],”16 and “the equally widespread tendency to
profoundly underestimate the human resourcefulness of the oppressed,”17 Boxill
argues that the oppressed themselves have the responsibility to resist their own
oppression, providing “they retain the moral capacity to resist.”18 Indeed, Boxill
outlines the significant ways in which the oppressed can „frustrate‟ their oppressor
and indeed have the capacity to do so, much in the same way Derrick Bell referred to
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Mrs. MacDonald‟s determination “to harass white folks” as the definitive
instructional fable he calls us to remember at the end of his article, “Racial
Realism.”19 The point is that even when one lacks structural power, there are still acts
of defiance that are meaningful and even gratifying in which the oppressed can
participate. Subscribing to a similar logic, Boxill concludes his argument in the
following two statements: 1) “The main ground of their responsibility to resist is their
responsibility to repudiate the insult and falsehood of oppression.”20 Further, drawing
on the work of Frederick Douglas, he concludes that it is the oppressed‟s
responsibility 2) “to show signs of power, and if they dare not show signs of power to
their oppressors, to show signs of power to bystanders, or even if that is too
hazardous, to at least resist in secret, in order to stave off the contempt of bystanders
and their own self-contempt.”21 Again, this appeal to „self-respect‟ seems reminiscent
of what came out of the discussion above regarding the encumbered sense of being
true to one‟s own personhood, so why is Boxill‟s account problematic? I believe it is
problematic because insofar as self-respect is conceived as a function of
individualism, it cannot provide the grounds from which the connectivity among
raced persons can be theorized and following from that, we are left with no basis from
which we can articulate raced persons‟ collective responsibility for challenging racial
injustice.
Let us return to Shelby‟s initial concern and indeed the parallel skepticisms
raced persons often have regarding persons who could be described as multiracial
insofar as they are presumed to be caused less harm as a result of racisms than their
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black counterparts. What if, a person does not feel the need to „repudiate the insult
and falsehood of oppression? What if, a person is very well aware of the oppressive
system of which they are a part, but derive their sense of power and self-respect from
other sources? This person has a job that is meaningful and enjoyable, they have a
degree of financial stability or even success, a loving family or other social and
personal relationships that are rewarding and they simply dismiss the idea that they
are inferior as so much racist nonsense. Or, consider the individual who has a
multiracial identity and thus rejects this racial hierarchy as utterly fictitious and while
being aware of the on-going social and political injustices of the society they live in
does not experience themselves to be any less than anyone else. Moreover, they do
not believe we should give any ignorant racist people our regard but find our selfrespect from within.22 Would Boxill‟s grounds for the oppressed to resist oppression
be compelling to these persons described above, or indeed other raced persons in
societies with racial consciousness, who have competing moral commitments?
There are, evidently people from all sectors of the raced population who very
actively participate in resisting racial oppression, but the degree of personal insult or
the extent to which the assumptions of racisms are false does not appear to map
directly onto those who resist. As Boxill rightly notes, there are other factors to
consider such as the cost of resisting or the likelihood of punishment.23 Yet, there is
something more important to consider here; the underlying question that underpins
Shelby‟s concern: isn‟t there some connection between middle class blacks and their
working class and indeed underclass brothers and sisters? Or as it relates to
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Sundstrom‟s claims, isn‟t the idea that persons who could be described as multiracial
can escape being raced in a society with racial consciousness false? If for arguments
sake we accept the oppressor, bystander, victim categories, surely it is a step too far to
suggest that middle class blacks and/ or persons who could be described as multiracial
are bystanders. Ultimately, isn‟t there some kind of collective responsibility all raced
persons have for resisting oppression and bringing an end to racial injustice?
Intuitively it seems that there is, but as long as we fail to take the power of
racial consciousness and the lived experience of being raced seriously and accept the
unencumbered model of self, it proves extraordinarily difficult to theorize what could
ground this moral imperative of collective responsibility. On the unencumbered
model we cannot make moral claims on a person that unduly infringe on the agents‟
fundamental rights to freedom of choice and/or association. So while we might
recognize races as social categories, it doesn‟t follow that by virtue of being raced, I
am morally obliged to associate with or make choices solely based upon this
classification. We can admit of certain „natural duties‟, which are owed to all
persons, but other moral considerations that fall outside of this framework are
considered „special.‟ These „special‟ obligations require far more stringent criteria of
justification. Two kinds of special obligations have traditionally been accepted as
legitimately giving rise to moral obligations: promissory or contractual relationships
we have entered into voluntarily, and intimate relationships with family members and
friends. All other special obligations must satisfy what has proven to be the
extremely elusive criteria derived from the unencumbered voluntarism imbedded in
the liberal paradigm and the intentionality criterion that holds it is not possible to have
group intentions. Smiley concurs, “The possibility that collective responsibility
requires, not only collective actions and intentions, but a collective mind, has proven
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to be one of the greatest challenges to those who want to sustain a notion of collective
responsibility.”24
This approach to moral obligation forces race scholars grappling with the
moral problem of racisms down a path which includes two elements that map on to
those „acceptable‟ forms of special obligation: First, they can forge a socially
constructed association between members of the defined group which are politically
relevant in the sense that they might not have been the result of a voluntary
contractual agreement but that the circumstances amount to a tacit agreement of some
sort. Second, they can give an account of group characteristics or membership which
are compatible with the family and friends contingency required by the intimacy
criteria. The difficulty is that such endeavors can often lead to confining and at worst
essentialized ontology of group identity, violating the liberal principle that we are free
to choose our own identity commitments and associations. Or, as Jeske highlights,
While consent theorists have struggled valiantly to interpret various types of
actions as expressions of citizens' consent to obey the laws of their countries,
it has become increasingly obvious that the vast majority of citizens of any
modern state have never agreed to do any such thing. Appreciating the nature
of intimate relationships will lead us to see that we can offer a voluntarist
account of special obligations to intimates. Once we do that, however, any
hopes of modeling political relationships on intimate relationships must be
abandoned.25
Shelby and Sundstrom both try to overcome the challenges inherent within the
two strands of justification engendered from the traditionally legitimized frameworks
of special obligations. Shelby‟s notion of thin blackness and the accompanying
argument for black solidarity like Sundstrom‟s mixed race ontology and his account
of multiracial responsibility, however, are both constrained by the unencumbered
conception of moral agency and the voluntarist obligations that emerge out of it. Like
24
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Boxill‟s broad category „the oppressed,‟ Shelby‟s notion of thin blackness carries the
expectation that those picked out by the thin black descriptor have a duty to resist
oppression by virtue of their status of being oppressed. In Shelby‟s case, a more
robust conception of racial identity would fail the voluntary test and so thin black
identity is designed to speak to some kind of special relationship between those who
are the victims of anti-black oppression. Yet, as Jeske cautioned, the very thinness of
Shelby‟s criteria makes an appeal to an intimacy argument impossible. Thus,
operating within an unencumbered paradigm, Shelby must rely on the idea of
obligations borne out of “socially salient connections.”
Sundstrom also finds himself torn between two seemingly incompatible
theoretical demands. For Sundstrom however, the challenge is to reconcile his
communitarian proclivities with his commitments to liberalism. As such, Sundstrom
posits a framework of responsibility that appeals to familial connections (which we
presume engender a stronger sense of obligation than what we might experience for a
stranger). However, it is not clear how the free (in the liberal sense), albeit
responsible, multiracial person is to make the leap from their own grandmother to the
wider, essentially kinship model of race as family, and still maintain that strength of
connection and that is presuming they have a raced grandmother they know and love.
However, as Jeske further argues,
In order to assimilate political relations to intimate relationships, the notion of
a relationship has to be weakened to an extraordinary degree. Thus, all of the
features of intimate relationships that seem morally significant - the mutual
emotions and attitudes of the parties to each other as individuals, the personal
interaction, the mutual knowledge and understanding of each other's character
- must be ignored in the grounding of associative obligations. Instead, we are
forced to appeal to impersonal features of the "relationship," such as that of
doing good or suffering evil "together' (where 'together' does not imply any
direct interaction), or of giving reason to value.26
26
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The problem with Sundstrom‟s account is that it doesn‟t fully recognize the
significance of a person‟s life experiences. Surely, for something to be significant it
must be valuable in one‟s life. Indeed, we need not try to make the leap from our own
grandmother to our grandmothers through racial kinship. Compare, for example, the
grandmother (or any other relative) who we have not shred life experiences with to
the grandmother with whom we share our most cherished childhood memories. We
might reason that out of some notion of family loyalty or duty that we have some
obligations to the grandmother we do not know well (other than the fact she is our
grandmother) by virtue of that role,27 but we would certainly not prioritize her over
the grandmother with whom we have talked, played, laughed and cried. In this
regard, an unencumbered justification of moral motivation is very weak because it
doesn‟t account for motivation born out of the emotional connectivity forged out of
lived experiences. Just because a person assumes a particular role of fits a certain set
of contingencies, is this really enough to generate the degree of conviction necessary
to uphold or enforce some moral standard, particularly if it requires some time or
action that conflicts with other personal commitments, like family or work? That is
notwithstanding the very real and often devastating, even fatal consequences raced
persons have experienced when battling the injustices of racisms.
Moreover, it turns out to be extremely difficult to detail the contingencies that
establish who indeed is responsible for addressing injustices or taking moral positions.
As has been the case in trying to formulate a description of who is black such that
they should have black solidarity and participate in collective action on behalf of
themselves and other blacks. There are always those exceptions to who in a common
27
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sense or instinctive way one feels ought to be obligated but for some reason fall
outside the demarcations of an unencumbered ethical formulation. Indeed, this is the
very issue with regard to middle class blacks who do not necessarily experience the
effects of racism in the same way as working class or under class blacks; Shelby‟s
framework is trying to overcome. It clearly doesn‟t ring true to suggest that those
blacks who have managed to overcome many of the limitations racisms place on
one‟s life chances should not contribute to ensuring such fortunes are bestowed on
other blacks who are yet to achieve that status. However, I am not convinced that the
thin blackness catch-all net of identity does the moral work Shelby seems to think it
can. It‟s not as if middle class blacks had not realized they were black or were
unaware that all black are impacted by anti-black discrimination prior to Shelby‟s
work! Moreover, the suggestions that all blacks are on the same team belies the
complicated reality of the path to success for many raced persons, which might
necessarily involve „leaving behind‟ some of their closest team members, even if that
is accompanied by a personal commitment to „give back‟ at some later time.28
Sundstrom‟s account of multiracial responsibility is similarly problematic
insofar as there are simply too many exceptions and people who do not fit the
contingencies for it to be a meaningful account of what members of this group ought
to do. More importantly, beyond the costs, what would have engendered such a deep
moral conviction in this unencumbered individual such that their sense of self was
bound to this principle of extended family loyalty? What of the multiracial person
who doesn‟t know their raced grandmother or grandfather? What of the multiracial
28
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person who has been adopted? What of the multiracial person who has been raised in
a predominantly non-raced community and doesn‟t feel connected to raced persons?
What of the multiracial person who knows their raced relatives but who do not share
their experiences of racisms for whatever reason? What of the multiracial person who
has grown up in a relatively affluent family and who, like Shelby‟s middle class, does
not relate to the „struggles‟ of the disenfranchised and disempowered masses? The
list goes on, but none of these scenarios are uncommon among this group so surely we
need something more on which to base our hopes for social justice. Even if the
multiracial person does feel this commitment to their raced grandmother and/or
family in general, how do we get from that personal ethic of care to a more abstract
and generalized sentiment about the wider population? What is it that allows us to
extend these principles of care to a broader kinship model of race? While the appeal
to family ties clearly speaks to an attempt to ground morality in a deeper sense of
connectivity, it is not clear what grounds this value for the individual who hasn‟t had
the requisite familial experiences to cultivate such bonds if there isn‟t a richer
conception of the self to underpin it.
Boxill fares little better, for he doesn‟t even attempt to imply any notion of
solidarity or memory to link the oppressed together in any meaningful way. They
share the status of being oppressed, which we presume is the same form of oppression
(although this is clearly over simplistic), but beyond that, we get no sense that this
collection of oppressed individuals has any connection to each other. Rather Boxill‟s
call for resistance appeals to an individualistic notion of self-respect that offers little
justification for why the more confident and/ or the less reliant on recognition from
their oppressors should uphold a sense of collective responsibility. If those who fare
better in systems of oppression do not experience a sense of collective responsibility,
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this individualistic picture appears particlarly problematic given it would seem that
the most confident and independent are the very people who would be best placed to
challenge oppression.
It is my contention that the philosophical problem here is the failure to
properly take up the power of racial consciousness and the significance of the lived
experience in conceptions of moral agency. As such the unencumbered conception of
self remians in-tact. Yet, it is the racial consciousness that impacts the lived
experience of persons who are raced. These two factors ground the connectivity that
is intuitively understood and exposes the limitations of an unencumbered conception
of self. If we are open to the possibility that the moral agent is in indeed encumbered
by his or her history, society, culture and live experiences, Boxill‟s oppressees,
Shelby‟s thinly identified blacks, and Sundstrom‟s multiraicals now have a very
significant reason to take up their collective responsibility for resisting oppression. It
is not that all perons who might fall under these labels necessarily have the same lived
experience, but that the impact of racial conscousness on their lived experience makes
it such that experiencing, having to attend to, or being perpetually aware of racial
consciousness and the assumption of their moral inferiority within that meta-ethical
framework that governs their society is unavoidable. It is in this sense that raced
persons are connected. Not even Mr. Golightly, in Bell‟s Space Traders, was
surprised by the president and his cabinet‟s decision to exchange African-American‟s
for economic security. He was disappointed in his own inability to outwit his
opponent, but not surprised.29 People in racist societies have racial consciousness!
Indeed, the apparent oblivion of some bystanders to the all-consuming nature of white
superiority belies the racial consciousness that makes it manifest socially. The litmus
29
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test is a question that has been put to non-raced persons as a philosophical,
educational and comedic device: “Would you change places with a raced person?”
The answer, which inevitably comes back in the negative, evidences the impact of
racial consciousness on a social and indeed moral level, not just as a personal
orientation. All people, raced and non-raced know what it means to be raced in a
society with racial consciousness; we know the lived reality of being raced – to be
treated with less respect, less regard, less compassion. As Chris Rock famously
chided, even the poorest white person would decline to change places with him,
despite his fame, wealth and success in so many other areas commonly understood as
desirable.30
This disrespectful treatment of raced persons is significant, not only insofar as
it is unequal, but even more so because equal respect is built into liberal ideals. One
is accorded respect by virtue of being human; natural law by definition applies to all
people.31 And yet, white superiority as an overarching framework intervenes, if not
overrides, liberal moral ideals such that raced persons are considered morally inferior
in a manner which puts them outside the realm to which natural law and thus
universal and objective moral frameworks apply. This distortion is perpetuated where
racial categories are used legally because they are understood to be disconnected from
their social, cultural and historical attributes. Thus, as Gotanda rightly argues in his
critique of America‟s „color-blind constitutionalism,‟ “The treatment of racial
categories as functionally objective devalues the socio-economic and political history
of those placed within.... Through this complex process of assertion, disguise, and
devaluation, racial categorization based upon hypodescent advances white
30
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interests.”32 Acknowledging racial consciousness enables us to move beyond the
fallacy of objectivity and appreciate that just as racial categories cannot be detached
from their substantive social, historical and moral content neither can raced persons
be understood as wholly detached from each other and the lived reality of being raced.
So, while it is possible to escape some of the material and social binds experienced on
account of one‟s race, as Peller notes, to „transcend‟ the moral constraints is an
entirely different proposition.33 By integrating the moral, historical, social and
personal an encumbered model of moral agency recognizes this connectivity, which in
turn provides the platform from which we can discuss those collective responsibilities
that currently fall outside of those legitimized in mainstream Anglo-American
philosophy.

Buss’ Unfortunate U-Turn
Let s now return to the primary concern expressed at the beginning of this
chapter - the hegemony of the unencmbered self in moral theory. My worry is that
even when it appears to confine one‟s philsophy or multiply the obstacles present in
an attempt to theorise collective responsibility, we remain committed to its tenets,
much as a slave might have stayed loyal to his master. A reavealing example of this
relctance to rethink the commitments of unencumbered moral agency is Sarah Buss‟
article “Reflections on the Responsibility to Resist Oppression.”
Buss takes up the question that „always looms large‟ in discussion about
resistance and responsibility: cost. “How much time and energy is it reasonable to
32
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expect anyone to give to even the most noble of causes?”34 How much punishment or
danger should a person be willing to risk in taking a stand against injustice?
Intuitively, the assumption is that there are limitations to those costs and Buss frames
her task as understanding those limitations. She questions Hannah Arendt‟s claim
that if one is willing to sacrifice their own happiness to resist oppression, then
considerations of the impact of that resistance are misplaced. Buss seeks to
complicate this picture. She rightly notes that the oppressed are not necessarily so
unhappy such that this is sufficient motivation for resistnace.35 Moreover, it is not
necessarily the case that one mst choose between their own self-respect, insofar as
they acqire it by resisting oppression, and their happiness, which is the pressumed
cost a person will sacrifice as punishment for this resistance.36 However, the
fundamental point Buss‟ discussion of cost aims to illustrate is that cost is not the
most salient axis around which discussions of resistance and responsibility should
revolve. Drawing on a range of testimony from both victims and bystanders, Buss
observes that people do not experience the „decision‟ to resist oppression as a matter
of weighing up the possible costs against the possible benefits. Rather, the move to
resistance is experienced as „a kind of epipheny,‟ finding one‟s sense of „balance‟ in
life, a compulsion or even a need to act. Buss explains,
Such testimony calls our attention to another factor complicating our thinking
about the cost we can reasonably be expected to pay in resisting opppression:
resisting oppression can be self-fulfilling, even as the self-sacrifice involved is
very real. Neiman‟s heroes – and Arendt‟s – suggest that when resisting
oppression appears to be an essential element of a good life, questions about
cost and the likelihood of success are hard to take seriously. If a bystander to
oppression finally reaches a point where she cannot really be happy, or free, or
“balanced” unless she incorporates acts of resistance into her daily life, then
34
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the fact that she will have to give up many desirable aspects of her old life will
not seem to be such a powerful counter-consideration.37
This describes in practice precisely what the encmbered conception of self seeks to
capture teoretically. Recall, as we saw in the discussion of Charles Taylor, the
encumbered self was one for whom what he/she ought to do was synonymous with
who he/she thinks it is good to be. For the encmbered moral agent, whose identity,
articulations and reflections are constittive of his/her sense of self, hypergoods
characterise and indeed are the compass for one‟s own moral aspirations. As Buss
succinctly explained in her commentary on the feelings experienced by those who‟ve
resisted oppression, “The sense of what one ought to do is swamped by the sense of
what one must do; and one‟s moral impulse is hardly distinguishable from the desire
to live a good life.”38
Having seemed to capture a picture of moral agency that is both theoretically
sound and empirically accurate insofar as it reflects the way in which people
experience their own sense of morality, Buss‟ next move is unfortunate. She states,
Far from worrying that concerns about one‟s own balance and freedom are
insufficiently “moral” motives, I am inclined to believe that a morally ideal
human being would be guided by the very feelings that guide the actions of
these inspiring resistors. If, however, nothing has yes exploded in the rest of
us, then we are faced with the question of cost that has been the theme of this
brief commentary. This qestion can now be reformulated: are we morally
obligated to do what we can to realize the morally ideal response to
oppression?39
The resignation that once again cost must be our first port of call for moral
deliberations, doen‟t seem to follow from Buss‟ thorough and eloquent demonstration
of precisely why cost is neither the singularly most important nor the fundamental
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criterion for moral deliberations and actions. My intent here is not to suggest that we
do not weigh up the potential costs of our moral behaviours or that there are no
contigent considerations; clearly this is not the case and neither does the move to an
encumbered model suggest it is or should be. The point is however, that when people
do take a stand against oppression and live according to their highest values, the cost
model of moral agency is not applicable. Consequently, it would seem that the next
question would not be another essentially cost based exploration as Buss sets forth,
but rather: what was it that led these resitors to reach their respective points of
conviction, epiphany or balance? Surely, now we have some concrete examples and
testimony of this phenomenon, given our aim is to unearth the secret to resisting
oppression, the most fruitful course of action is to acquire a thorough understanding
of this way of being in the world in the hope that we could encourage it in ourselves
and others. If our line of questioning reverts back to the dead end road of costs, it
becomes extremely difficult to tease out any answers.
The second unfortunate step Buss takes, is to characterise this experiecne of
resistnace as „ideal.‟ While we may conceed it is uncommon (although I am not
entirely comfortable with this idea as many people are engaged in forms of resistance
against the abundant forms of social injustice in our modern societies), it need not
follow that the resisters cited are ideal moral agents. Certainly they are worthy of our
recognition and even admiration of their moral conviction, but the suggestions that
these persons are in someway morally different from the rest of us has the unfortunate
effect of making the path to epiphany seem unreachable or at least harder to reach for
us moral mortals. I cannot help recall a lecture delivered by Donzeleigh Abernathy,
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daughter of Ralph Abernathy, the great Civil Rights lawyer.40 Ms. Abernathy recalled
the events and experiences that lead up to the landmark legislation, the church
meetings, student protests and practical challenges of political activism. She provided
a very intimate and personal perspective of her father and Dr. King Jr.‟s thoughts and
feelings, rather than the kinds of information that are standard fare in any account of
this chapter of history. The message she was most eager to convey, however, was that
her father and Dr. King Jr. were just like those hundreds of students who sat in the
auditorium almost half a century years later, listening with a combination of curiosity
and awe. There was nothing exceptionally courageous or morally ideal about these
two young men who we have come to know as almost mythical heroes; they just did
what they felt they had to do, Ms. Abernathy beseeched. Sometimes muddling along
making last minute adjustments to ensure meetings could proceed, having to
overcome the nervousness of speaking to congregations where they neither had
seniority in terms of age or rank, formulating unprecedented legal arguments, not
knowing what the outcome might be. They just did what they had to do; compelled
by the circumstances and their own conscience. It was not that they didn‟t consider
the very real and imminent costs, she explained, but these were obstacles to be
strategically overcome, not considerations that impacted the moral principle at stake.
Given these testimonies about the experience of challenging racial injustice, it appears
we need to reformulate the question thus: How do people expereince their moral
agency? What drove these people and the other „regular‟ people (including Dr. King
Jr. and Mr. Abernathy) who participated in the many acts of resistnce both big and
small that contributed to the most monumental shift in race relations in moden U.S.
40

Delivered on February 6, 2004 at Morgan State University. See Derek G. Powell, Partners
with History
http://media.www.msuspokesman.com/media/storage/paper270/news/2004/02/20/CampusLife/Partners
.With.History-614057.shtml (Accessed on 17.11.2010).

188

history? What was on the mind of those unnamed men and women who decided to
boycott the bus system, and how did they feel as they walked door to door after a
grueling day‟s work to deliver leaflets in the hope of finding a sympathetic ear? What
was the tipping point when they decided enough was enough? We are back again to
the importance of the lived experience, not just in terms of understanding how racisms
impact our understanding on or conception of of moral reasoning, but also in terms of
our ability to understand how moral agency is practiced.
I don‟t suspect Buss would necessarily disagree; she shows here skepticism to
what she describes as a purely „academic‟ approach to understanding resistance. “It is
certainly important to keep asking ourselves what we are obligated to do to resist
oppression. It may be, however, that this is not a question we can answer to our own
satisfaction unless our sense of balance has made weighing the pros and cons come to
seem merely “academic.”41 And yet, it is the default position she reverts back to. So
my next question is why? What draws Buss, Boxill, Hill, Shelby and Sundstrom and
so many others into these lines of argument, which obviously have a rich theoretical
basis but prove to be so difficult to reconcile with the actual lived manifestations of
oppression and resistance they seek to understand and explain? Why when
phenomena like collective responsibility, that seem so central to our sense of how
oppression and resistnace operate yet have been so difficult to theorize, do we hold
fast to an unencumbered framework?
Indeed, it is not only those wedded to the liberal paradigm who find it
difficult to incorporate the moral implications of racisms into their theories. Scholars
who take a strong stance on the impact of racisms also ultimately revert back to its
basic principles.
41
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For example, Charles Mills explores the posibility of defending blacks men‟s „special
obligation‟ to marry black women, and concldes that he has shown that, “using
conventional moral theories, and without making racist assumptions about whites, or
even appealing to any controversial separatist ideology – an interesting case can in
fact be built for a.position quite widespread in the “commonsense morality” of the
black community.”42 Although Mills does present a range of possible arguments that
those less familiar with the commonsense morality of the black community might find
intriguing, [racial purity (keep the cream out of the coffee) argument; racial caution
(don‟t upset the white folk argument; racial solidarity (no sleeping with the enemy)
argument; racial demographic (where are all the black men?) argument; the tragic
mulatto-to-be (what about the children?) argment; questionable racial motives (you
can fool that white girl but you can‟t fool the rest of us) argument] in doing so, none
really stand up to Mills‟ conventional analysis. So while the speed with which this
special obligation would be dismissed might not be as quick as it was prior to Mills
complicating the picture, the idea that black men have an duty to marry black women
does not meet the reqirements of unencumbered agency. I do not aim to suggest it
should. The point is why does Mills, given stance on race and racism, use such a
conventional methodology, that does not account for, or in any way factor in race and
racisms, as the criteria for determining the legitimacy of special race-based
obligations.
This, I believe, is the hegemony of the unencumbered moral agent;
foundational to the liberal paradigm that draws us back to contingent cost analyses,
disconnected volunteerism, abstract self-respect, mythical memories and vacuos
solidarity. Such has been the dominance and resiliance of the liberal paradigm in
42
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Western philosophy since the enlightenment, it is more often than not taken for
granted. Indeed, any ideological framework that has been at the forefront of our
thinking and practice for four hundred years is bound to have a profound influence on
our thinking. It is perhaps only when we consider those philosophical problems that
have traditionally been excluded from mainstream philosophy, like racial and gender
inequality, that the limitations of an unencumbered self become apparent. In any
case, the challenge of philosophy, indeed the thrill of it is to overcome such
theoretical blocks, so one can appreciate the tendancy to remian within a framework
that has at its core the very principles those who aim to challenge oppression must
keep sight of.
Indeed, let us consider briefly some likely concerns or objections to these
claims about an encumbered self. How can we relinquish the liberal ideals that fall
out of the unencumbered conception of self? If we don‟t hold the values of freedom
and eqality as objective moral ideals, we open the door to those who hold white
supremacy as their hypergood. I absolutely agree to the point that some conception of
freedom and eqality must be at the heart of any democratic and pluralistic society.
That being said, I do not agree that this confines s to an unencmbered model of human
agency. It appears to me quite possible, indeed necessary, to keep freedom and
equality as hypergoods, particlarly given the aim if to elliminate racial injustice.
However, our formulation of these concepts must change. For insofar as freedom is
conceived of disconnection and equality means we cannot make claims about which
versions of the good are morally higher or lower than others we do indeed run the risk
of permitting white supremacy to be the meta-moral frameowrk that continues to
infiltrate our social structures and influence our moral reasoning. At present, we
don‟t have the new language and concepts we require to interpret freedom and eqality
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such that they are compatible with how humans are in the world and so the risk of
moving away from a paradigm we know so well is great. But, I believe a proverbial
leap of faith is required, because we cannot forge a better understanding of human
agency and what it means for encmbered agents to be free and equal unless we begin
by acknowledging that we are. This recognition will allows us to grapple more
effectively with our ow moral falability.
With regard to the person who holds white supremacy as a hypergood, the
encumbered framework, allows us to take a different approach to their prejudices.
Instead of being reqired to remain neutral about their morally problematic attitudes,
we can question the extent to which their interpretations are compatible with their
other hypergoods and indeed with what they take to be their original prpose. More
importantly, we can enquire about the kind of society such attitudes constitute and
whether this society is consistent with our overarching principles of freedom and
eqality. This is not to naively suggest that a person who holds white supremacy as a
hypergood will suddenly revise their oppinions. However, in recognising the
encmbered nature of moral agency, we can now explore the historical, social, cultral
and personal factors that were the breeding ground for a philosophy of white
superiority. We can enquire in what sense and why these views have become so
important to that person‟s sense of self. From this point we can in turn begin to
explore other ways in which such a person could derive self-worth that are not reliant
on the denigration of others. Similarly, we can also ask oppressed people which
historical, social, cultral and personal factors move them to resist. We can enquire in
what sense and why these views have become so important to that person‟s sense of
self. From this point we can in turn begin to explore ways in which such a person
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could arrive at the kind of ephiphany Buss described such that resisting oppression
gave a sense of achieving one‟s balance or living one‟s best self.
Yet, some might question, why should we accept that humans are connected in
the way an encumbered model of self sggests; surely people can and have been able to
separate their moral commitments from their notion of justice as the unencumbered
model claims? In this case we must turn to the empirical record, which simply
doesn‟t bear this claim out. The unencumbered conception of self, simply does not fit
with how people experiecne their lives nor does it fit with what we know about
human neuropsychology and psychology today. In the past three decades, there have
been incredible advances in these fields in areas that are fundamental to our
understanding of moral agency. The insights we have now about human emotions,
unconscious processing, the mechanics of brain function, neurological development,
moral reasoning and cognitive development and the relationship between all these
elements, simply were not available at the time the corner stones of an unencumbered
self and liberalism were emerging. Just as the enlightenment ushered in a whole new
understanding of the universe and the animals who inhabit it, which inevitably
impacted philosopher‟s metaphysical, epistemological and ethical understanding, so
again we are at a time where our understanding of human psychology has gone
through some radical changes. Again, our theory must respond to these changes. For
as we noted at the begining of this work, Thomas Hobbes rightly reasoned as he
penned the Leviathan, before we begin trying to set down a moral theory, we must
first understand human nature.43
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Conclusion
I do not believe human nature is as barbarous and destructive as Hobbes.
Perhaps this is a naive hope given the extent of the cruelty and chaos we can see
wrecking our planet. Even as I am writing the world is in turmoil and human beings
are destroying each other in the name of any characteristic that defines who we
understand ourselves to be; differences in politics, religion, race, culture, sexual
orientation, the list goes on. Somewhere along the line, we are not hearing each other.
Somewhere along the line, we are not listening to what really matters to people. In
this work, I have argued that one of the inhibitors to a new-found understanding of
how to deal with social injustice (specifically racisms as presented here) is the
prevailing conception of self in Anglo-American philosophy. A moral philosophy
that does not take racial consciousness and the lived experience as central to moral
agency will inevitably remain deaf to what really matters to us all.
Through a discussion of multiracial identity, I have tried to show that an
encumbered model of self is a preferable metaphysical starting point for theorizing
moral reasoning and collective responsibility. Indeed, I have argued that it is a
necessary philosophical shift for those who seek to eradicate racial injustice. To the
end, in chapter one, we looked at Tommy Shelby‟s unencumbered model of black
solidarity. In light of the reality of racial consciousness, I demonstrated was
embedded in British and U.S. society, we saw that an unencumbered conception of
black identity was untenable. Chapter two extended our understanding of the racial
consciousness by including conceptions of multiracial identity. While multiracial
identity is indeed part of the racial consciousness in the U.S. and Britain, I argued it
does not follow that we can or indeed should, formulate an unencumbered multiracial
ontology as Ronald Sundstrom aims to do. The pivotal issue for our analysis of both
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Shelby and Sundstrom is that racial consciousness and the lived experience of racisms
impact people‟s moral reasoning and moral motivation in a far more fundamental way
than the unencumbered conception of self permits. In this regard, I urged
philosophers grappling with racial justice to take seriously the extent to which racial
consciousness distorts our conceptions about the moral worth of raced persons and the
manner in which the lived experience makes it impossible to step outside one‟s social
context and engage in moral reasoning from an objective standpoint.
Chapter three presented an alternative conception of the self that seeks to
overcome the above theoretical obstacles. Drawing on Charles Taylor‟s purposeful
human agent, I presented an encumbered model of human agency that allows us to
theorize moral agency in a manner that is consistent with what we understand about
human behavior in the context of racial injustice. Recognition of our encumberedness
enables us to theorize the link between our identities, values and hypergoods such that
we understand our moral evaluations as constitutive of the self and as we see in
chapter four, of social reality also. Rather than talk about injustice in terms of blame
and obligations, the encumbered model of human agency enables us to understand the
power of our own articulations, actions and behaviors, such that we can constitute the
society we hope for. More importantly, it provides the framework for rejecting
essentialized notions of racial identity and instead recognizes racial identities in virtue
of their psychological impact on moral reasoning.
Given the above conception, the emphasis on the social nature of language and
its role in moral agency, coupled with our understanding of racial consciousness and
raced persons‟ lived experience further provides the tools to theorize the connectivity
between persons who could be described as multiracial and persons who could be
described as black. As we see through the lived experiences of our multiracial
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archetypes in chapter four, it is not possible to escape being raced or the moral
connection to other raced persons. One‟s articulations, actions and behaviors always
impact the racial consciousness. Moreover, insofar as there is a racial consciousness,
are always interpreted at the level of the group, which invariably includes and impacts
other raced persons. In this regard, I contend discussions of multiracial ontology are
essentially diversions from the more fundamental challenge of ending racial injustice.
For whether one is publically recognized as multiracial, mixed raced, or any other
label that seeks to complicate the one-drop rule conception of blackness, where white
supremacy infiltrates racial consciousness the problematic is the presumed inferiority
of all raced persons against that non-raced norm. This is not to suggest that we
should accept gross simplifications and generalizations of black persons; narrow and
overly simplistic conceptions of raced persons are the foundation of racial
consciousness and racial injustice, hence the significance of theorizing racial
identities in the manner I suggest. Essentializing notions of race that refuse to
acknowledge raced persons‟ lived experience and the racial consciousness,
consequently, fail to appreciate how these factors impact all persons‟ moral reasoning.
The moral ought here is that we should take the lived experience as more fundamental
to our understanding of moral agency that we currently do. However, in doing so we
shall have to revisit the relationship between raced persons. Thus, I further contend
that persons with multiracial identities and black identities are morally connected in a
manner that makes claims on their collective responsibilities.
In chapter five, I argue that it is the commitment to an unencumbered model of
self that makes such notions of collective responsibility so difficult to theorize, even
for those esteemed philosophers genuinely engaged in the pursuit of racial justice. As
long as the metaphysical presumption is one of moral abstraction, human connectivity
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will always be bound by notions of voluntarism such that moral obligations are
„special‟ and moral agency reduced to a cost analysis. My hope is that given the
fruitlessness of this dependency on an unencumbered self, we are willing to explore
the possibility of an alternative model of agency that enables us to challenge the most
pressing moral problems of our time, like racial injustice. As long as we are
committed to freedom, equality and pluralism, I believe we must take this course of
action.
If we take an encumbered model of self as our starting point, we open up new
lines of philosophical enquiry in areas such as racial justice, collective responsibility
and moral agency more generally. We can, as I intend to do, being to develop new
models of agency that incorporate our new understanding of human psychology and
the lived experience into our moral theories. Moreover, we can begin to understand
racial identities and talk about the reality of racial injustice in a manner that doesn‟t
reify racial categories and buttress racial consciousness.
Ultimately, I would like to develop a model of moral reasoning and moral
motivation that provides a framework from which we can effectively challenge all
forms of group level oppression, which is also compatible with how people
experience oppression and indeed their own sense of morality. Such a model must
understand the connectivity among moral agents but also what motivates people to
respect other people in practice as well as theory. An encumbered model of self that
would underpin such a conception of moral reasoning and collective responsibility
obviously has implications for our conception of the fundamental values of liberty we
hold like freedom and equality. Indeed, in my future research projects I intend to
analyze what a conception of freedom and equality would look like on an encumbered
model of self in the hope that we can account for both the sense in which we are

197

aware of making individual choices, but also the sense we have of being connected to
other people in ways that are fundamentally important to us as human beings.
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